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PROLOGUE 
It is 1948. I am sitting in a kindergarten classroom at the Dalton 
School, a fashionable and progressive New York City private school. 
My parents, both products of a segregated Mississippi school system, 
have come to New York to attend graduate and professional school. 
They have enrolled me and my sisters here at Dalton to avoid sending 
us to the public school in our neighborhood where the vast majority of 
the students are black and poor. They want us to escape the ravages of 
segregation, New York style. 
It is circle time in the five-year old group, and the teacher is reading 
us a book. As she reads, she passes the book around the circle so that 
each of us can see the illustrations. The book's title is Little Black Sambo. 
Looking back, I remember only one part of the story, one illustration: 
Little Black Sambo is running around a stack of pancakes with a tiger 
chasing him. He is very black and has a minstrel's white mouth. His 
hair is tied up in many pigtails, each pigtail tied with a different color 
ribbon. I have seen the picture before the book reaches my place in the 
circle. I have heard the teacher read the "comical" text describing 
Sambo's plight and have heard the laughter of my classmates. There is 
a knot in the pit of my stomach. I feel panic and shame. I do not have 
the words to articulate my feelings-words like "stereotype" and 
"stigma" that might help cathart the shame and place it outside of me 
where it began. But I am slowly realizing that, as the only black child in 
the circle, I have some kinship with the tragic and ugly hero of this 
story-that my classmates are laughing at me as well as at him. I wish I 
could laugh along with my friends. I wish I could disappear. 
I am in a vacant lot next to my house with black friends from the 
neighborhood. We are listening to Amos and Andy on a small radio and 
laughing uproariously. My father comes out and turns off the radio. 
He reminds me that he disapproves of this show that pokes fun at Ne-
groes. I feel bad-less from my father's reprimand than from a sense 
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that I have betrayed him and myself, that I have joined my classmates in 
laughing at us. 
I am certain that my kindergarten teacher was not intentionally ra-
cist in choosing Little Black Sambo. I knew even then, from a child's intu-
itive sense, that she was a good, well-meaning person. A less benign 
combination of racial mockery and profit motivated the white men who 
produced the radio show and played the roles of Amos and Andy. But 
we who hadjoined their conspiracy by our laughter had not intended to 
demean our race. 
A dozen years later I am a student at Haverford College. Again, I 
am a token black presence in a white world. A companion whose face 
and name I can't remember seeks to compliment me by saying, "I don't 
think of you as a Negro." I understand his benign intention and accept 
the compliment. But the knot is in my stomach again. Once again, I 
have betrayed myself. 
This happened to me more than a few times. Each time my interloc-
utor was a good, liberal, white person who intended to express feelings 
of shared humanity. I did not yet understand the racist implications of 
the way in which the feelings were conceptualized. I am certain that my 
white friends did not either. We had not yet grasped the compliment's 
underlying premise: To be thought of as a Negro is to be thought of as 
less than human. We were all victims of our culture's racism. We had 
all grown up on Little Black Sambo and Amos and Andy. 
Another ten years pass. I am thirty-three. My daughter, Maia, is 
three. I greet a pink-faced, four-year old boy on the steps of her nurs-
ery school. He proudly presents me with a book he has brought for his 
teacher to read to the class. "It's my favorite," he says. The book is a 
new edition of Little Black Sambo. 
INTRODUCTION 
This article reconsiders the doctrine of discriminatory purpose that 
was established by the 1976 decision, Washington v. Davis. l This now 
well-established doctrine requires plaintiffs challenging the constitu-
tionality of a facially neutral law to prove a racially discriminatory pur-
pose on the part of those responsible for the law's enactment or 
administration.2 
1. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
2. E.g., Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985). In Hunter, the Court detennined 
that a provision in the Alabama Constitution disenfrachising persons convicted of crimes in-
volving moral turpitude violated the equal protection clause. Even though the provision was 
racially neutral on its face, its original enactment was motivated by a desire to discriminate 
against blacks, and it had had a racially discriminatory impact since its adoption. The Court 
reaffinned the doctrine that "[p ]roof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required to 
show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause." [d. at 226 (citing Village of Arlington 
Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-65 (1977». A LEXIS search in 
October of 1986 found 38 cases that cite Davis for the principle that proof of discriminatory 
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Davis has spawned a considerable body ofliterature treating its mer-
its and failings.s Minorities and civil rights advocates have been virtu-
ally unanimous in condemning Davis and its progeny.4 They have been 
joined by a significant number of constitutional scholars who have been 
equally disapproving, if more restrained, in assessing its damage to the 
cause of equal opportunity.5 These critics advance two principal argu-
ments. The first is that a motive-centered doctrine of racial discrimina-
tion places a very heavy, and often impossible, burden of persuasion on 
the wrong side of the dispute.6 Improper motives are easy to hide. 
And because behavior results from the interaction of a multitude of 
motives, governmental officials will always be able to argue that racially 
neutral considerations prompted their actions. Moreover, where sev-
eral decisionmakers are involved, proof of racially discriminatory moti-
vation is even more difficult. 
The second objection to the Davis doctrine is more fundamental. It 
argues that the injury of racial inequality exists irrespective of the deci-
sionmakers' motives. Does the black child in a segregated school expe-
rience less stigma and humiliation because the local school board did 
not consciously set out to harm her? Are blacks less prisoners of the 
ghetto because the decision that excludes them from an all-white neigh-
borhood was made with property values and not race in mind? Those 
who make this second objection reason that the "facts of racial inequal-
intent is necessary when disproportionate impact results from facially neutral governmental 
action. 
3. See, e.g., Bell, Foreword: EqlUll Employment Law and the Continuing Need for Self-Help, 8 
Loy. U. CHI. LJ. 681 (1977); Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimina-
tion Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REv. 1049 (1978); Karst, Fore-
word: EqlUll Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1977); Reiter, 
Compensating for Race or National Origin in Employment Testing, 8 Loy. U. CHI. LJ. 687 (1977); 
Schwemm, From Washington to Arlington Heights and Beyond: Discriminatory Purpose in EqlUll 
Protection Litigation, 1977 U. ILL. L.F. 961; see also Colloquium on Legislative and Administrative Moti-
vation in Constitutional Law, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 925 (1978) (colloquium containing ten arti-
cles discussing motivation theory). 
4. See Lewin, Trivializing Discrimination, NEW REPUBUC, Apr. 2, 1977, at 19; The Court's 
Purpose-and Effect, N.Y. Times, Jan. 15, 1977, at 20, col. 1; see also Dreyfus, The New Racism, 
BLACK ENTERPRIsE,Jan. I, 1978, at 41; Hall, Exclusionary Zoning-City of Memphis v. Greene, 8 
BLACK LJ. 138 (1983) (student author); Perka, Racially Disproportionate Impact of Facially Neutral 
Practices-What Approach Under 42 U.S.C. Sections 1981 and 1982'1, 1977 DUKE LJ. 1267 (student 
author); Schnapper, Two Categories of Discriminatory Intent, 17 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 31 
(1982); note 3 supra. 
5. See Karst, The Costs of Motive-Centered Inquiry, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1163 (1978); 
Schwemm, supra note 3; see also Eisenberg, Disproportionate Impact and Illicit Motive: Theories of 
Constitutional Adjudication, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 36 (1977); Perry, The Disproportionate Impact Theory 
of Racial Discrimination, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 540 (1977); Weinzweig, Discriminatory Impact and 
Intent Under the EqlUll Protection Clause: The Supreme Court and the Mind-Body Problem, 1 LAw & 
INEQ.,uALITY 277 (1983). 
6. Professor Ely, the motive test's first advocate, recently expressed concern that the 
effect of the Supreme Court's use of the test "has been in each case to deny the constitutional 
claim." Ely, The Centrality and Limits of Motivation Analysis, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1155, 1160 
(1978); see also Karst, supra note 5, at 1165; Simon, Racially Prejudiced Governmental Actions: A 
Motivation Theory of the Constitutional Ban Against Racial Discrimination, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
1041, 1097-107 (1978). 
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ity are the real problem."7 They urge that racially disproportionate 
harm should trigger heightened judicial scrutiny without consideration 
ofmotive.8 
Supporters of the intent requirement are equally adamant in assert-
ing the doctrine's propriety.9 They echo the four main arguments that 
the Court itself set forth in Davis: (1) A standard that would subject all 
governmental action with a racially disproportionate impact to strict ju-
dicial scrutiny would cost too much; such a standard, the Court argues, 
would substantially limit legitimate legislative decisionmaking and 
would endanger the validity of a "whole range of [existing] tax, welfare, 
public service, regulatory and licensing statutes";10 (2) a disproportion-
ate impact standard would make innocent people bear the costs of rem-
edying a harm in which they played no part;ll (3) an impact test would 
be inconsistent with equal protection values, because the judicial deci-
sionmaker would have to explicitly consider race;12 and (4) it would be 
inappropriate for the judiciary to choose to remedy the racially dispro-
portionate impact of otherwise neutral governmental actions at the ex-
7. Karst, supra note 5, at 1165. A related argument notes that prior intentional discrimi-
nation can produce current deprivation even without a present intent to discriminate. Wash-
ington v. Davis itself provides an excellent example. In Davis, blacks' poor performance on the 
civil service written exam could be traced directly to the history of intentional discrimination 
in the city's segregated school system. See Lawrence, 'Justice" or 'Just Us": Racism and the Role 
of Ideology (Book Review), 35 STAN. L. REV. 831, 849 n.69 (1983). Furthermore, the "dispro-
portionate absence of minorities from certain positions-whether or not itself the result of 
racial discrimination-may produce discrimination in other areas." Brest, Foreword: In Defense 
of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1, 43 (1976). Brest notes that the Court's 
special concern for minority voting rights reflects the belief that uneven voting power, even if 
it results from unintentional acts, produces discrimination in other areas and justifies judicial 
resort to a pure impact test. !d. at 43, 44. 
8. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 5, at 57 (proposing a "causation" theory under which 
strict scrutiny would be triggered, regardless of motive, whenever disproportionate impact 
was "reasonably attributable to race"). 
9. See Bennett, "Mere" Rationality in Constitutional Law: Judicial Review and Democratic The-
ory, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 1049, 1076 (1979); Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitu-
tional Law, 79 YALE LJ. 1205 (1970); Miller, Proof of Racially Discriminatory Purpose Under the 
Equal Protection Clause, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 725, 738-39 (1977) (student author). 
10. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 248 & n.14 (1976) (citing Goodman, De Facto 
School Segregation: A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis, 60 CALIF. L. REv. 275, 300 (1972»; see 
also Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (arguing constitutionality oflimiting welfare 
to AFDC recipients relative to what other equally needy families receive); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 
372 U.S. 726, 726-27 (1963) (upholding state's power to limit "the business of debt adjust-
ing" to those in "the lawful practice of law"); Brest, supra note 7, at 11, 29. 
11. The Court has noted that invalidating a decision because of its disproportionate im-
pact would often be a remedy disproportionate to the decisionmakers' presumably racially 
neutral act. See Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 293-94 (1976); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 
717,738,744-45 (1974). Justice White has also argued that an impact approach would grant 
rights to individuals as members of groups which they do not have as individuals under the 
equal protection clause: No individual who failed a racially neutral employment test could 
claim a denial of his equal protection rights whatever his race. Davis, 426 U.S. at 245-46. 
12. See Ely, supra note 9, at 1258-59; Kaplan, Segregation Litigation and the Schools-Part II: 
The General Northern Problem, 58 Nw. U.L. REV. 157, 188 (1963). But if. Eisenberg, supra note 5, 
at 84-85 (citing Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 723, 
734-36 (1974» (arguing that the costs to minorities of not considering disproportionate im-
pact far outweigh the risks in explicitly considering race). 
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pense of other legitimate social interests. I3 
My own sympathies lie with the critics of the doctrine of discrimina-
tory purpose. The problems posed by a disproportionate impact stan-
dard do not seem insurmountable. I4 And none of the current 
doctrine's proponents explain why it is important to search for bad mo-
tives or why such a search is the only alternative to an impact test. But I 
do not intend to simply add another chapter to the intent/impact de-
bate. Rather, I wish to suggest another way to think about racial dis-
crimination, a way that more accurately describes both its origins and 
the nature of the injury it inflicts. 
Much of one's inability to know racial discrimination when one sees 
it results from a failure to recognize that racism is both a crime and a 
disease. IS This failure is compounded by a reluctance to admit that the 
illness of racism infects almost everyone. I6 Acknowledging and under-
standing the malignancy are prerequisites to the discovery of an appro-
priate cure. But the diagnosis is difficult, because our own 
contamination with the very illness for which a cure is sought impairs 
our comprehension of the disorder. 
Scholarly and judicial efforts to explain the constitutional signifi-
cance of disproportionate impact and governmental motive in cases al-
leging racial discrimination treat these two categories as mutually 
exclusive. That is, while disproportionate impact may be evidence of 
racially discriminatory motive, 17 whether impact or motive is the appro-
priate focus is normally posed in the alternative: Should racially dis-
proportionate impact, standing alone, trigger a heightened level of 
judicial scrutiny? Or, should the judiciary apply a deferential standard 
to legislative and administrative decisions absent proof that the deci-
13. Brest, supra note 7, at 47-48. Brest argues that the judiciary could not administer a 
general doctrine disfavoring harmful results. Id. at II; see also Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protec-
tion Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107 (1976) (recognizing possible institutional limitations on 
the judiciary but arguing for a "group-disadvantage" equal protection test). 
14. Karst and Horowitz note that many of the problems posed by the disproportionate 
impact test grow out of the Court's continuing adherence to a two-tiered equal protection 
analysis: "If the two-tier analysis was designed to soothe the Court's critics, it utterly failed to 
achieve its purpose. One reason for this failure is that in focusing on the standards of review, 
the Court gave insufficient attention to matters of substance." Karst & Horowitz, The Bakke 
Opinions and Equal Protection Doctrine, 14 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 7, 24 (1979); see also Eisen-
berg, supra note 5, at 58-75 (proposing a new equal protection test, the causation principle, 
under which evidence of prior race-dependent decisions that proximately caused present dis-
parate impact would compel heightened judicial scrutiny). 
15. "Immorality" and "criminality" are thought of in terms of blameworthiness. In con-
trast, Chester Pierce, a black psychiatrist, has described racism as a "public health problem." 
Pierce, Psychiatric Problems of Black Minority, in 2 AMERICAN HANDBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 512,513 
(G. Caplan 2d ed. 1974); see also Butts, White Racism: Its Origins, Institutions, and the Implications 
for Professional Practice in Mental Health, 8 INT'LJ. PSYCHIATRY 914 (1969); notes 47-54 infra and 
accompanying text. 
16. See Lawrence, supra note 7; notes 47-54 infra and accompanying text. 
17. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 
(1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241 (1976). 
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sionmakers intended a racial consequence?18 Put another way, 
the Court thinks of facially neutral actions as either intentionally 
and unconstitutionally or unintentionally and constitutionally 
discriminatory. 19 
I argue that this is a false dichotomy. Traditional notions ofintent20 
do not reflect the fact that decisions about racial matters are influenced 
in large part by factors that can be characterized as neither inten-
tional-in the sense that certain outcomes are self-consciously sought-
nor unintentional-in the sense that the outcomes are random, fortui-
tous, and uninfluenced by the decisionmaker's beliefs, desires, and 
wishes. 
Americans share a common historical and cultural heritage in which 
racism has played and still plays a dominant role.21 Because of this 
shared experience, we also inevitably share many ideas, attitudes, and 
beliefs that attach significance to an individual's race and induce nega-
tive feelings and opinions about nonwhites. To the extent that this cul-
tural belief system has influenced all of us, we are all racists. At the 
same time, most of us are unaware of our racism. We do not recognize 
the ways in which our cultural experience has influenced our beliefs 
about race or the occasions on which those beliefs affect our actions. In 
other words, a large part of the behavior that produces racial discrimi-
nation is influenced by unconscious racial motivation.22 
There are two explanations for the unconscious nature of our ra-
cially discriminatory beliefs and ideas. First, Freudian theory states that 
the human mind defends itself against the discomfort of guilt by deny-
ing or refusing to recognize those ideas, wishes, and beliefs that conflict 
with what the individual has learned is good or right. While our his tori-
18. See notes 5, 9 supra. 
19. See Eisenberg, supra note 5, at 41. 
20. There is no constitutionally significant difference between intent, purpose, and mo-
tive. Id.; see also Weinzweig, supra note 5, at 305-08 (while the meaning of motive, intention, 
and purpose overlap, the concepts should not be confiated). 
21. See D. BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAw (2d ed. 1980); L. BENNETr, BEFORE 
THE MAYFLOWER (5th ed. 1982);j. FRANKLIN, FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM (5th ed. 1980); V. 
HARDING, THERE Is A RIVER (1981); A. HIGGINBOTHAM, IN THE MATTER OF COLOR (1978);j. 
KOVEL, WHITE RACISM: A PSYCHOHISTORY (1970); M. MARABLE, BLACK AMERICAN POLITICS: 
FROM THE WASHINGTON MARCHES-jESSE JACKSON (1985); Delgado, Wonls That Wound: A Tort 
Action for Racial Insults, Epithets and Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133, 135-43 
(1982). 
22. The role of the unconscious in gender discrimination is beyond the scope of this 
article. It should be apparent, however, that much of my analysis is applicable to unconscious 
sexism and the Supreme Court's use of the Davis doctrine in cases of alleged gender discrimi-
nation. See Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979). For a thoughtful discussion of 
Feeney and the intent requirement in gender discrimination cases, see \Veinzweig, supra note 5, 
at 277-322. 
It has been argued that sexism is even more deeply imbedded in our culture than racism 
and, thus, less visible. See, e.g., Wasserstrom, Racism, Sexism, and Preferential Treatment: An Ap-
proach to the Topics, 24 UCLA L. REV. 581, 590 (1977). But Wasserstrom also notes that sexism 
is "less unequivocally regarded as unjust and unjustifiable." Id. This would indicate that until 
the dominant ideology wholly rejects sexism, sexist attitudes may be repressed and held at an 
unconscious level less often than racist attitudes. 
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cal experience has made racism an integral part of our culture, our soci-
ety has more recently embraced an ideal that rejects racism as immoral. 
When an individual experiences conflict between racist ideas and the 
societal ethic that condemns those ideas, the mind excludes his racism 
from consciousness.23 
Second, the theory of cognitive psychology states that the culture-
including, for example, the media and an individual's parents, peers, 
and authority figures-transmits certain beliefs and preferences. Be-
cause these beliefs are so much a part of the culture, they are not exper-
ienced as explicit lessons. Instead, they seem part of the individual's 
rational ordering of her perceptions of the world.24 The individual is 
unaware, for example, that the ubiquitous presence of a cultural stereo-
type has influenced her perception that blacks are lazy or unintelligent. 
Because racism is so deeply ingrained in our culture, it is likely to be 
transmitted by tacit understandings: Even if a child is not told that 
blacks are inferior, he learns that lesson by observing the behavior of 
others. These tacit understandings, because they have never been ar-
ticulated, are less likely to be experienced at a conscious level. 
In short, requiring proof of conscious or intentional motivation as a 
prerequisite to constitutional recognition that a decision is race-depen-
dent25 ignores much of what we understand about how the human 
mind works. It also disregards both the irrationality of racism and the 
profound effect that the history of American race relations has had on 
the individual and collective unconscious.26 
It may often be appropriate for the legal system to disregard the 
influence of the unconscious on individual or collective behavior. But 
where the goal is the eradication of invidious racial discrimination, the 
law must recognize racism's primary source. The equal protection 
clause requires the elimination of governmental decisions that take race 
into account without good and important reasons. Therefore, equal 
protection doctrine must find a way to come to grips with unconscious 
racism. 
23. See notes 55-75 infra and accompanying text; see also Delgado, Dunn, Brown, Lee & 
Hubbert, Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 
1985 WIS. L. REV. 1359 (conflict between racist impulses and formal egalitarian creed a 
source of prejudice in adjudication). 
24. See notes 76-91 infra and accompanying text. 
25. See note 162 infra. 
26. In using the term "collective unconscious," I refer to the collection of widely shared 
individual memories, beliefs, and understandings that exist in the mind at a nonreporting 
level. This nonreporting mental activity is widely shared because individuals who live within 
the same culture share common developmental experiences. This use of the term "collective 
unconscious" is to be distinguished fromJung's "collective unconscious," which he described 
as that part of the psyche that retains and transmits the common psychological inheritance of 
humankind. Henderson, Ancient Myths and Modem Man, in MAN AND HIS SYMBOLS 104, 107 (C. 
Jung ed. 1964). It should also be distinguished from Freud's "archaic remnants," whichJung 
described as "mental forms whose presence cannot be explained by anything in the individ-
ual's own life [and] which seem to be aboriginal, innate, and inherited shapes of the human 
mind." Jung, Approaching the Unconscious, in MAN AND HIS SYMBOLS, supra, at 18,67. 
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In pursuit of that goal, this article proposes a new test to trigger 
judicial recognition of race-based behavior. It posits a connection be-
tween unconscious racism and the existence of cultural symbols that 
have racial meaning. It suggests that the "cultural meaning"27 of an 
allegedly racially discriminatory act is the best available analogue for, 
and evidence of, a collective unconscious that we cannot observe di-
rectly. This test would thus evaluate governmental conduct to deter-
mine whether it conveys a symbolic message to which the culture 
attaches racial significance. A finding that the culture thinks of an alleg-
edly discriminatory governmental action in racial terms would also con-
stitute a finding regarding the beliefs and motivations of the 
governmental actors: The actors are themselves part of the culture and 
presumably could not have acted without being influenced by racial 
considerations, even if they are unaware of their racist beliefs. There-
fore, the court would apply strict scrutiny. 
This proposal is relatively modest. It does not abandon the judicial 
search for unconstitutional motives, nor does it argue that all govern-
mental action with discriminatory impact should be strictly scrutinized. 
Instead, it urges a more complete understanding of the nature of 
human motivation. While it is grounded in the Court's present focus 
on individual responsibility, it seeks to understand individual responsi-
bility in light of modem insights into human personality and collective 
behavior. In addition, this proposal responds directly to the concern 
that abandoning the Washington v. Davis doctrine will invalidate a broad 
range of legitimate, race-neutral governmental actions.28 By identify-
ing those cases where race unconsciously influences governmental ac-
tion, this new test leaves untouched nonrace-dependent decisions that 
disproportionately burden blacks only because they are over-
represented or underrepresented among the decision's targets or 
beneficiaries.29 
This effort to inform the discriminatory intent requirement with the 
learning of twentieth century psychology is important for at least three 
reasons. First, the present doctrine, by requiring proof that the defend-
ant was aware of his animus against blacks, severely limits the number 
of individual cases in which the courts will acknowledge and remedy 
racial discrimination. 
Second, the existing intent requirement's assignment of individual-
ized fault or responsibility for the existence of racial discrimination dis-
torts our perceptions about the causes of discrimination and leads us to 
think about racism in a way that advances the disease rather than com-
batting it. By insisting that a blameworthy perpetrator be found before 
the existence of racial discrimination can be acknowledged, the Court 
27. See notes 176-296 infra and accompanying text. 
28. See note 10 supra. 
29. See notes 225-228 infra and accompanying text. 
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creates an imaginary world where discrimination does not exist unless 
it was consciously intended. And by acting as if this imaginary world 
was real and insisting that we participate in this fantasy, the Court and 
the law it promulgates subtly shape our perceptions of society.30 The 
decision to deny relief no longer finds its basis only in raw political 
power or economic self-interest; it is now justifiable on moral grounds. 
If there is no discrimination, there is no need for a remedy; if blacks are 
being treated fairly yet remain at the bottom of the socioeconomic lad-
der, only their own inferiority can explain their subordinate position. 
Finally, the intent doctrine's focus on the narrowest and most un-
realistic understanding of individual fault has also engendered much of 
the resistance to and resentment of affirmative action programs and 
other race-conscious remedies for past and continuing discrimina-
tion.31 If there can be no discrimination without an identifiable crimi-
nal, then "innocent" individuals will resent the burden of remedying an 
injury for which the law says they are not responsible.32 Understanding 
the cultural source of our racism obviates the need for fault, as tradi-
tionally conceived, without denying our collective responsibility for ra-
30. Several critical commentators have described the process by which law transmits ide-
ological imagery that helps to preserve and legitimize existing power relationships. Those in 
power use the legal system to achieve results in individual legal disputes that maintain the 
status quo. What is less obvious, but perhaps more important, is the use of legal ideas to 
create and transmit utopian images that serve to justify that status quo. By representing real-
ity in ideal terms, the law validates the socioeconomic setting in which legal decisions are 
made. The ideological imagery masks or denies the reality of oppressive or alienating social 
and economic relations and persuades us that they are fair. See, e.g., D. HAy, P. LINEBAUGH,J. 
RULE, E. THOMPSON & C. WINSLOW, ALBION'S FATAL TREE (1975); Delgado, The Imperial 
Scholar: Reflections on a Review oj Civil Rights Literature, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 561, 568-77 (1984); 
Freeman, supra note 3; Gabel & Feinman, Contract Law as Ideowgy, in THE POLITICS OF LAw: A 
PROGRESSIVE CRmQ.UE 172 (D. Kairys ed. 1982); Gordon, New Developments in Legal Theory, in 
THE POLmcs OF LAw: A PROGRESSIVE CRmQ.UE, supra, at 281; Kennedy, The Structure oj Black-
stone's Commentaries, 28 BUFFALO L. REV. 205 (1979); Lawrence, supra note 7; Wildman, The 
Legitimation of Sex Discrimination: A Critical Response to Supreme Court Jurisprudence, 63 OR. L. REV. 
265 (1984). 
31. When the intent requirement produces a finding of no constitutional injury, this 
finding is generalized to mean that no actual injury has occurred. Subsequently, when race-
conscious affirmative action programs are introduced, the resentment of the white individual 
who is displaced increases, because she has seen no injury that requires a cure. She perceives 
the race-conscious remedy as an unfair gift or bonus-as "reverse discrimination" favoring 
blacks who have been no more disadvantaged than she. See, e.g., N. GLAZER, AFFIRMATIVE 
DISCRIMINATION: ETHNIC INEQ.UALITY AND PUBLIC POLICY (1975); 1. KRAFT, DEFUNIS v. ODE-
GAARD: RACE, MERrr, AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1976); R. O'NEIL, DISCRIMINATING 
AGAINST DISCRIMINATION (1975). Freeman writes: 
The fault concept gives rise to a complacency about one's own moral status; it cre-
ates a class of "innocents," who need not feel any personal responsibility for the 
conditions associated with discrimination, and who therefore feel great resentment 
when called upon to bear any burdens in connection with remedying violations. This 
resentment accounts for much of the ferocity surrounding the debate about so-called 
"reverse" discrimination, for being called on to bear burdens ordinarily imposed 
only upon the guilty involves an apparently unjustified stigmatization of those led by 
the fault notion to believe in their own innocence. 
Freeman, supra note 3, at 1055. 
32. See Delgado, supra note 30, at 567-76; Karst, supra note 5. 
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cism's eradication. We cannot be individually blamed for 
unconsciously harboring attitudes that are inescapable in a culture per-
meated with racism. And without the necessity for blame, our resist-
ance to accepting the need and responsibility for remedy will be 
lessened.33 
Understanding unconscious motivation will also help us compre-
hend and combat the hegemony of the ideology of equal opportunity. 
A considerable body of scholarship from the academic left has analyzed 
the law as a hegemonic tool of domination.34 According to one theory, 
domination occurs when the ruling class gains the consent of the domi-
nated classes through a system of ideas that reinforces the morality or 
inevitability of the existing order. This "interest theory" sees ideology 
as a consciously wielded weapon, an intellectual tool that a group uses 
to enhance its political power by institutionalizing a particular view of 
reality.35 
Another view of ideology draws upon the theories of unconscious 
motivation discussed in this article. Under this view, ideology is a de-
fense mechanism against the anxiety felt by those who hold power 
through means and with motives that they cannot comfortably acknowl-
edge.36 This "strain theory" explains ideology as a response to the 
strains that an individual's or a group's social role or position creates. 
Ideology "provides a 'symbolic oudet' for emotional disturbances gen-
erated by social disequilibrium";37 it enables privileged individuals to 
continue practices they would otherwise condemn and in which their 
own complicity would be painful to admit. 
This understanding of ideology provides valuable insight into the 
seductive powers of the ideology of equal opportunity as well as into 
our resistance to abandoning one of its most critical conceptual images: 
the intent requirement. It reconciles the observation that antidis-
crimination law has consistendy operated not so much in the interests 
of blacks as in that of white elites with the seemingly conflicting experi-
ence that white men in positions of power have often acted and theo-
33. See Karst, supra note 5, at 1165-66. 
34. See generally THE POLITICS OF LAw, supra note 30. 
35. This view is implicit in most of the leftist scholarship. See C. GEERTZ, Ideology As a 
Cultural System, in THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 201-02 (1973). 
36. Id. at 201, 203-04. 
37. 
"Ideology is a patterned reaction to the patterned strains of social role." It provides 
a "symbolic outlet" for emotional disturbances generated by social disequilibrium. 
And as one can assume that such disturbances are, at least in a general way, common 
to all or most occupants of a given role or social position, so ideological reactions to 
the disturbances will tend to be similar, a similarity only reinforced by the presumed 
commonalities in "basic personality structure" among members of a particular cul-
ture, class, or occupational category. 
/d. at 204 (quoting F. SurrON, S. HARRIS, C. KAYSEN & J. TOBIN, THE AMERICAN BUSINESS 
CREED 307-08 (1956». 
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rized with benign motives.38 Strain theory recognizes that no ideology 
of equal opportunity contrived through conscious manipulation can de-
lude its purveyors as powerfully as one that arises by the process of self-
mystification. The purveyors of this ideology, unlike charlatans, are 
themselves deluded. 
This article is divided into four parts. Each part considers an antici-
pated challenge to my thesis and responds to that concern. The con-
cerns are as follows: (1) What evidence is there of unconscious racism? 
(2) Even if unconscious racism exists, why should we recognize it in 
interpreting and applying the equal protection clause? (3) Given our 
inability to psychoanalyze individual or collective governmental deci-
sionmakers, how do we identify unconscious racism and apply it in spe-
cific cases? (4) If we cannot hold the unconscious discriminator 
responsible (since he has not engaged in a blameworthy act), is there a 
neutral principle that justifies heightened judicial scrutiny of his polit-
ical decisions? 
Part I explores the relationship between the unconscious and ra-
cially discriminatory practices.39 It explains why a legal theory that 
seeks to remove racial prejudice from governmental decisionmaking 
must acknowledge and incorporate what is known about unconscious 
motivation. This part introduces two theoretical explanations of un-
conscious motivation which demonstrate our considerable, if incom-
plete, understanding of this phenomenon. It then considers the special 
case of unconscious beliefs and attitudes about race. It observes that 
Americans share a historical experience that has resulted in individuals 
within the culture ubiquitously attaching a significance to race that is 
irrational and often outside their awareness. 
Part II examines two constitutional theories that justify the applica-
tion of heightened equal protection scrutiny to governmental decisions 
based on race.40 Each theory posits a distinct harm that equal protec-
tion's special sensitivity to racial classifications is intended to prevent or 
38. See Delgado, supra note 30, at 563·64; Lawrence, supra note 7, at 839·50. In another 
essay, I described the role of the unconscious in the creation oflegal ideology as follows: 
The ideology of equal opportunity has evolved through the collective efforts of aca· 
demics writing articles, politicians making speeches, and lawyers arguing andjudges 
deciding cases. These individuals tend to identifY with the socioeconomic order in 
which they hold privileged positions while at the same time feeling the tension be· 
tween the harsh realities of that order and their ideal images of themselves within 
that order. They would like to think of themselves as fair individuals who, by virtue 
of their hard work and superior talent, hold positions of influence in a just society. 
The natural response of the privileged individual confronted with this tension be· 
tween the real and the ideal is to resolve it by legitimizing the existing structure to 
himself. This self.mystification manifests itself in his legal arguments,judicial opin. 
ions, or theoretical discussions, which in turn become part of a defense mechanism 
that extends beyond the individual. 
Id. at 842-43; see also notes 323·327 infra and accompanying text. 
39. See notes 46·111 infra and accompanying text. 
40. These are the "process defect theory" and the "stigma theory." See notes 112·176 
infra and accompanying text. 
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eliminate. In asking whether and why the intent of the decisionmaker is 
important to the fulfillment of each of these rationales, one discovers 
that the reasons given for determining the decisionmaker's self-con-
scious intent are better served when unconscious motive is also taken 
into account. 
Part III proposes a new test, the "cultural meaning" test, to trigger 
judicial recognition of race-based behavior.41 This part also addresses 
whether courts are competent to apply a test that asks them to consider 
the meaning of social phenomena. It notes that while the cultural 
meaning test may appear novel, it actually requires the courts to engage 
in a very ordinary kind of judicial activity, one analogous to the most 
basic of judicial tasks: the construction of texts.42 
Part III then examines how a court might apply the cultural mean-
ing test by exploring several cases in which the Supreme Court relied 
upon the intent/effect dichotomy and by discussing how this test might 
have made a difference in both approach and outcome.43 Both "easy" 
cases (where almost everyone will agree on the cultural meaning) and 
"hard" cases (where the cultural meaning will be controversial) are ex-
amined. I argue that the chief virtue of the cultural meaning test lies 
not in its ease of application but in its ability to focus our attention on 
the correct question: Have societal attitudes about race influenced the 
governmental actor's decision? 
Part IV argues that there are at least two normative principles that 
justify judicial intervention where unconscious racial motivation has 
been identified.44 The first is the right to due process, which I argue is 
infringed by both self-conscious and unconscious racism. The second 
is the antidiscrimination principle, which involves interpreting "funda-
mental moral values that are widely shared in our society.',,!5 I argue 
that these values and the principle that embodies them should be ex-
panded to include unconscious racism. 
I. "THY SPEECH MAKETH THEE MANIFEST": A PRIMER ON THE 
UNCONSCIOUS AND RACE 
We have found-that is we have been obliged to assume-that very 
powerful mental processes or ideas exist which can produce all the ef-
fects in mental life that ordinary ideas do (including effects that can in 
their tum become conscious as ideas), though they themselves do not 
become conscious.46 
41. See notes 177-187 infra and accompanying text. 
42. See notes 188-208 infra and accompanying text. 
43. See notes 209-291 infra and accompanying text. 
44. See notes 297-322 illfra and accompanying text. 
45. Brest, supra note 7, at 5. 
46. S. FREUD, THE EGO AND THE ID, in 19 THE STANDARD EDITION OF THE COMPLETE 
PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD 3 (J. Strachey ed. 1951) [hereinafter THE COM-
PLETE WORKS]. 
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A. Racism: A Public Health Problem 
Not every student of the human mind has agreed with Sigmund 
Freud's description of the unconscious, but few today would quarrel 
with the assertion that there is an unconscious-that there are mental 
processes of which we have no awareness that affect our actions and the 
ideas of which we are aware. There is a considerable, and by now well 
respected, body of knowledge and empirical research concerning the 
workings of the human psyche and the unconscious.47 Common sense 
tells us that we all act unwittingly on occasion. We have experienced 
slips of the tongue and said things we fully intended not to say,48 and 
we have had dreams in which we experienced such feelings as fear, de-
sire, and anger that we did not know we had. 
The law has, for the most part, refused to acknowledge what we 
have learned about the unconscious. Psychiatrists and psychologists 
are called to court to discuss the mental state of the criminal defendant 
or the suspected incompetent or to report on the mental pathology 
produced by an alleged tort, a neglectful parent, or the deprivation of a 
civil right.49 But in most other legal matters, students of the uncon-
scious are excluded, and we pretend that what they have learned is 
unknown. 
It is hardly surprising that lawyers resist recognizing theories that 
describe the effects of unknown forces on our lives. For the most part, 
this reluctance is appropriate. The law is our effort to rationalize our 
relationships with one another. It is a system through which we at-
tempt to define obligations and responsibilities. Denial of the irrational 
is part of that system, as is our notion that one should not be held re-
sponsible for any thoughts or motives of which one is unaware.50 
47. See generally L. BOURNE, PSYCHOLOGY: ITs PRINCIPLES AND MEANINGS (1985); E. ERIK-
SON, CHILDHOOD AND SOCIETY (1963); H. EYSENCK & M. EYSENCK, MINDWATCHlNG: WHY PEO-
PLE BEHAVE THE WAY THEY Do (1983); A. FREUD, THE EGO AND THE MECHANISMS OF DEFENSE 
(1946); S. FREUD, THE COMPLETE WORKS, supra note 46; C. JUNG, PSYCHOLOGICAL REFLEC-
TIONS: AN ANTHOLOGY OF THE WRmNGS OF C.G.jUNG a.jacobi ed. 1953);j. KATZ,j. GOLD-
STEIN & A. DERSHOWITZ, PSYCHOANALYSIS, PSYCHIATRY, AND LAw (1967); T. MOORE, COGNmVE 
PSYCHOLOGY (1939). 
48. j. KATZ,j. GOLDSTEIN & A. DERSHOWITZ, supra note 47, at 53-58. 
49. See generally Girsh, Using Psychologists in the Courtroom, 35 NLADA BRIEFCASE 87 (1978); 
Lassen, The Psychologist as an E:>.pert Witness in Assessing Mental Disease or Defect, 50 A.B.A. j. 239 
(1964); Moore, Responsibility and the Unconscious, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 1563, 1639-75 (1980); Sam-
uels, Psychiatric Evidellce, 1981 CRIM. L. REV. 762. 
50. In most instances, lack of conscious intent excuses the actor from the legal conse-
quences of his act. One exception to this rule is the case where we have determined, for 
reasons unrelated to the actor's responsibility as an individual, that the law should always 
apply. But in this case, too, the law has no concern for the workings of the unconscious: The 
reason for applying the law is unrelated to the state of mind of the actor who occasioned its 
application. The law of strict liability, for example, is unconcerned with the tortfeasor's state 
of mind. See, e.g., Graham v. Bottenfield's Inc., 176 Kan. 68, 269 P.2d 413 (1954) (legal action 
can be brought against manufacturer who did not manufacture the hair dye at issue); Hen-
ningsen v. Bloomfield Motors Inc., 32 NJ. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960) (both manufacturer and 
dealer are liable for automobile malfunction); Wade, Stn'cl Tori Liabilily oj.lIalllif(lClllrm. 19 Sw. 
LJ. 5 (1965). Thus, the argument that discriminatory impact should trigger strict scrutiny 
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But the body oflaw and legal theory that governs the application of 
the equal protection clause to cases of alleged racial discrimination 
should not blind itself to what we know about the unconscious. Racism 
is in large part a product of the unconscious. It is a set of beliefs 
whereby we irrationally attach significance to something called race. I 
do not mean to imply that racism does not have its origins in the ra-
tional and premeditated acts of those who sought and seek property 
and power. But racism in America is much more complex than either 
the conscious conspiracy of a power elite or the simple delusion of a 
few ignorant bigots. It is a part of our common historical experience 
and, therefore, a part of our culture. It arises from the assumptions we 
have learned to make about the world, ourselves, and others as well as 
from the patterns of our fundamental social activities. 
Richard Wasserstrom has described the significance of race in our 
culture by contrasting our culture with a hypothetical one where race is 
an unimportant characteristic: "In such a culture, race would be largely 
if not exclusively a matter of superficial physiology; a matter, we might 
say, simply of the way one looked," much like eye color.51 But race 
does not function in our culture as does eye color, which is an irrele-
vant category, an unimportant cultural fact.52 Few of us can recall the 
color of our best friend's eyes, but when we pass a complete stranger 
on the street, we will remember his race.53 We attach significance to 
race even when we are not aware that we are doing so. 
Racism is irrational in the sense that we are not fully aware of the 
meanings we attach to race or why we have made race significant. It is 
also arguably dysfunctional to the extent that its irrationality prevents 
the optimal use of human resources. In this light it seems an appropri-
ate candidate for study and/or treatment by the psychoanalyst as well 
as for exclusion from law, the discipline that attempts to govern or in-
fluence the actions of rational people. But unlike other forms of irra-
tional and dysfunctional behavior, which we think of as deviant or 
abnormal, racism is "normal." It is a malady that we all share, because 
we have all been scarred by a common history. Racism's universality 
renders it normal. 54 
Racism's ubiquity underscores the importance of incorporating our 
knowledge of the unconscious into the legal theory of equal protection. 
The law has traditionally used psychological theory to define abnormal-
ity in order to exclude the irrational from the law's protection or sanc-
either implies an assertion of probable conscious but covert discriminatory intent or reasons 
that problems of proof, the severity of the harm, or social utility require that the burden be on 
the defendant without respect to his intent. 
51. Wasserstrom, supra note 22, at 585-86. 
52. Id. at 586. 
53. The other characteristic we will remember is sex. See note 22 supra; see also Rose, 
Cognitive and Dyadic Processes in Intergroup Contact, in COGNITIVE PROCESS IN STEREOlYPING AND 
INTERGROUP BEHAVIOR 271 (L. Hamilton ed. 1981). 
54. J. KOVEL, supra note 21, at 94. 
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tion. But where the law's purpose is to eradicate racial discrimination, 
it must recognize that racism is both irrational and normal. We must 
understand that our entire culture is afflicted, and we must take cogni-
zance of psychological t.heory in order to frame a legal theory that can 
address that affliction. 
B. Psychoanalytic Theory: An Explanation of Racism's Irrationality 
The division of the mind ir.to the conscious and the unconscious is 
the fundamental principle of psychoanalysis.55 Psychoanalytic theory 
explains the existence of pathological mental behavior56 as well as cer-
tain othenvise unexplained behavior in healthy people57 by postulating 
two powerful mental processes-the primary and the secondary-which 
govern how the mind works. The primary process, or Id, occurs outside 
of our awareness. It consists of desires, wishes, and instincts that strive 
for gratification. It follows its own laws, of which the supreme one is 
pleasure. The secondary process, or Ego, happens under conscious 
control and is bound by logic and reason. We use this process to adapt 
to reality: The Ego is required to respect the demands of reality and to 
conform to ethical and moral laws. On their way to gratification, the Id 
impulses must pass through the territory of the Ego where they are 
criticized, rejected, or modified, often by some defensive measure on 
the part of the secondary process. Defensive mechanisms such as re-
55. S. FREUD, THE EGO AND THE ID, supra note 46, at 3. It is not my purpose to defend 
psychoanalytic theory as the definitive description of psychological processes. It has often 
been noted that Freud himself was constantly revising his hypothetical constructs and defini-
tions. Rather, I have drawn upon psychoanalytic theory because it provides a conceptual vo-
cabulary for processes that we have all observed in our everyday lives. That vocabulary, while 
controversial, has gathered sufficient preeminence in the scientific world and among lay per-
sons that its meanings are understood by a relatively broad range of people. Moreover, the 
theory's major contribution, the discovery of motivational dynamics, is the foundation of 
much of modem psychology. MarieJahoda notes that "[w]hat Churchill said about democ-
racy can weIl be applied to psychoanalysis too: It is the worst theory ever proposed, except 
for all the others that have so far been tried." M.JAHODA, RACE RELATIONS & MENTAL HEALTH 
11 (1960) (UNESCO publication). Mindful of the flaws in psychoanalytic theory and the diffi-
culties it presents for empirical verification, I have also drawn heavily upon studies, concepts, 
and interpretations in the social sciences that are based on different theoretical premises. See 
notes 76-91 infra and accompanying text. 
56. In his case histories, Freud explained how pathological mental behavior develops. 
See, e.g., S. FREUD, STUDIES ON HYSTERIA, in 2 THE COMPLETE WORKS, supra note 46, at 135 (in 
the case of Elisabeth von R., the patient succeeded in sparing herself the painful conviction 
that she loved her brother-in-law by inducing physical pains in herself); S. FREUD, NOTES UPON 
A CASE OF OBSESSIONAL NEUROSIS, in 10 THE COMPLETE WORKS, supra note 46, at 19 (in the 
case of the Rat Man, obsessive behavior resulted from the displacement of self-reproach re-
lated to pleasurable sexual acts performed during childhood; the patient suffered guilt and 
feIl ill to avoid resolving the conflict). 
57. For example, psychoanalytic theory explains parapraxes (i.e., "faulty acts" such as 
slips of the tongue or misperceptions), forgetting, and similar responses. See S. FREUD, INTRO-
DUCTORY LECTURES ON PSYCHOANALYSIS, in 15 THE COMPLETE WORKS, supra note 46, at 25-79. 
Psychoanalysis is not only a therapy for those who suffer from mental and emotional distur-
bances; it is also a comprehensive general theory of personality that applies to the sick and the 
healthy mind alike. See generally READINGS IN PSYCHOANALYTIC PSYCHOLOGY (M. Levitt ed. 
1959). 
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pression, denial, introjection, projection, reaction formation, sublima-
tion, and reversal resolve the conflicts between the primary and 
secondary processes by disguising forbidden wishes and making them 
palatable.58 
Several observations about the nature of racial prejudice give 
credence both to the theory of repression and to the suggestion that 
racial antagonism finds its source in the unconscious. For example, 
when we say that racism is irrational, we mean that when people are 
asked to explain the basis of their racial antagonism they either express 
an instinctive, unexplained distaste at the thought of associating with 
the out-group as equals 59 or they cite reasons that are not based on 
established fact and are often contradicted by personal experience. In 
one study on racial prejudice, E. L. Hartley included in his survey three 
fictitious groups he called the Dariens, the Praneans, and the Walloni-
ans. A large portion of respondents who expressed a dislike for blacks 
and Jews also disliked these nonexistent groups and advocated restric-
tive measures against them.60 
In psychoanalytic terms, this irrational behavior indicates poor "re-
ality-testing." When people of normal intelligence behave in a way that 
rejects what they experience as real, it requires some explanation. Psy-
choanalytic theory assumes that inadequacy in reality-testing fulfills a 
psychological function, usually the preservation of an attitude basic to 
the individual's makeup. If adequate reality-testing threatens to under-
mine such a functionally significant attitude, it is avoided. In such 
cases, the dislike of out-groups is based on rationalization-that is, on 
socially acceptable pseudoreasons that serve to disguise the function 
that the antagonism serves for the individua1.61 
Of course, not all inadequate reality-testing is a rationalization of 
58. See generally A. FREUD, supra note 47. 
59. See M.JAHODA, supra note 55, at 15 (quoting G. CARTER, THE POLmcs OF INEQ.UALITY, 
SOUTH AFRICA SINCE 1948, at 412 (1958) on the South African nationalist's horror at associat-
ing with black South Africans: "The most extreme example of this sentiment is bound up with 
the phrase: 'Do you want your daughter to marry a Native?' "). 
60. See E. HARTLEY, PROBLEMS IN PREJUDICE 21-40 (1946). Considerable research has 
been done on the irrationality of racism, yielding many equivalents of the notorious remark: 
"Some of my best friends are Jewish but .... " See, e.g., N. ACKERMAN & M. JAHODA, AN-
TISEMmSM AND EMOTIONAL DISORDER: A PSYCHOANALYTIC INTERPRETATION 82-84 (1950) (an-
tisemitism persisting notwithstanding many positive contacts with Jews); B. BETTELHEIM & M. 
JANOWITZ, DYNAMICS OF PREJUDICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF VETERANS 
33 (1950) (study of World War II veterans in the Chicago area concluded that most 
prejudiced people base their attitudes on untested preconceptions rather than personal expe-
rience; one veteran remarked, "There was one Jewish fellow in our outfit whom I liked espe-
cially. He wasn't like the ordinary run of Jews, that's why I remember him."); G. SELZNICK & 
S. STEINBERG, THE TENACITY OF PREJUDICE: ANTISEMmSM IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA (1969); 
Mussen, Some Personality and Social Factors Related to Changes in Children s Altitudes Toward Negroes, 
45 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 423-41 (1950) (study conducted at an interracial boys' 
camp concluded that getting to know members of the disliked group is not likely to change 
attitudes); Sanford, The Roots of Prejudice: Emotional Dynamics, in PSYCHOLOGY AND RACE 57 (P. 
Watson ed. 1973). 
61. M.JAHODA, supra note 55, at 14. 
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hidden motives. The occasion for reality-testing is not always available, 
and all of us make prejudgments based on insufficient evidence. But 
when these prejudgments become rigidly stereotyped thinking that es-
chews reality even when facts are available, there is reason to search for 
a psychological function that the rigidity of the prejudgment fulfills.62 
An examination of the beliefs that racially prejudiced people have 
about out-groups demonstrates their use of other mechanisms ob-
served by both Freudian and nonFreudian behavioralists. For example, 
studies have found that racists hold two types of stereotyped beliefs: 
They believe the out-group is dirty, lazy, oversexed, and without con-
trol of their instincts (a typical accusation against blacks),63 or they be-
lieve the out-group is pushy, ambitious, conniving, and in control of 
business, money, and industry (a typical accusation against Jews).64 
These two types of accusation correspond to two of the most common 
types of neurotic conflict:65 that which arises when an individual can-
not master his instinctive drives in a way that fits into rational and so-
cially approved patterns of behavior,66 and that which arises when an 
62. "Racial prejudice, in its narrowest sense, is an attitude towards outgroups which 
refrains from reality-testing, not just because the mental effort is too much, but because the 
attitude itselffulfills a specific irrational function for its bearer." Id. Scientific thought repre-
sents a major effort at rationalization-Le., the attempt to avoid the contamination of secon-
dary (rational) thought processes by primary (irrational) ones. Research on race questions 
provides numerous illustrations of the failure to achieve that goal. See, e.g., id. at 18; A. 
MONTAGU, MAN'S MOST DANGEROUS MYrH: THE FALLACY OF RACE (5th ed. 1974); Snyder, On 
the Self-Perpetuating Nature of Social Stereotypes, in COGNITIVE PROCESSES IN STEREOTYPING AND 
INTERGROUP BEHAVIOR 183 (D. Hamilton ed. 1981); White, The Definition of Legal Competence: 
Will the Circle Be Unbroken?, 18 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 641 (1978). Other works on the race 
question demonstrate that the less rational processes affect the rational processes. See, e.g., 1 
G. MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MODERN DEMOCRACY (1975); 
G. SAENGER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PREJUDICE (1953); Bigoness, Effiet of Applicant's Sex, 
Race, and Performance on Employers' Performance Ratings: Some Additional Findings, 61 j. ApPLIED 
PSYCHOLOGY 80 (1976). 
63. See G. ALLPORT, THE NA11JRE OF PREJUDICE 196-98 (1954);j. KOVEL, supra note 21, at 
51-92; G. SELZNICK & S. STEINBERG, supra note 60, at 170-71. 
64. See G. ALLPORT, supra note 63, at 192-96; G. SELZNICK & S. STEINBERG, supra note 60, 
at 3-21. 
65. See B. BETIELHEIM & M.jANOWITZ, supra note 60, at 156-59 (describing case histories 
of antisemitic people under psychoanalytic treatment; the study found that these people pro-
jected culturally prevalent stereotypes of jews to embody the conflicts they could not face in 
themselves); see also M. jAHODA, supra note 55, at 28; Sofer, Working Groups ill a Plural Society, 8 
INDUS. & U.B. REL. REV. 68 (1954). A number of studies have demonstrated that this parallel 
between racial stereotypes and the most basic human conflicts is not fortuitous. See, e.g., T. 
ADORNO, E. FRENKEL-BRUNSWIK, D. LEVINSON & R. SANFORD, THE AUTHORITARIAN PERSONAL-
ITY 474-82 (1950) (finding that the personality type most given to intense feelings of racial 
prejudice is characterized by a rigid adherence to conventional values and a submissive, un-
critical attitude toward idealized authorities of the in-group; to achieve some sense of identity, 
the authoritarian personality needs a black and white perception of the world; this need for 
clear-cut categories inevitably disinclines such people to look closely at their own or other 
people's motives; they fear that a full understanding of the world will blur the sharp divisions 
that tell them where they belong and who they are). 
66. See T. ADORNO, E. FRENKEL-BRUNSWIK, D. LEVINSON & R. SANFORD, supra note 65, at 
474-75. jean-Paul Sartre arrived intuitively at much the same picture as these empirical stud-
ies. See Sartre, Portrait of the Antisemite, 13 PARTISAN REV. 6 (1946); see also j. SARTRE, REFLEX-
IONS SUR U. QUESTIONjUIVE (14th ed. 1954). 
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individual cannot live up to the aspirations and standards of his own 
conscience.67 Thus, the stereotypical view of blacks implies that their 
Id, the instinctive part of their psyche, dominates their Ego, the ration-
ally oriented part. The stereotype of the Jew, on the other hand, ac-
cuses him of having an overdeveloped Ego. In this way, the racially 
prejudiced person projects his own conflict into the form of racial 
stereotypes. 
The preoccupation among racially prejudiced people with sexual 
matters in race relations provides further evidence of this relationship 
between the unconscious and racism. Taboos against interracial sexual 
relations, myths concerning the sexual prowess of blacks, and obses-
sions with racial purity coexist irrationally with a tendency to break 
these taboos.68 Again, psychoanalytic theory provides insights: Ac-
cording to Freud, one's sexual identity plays a crucial role in the unend-
ing effort to come to terms with oneself.69 Thus, the prominence of 
racism's sexual component supports the theory that racial antagonism 
grows in large part out of an unstable sense of identity.70 
Another piece of evidence that supports the contention that racism 
originates in the unconscious is the fact that racially discriminatory be-
havior usually improves long before corresponding attitudes toward 
members of the out-group begin to change.71 Again, this is to be ex-
67. Psychoanalytic theory sees conflict over one's sense of identity as universal. It re-
sults from the developmental conflict that is inevitable in the child who loves and identifies 
with his parents yet must be controlled, rejected, and punished by them. Before the child 
acquires self-control, internal standards, and the ability to understand the need for rules and 
regulations, this punishment and disapproval can make him feel unwanted and unloved. This 
conflict or lack of clarity concerning one's self-image is inescapable at one stage of develop-
ment, but it may remain unresolved and become a basic feature of the adult personality. Case 
histories of people who feel strong racial antagonism have shown that their identity conflicts 
were particularly severe and remain unresolved. See M. JAHODA, supra note 55, at 18. 
68. See J. DOLLARD, CASTE AND CLASS IN A SOUTHERN TOWN (1937); F. FANON, BLACK 
SKIN, WHITE MASKS (1967); W. GRIER & P. COBBS, BLACK RAGE (1968); C. HERNTON, SEX AND 
RACISM IN AMERICA (1965);J. KOVEL, supra note 21, at 25; P. MASON, THE BIRTH OF A DILEMMA 
(1958); A. PATON, Too LATE THE PHALAROPE (1953). 
69. S. FREUD, THREE ESSAYS ON THE THEORY OF SEXUALITY, in 7 THE COMPLETE 'VORKS, 
supra note 46, at 123. Psychoanalytic theory sees unresolved conflicts in one's sexual identity 
as the chief source of anxiety and insecurity in adulthood. See Kramer, On Discovering One's 
Identity, 10 PSYCHOANALYTIC STUD. CHILD 47 (1955); Reich, A Character Formation Representing 
the Integration oj Unusual Conflict Solutions in the Ego Structure, 13 PSYCHOANALYTIC STUD. CHILD 
309 (1958). 
70. Also note that the out-group is almost always designated by the prejudiced group as 
dirty or smelly or both. This parallels the psychoanalytic observation regarding the centrality 
of feces and dirt to developmental conflicts. See J. KOVEL, supra note 21, at 65-87. 
71. See Cook & Stuart, Desegregation: A Psychological Analysis, 12 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1 
(1957); P. West & M. Jahoda, Social Fictions and Social Facts (1949) (unpublished manu-
script) (on file with author); see also LaPiere, Attitudes vs. Actions, 13 Soc. FORCES 230 (1934) 
(after traveling throughout the United States with a Chinese couple, LaPiere wrote to the 
hotels and restaurants they had visited and asked if they would accept Chinese individuals as 
guests; over 90% of the respondents, all of whom had actually served the Chinese couple, said 
they would not); Nisbett & Wilson, The Halo Effect: Evidencefor Unconscious Alteration of Judgments, 
35 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 250 (1977) (instructor with European accent, manner-
isms, and appearance acted warm in one interview and cold in another; subjects interviewing 
warm instructor rated his idiosyncracies as appealing, while subjects interviewing cold instruc-
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pected in light of the underlying psychological processes. Behavior is 
more frequendy under Ego control than is attitude. Attitude reflects, in 
large part, the less conscious part of the personality, a level at which 
change is more complex and difficult. It also seems reasonable for a 
change in behavior to stimulate a change in attitude, if for no other 
reason than that flagrant inconsistency between what one does and 
what one thinks is uncomfortable for most people.72 
Thus far we have considered the role the unconscious plays in creat-
ing overdy racist attitudes. But how is the unconscious involved when 
racial prejudice is less apparent-when racial bias is hidden from the 
prejudiced individual as well as from others? Increasingly, as our cul-
ture has rejected racism as immoral and unproductive, this hidden prej-
udice has become the more prevalent form of racism. The individual's 
Ego must adapt to a cultural order that views overtly racist attitudes 
and behavior as unsophisticated, uninformed, and immoral. It must re-
press or disguise racist ideas when they seek expression. 
Joel Kovel refers to the resulting personality type as the "aversive 
racist" and contrasts this type with the "dominative racist," the true 
bigot who openly seeks to keep blacks in a subordinate position and 
will resort to force to do SO.73 The aversive racist believes in white 
superiority, but her conscience seeks to repudiate this belief or, at least, 
to prevent her from acting on it. She often resolves this inner conflict 
by not acting at all. She tries to avoid the issue by ignoring the exist-
ence of blacks, avoiding contact with them, or at most being polite, cor-
rect, and cold whenever she must deal with them.74 Aversive racists 
range from individuals who lapse into demonstrative racism when 
threatened-as when blacks get "too close" -to those who consider 
themselves liberals and, despite their sense of aversion to blacks (of 
which they are often unaware), do their best within the confines of the 
existing societal structure to ameliorate blacks' condition.75 
tor rated them as irritating); Saenger & Gilbert, Customer Reactions to the Integration of Negro Sales 
Personnel, 4 INT'LJ. OPINION & ATrITUDE RES. 57 (1950) (white women who had been seen 
buying goods from black saleswomen denied that they would do so). 
72. See M. JAHODA, supra note 55, at 43. 
73. J. KOVEL, supra note 21, at 54-55. Kovel sees the decline of dominative racism and 
the ascent of aversive racism as products of the rationalization of the industrial state. He 
argues that the state has attacked dominative racism because it has become more threatening 
than useful as a regulator of culture. The industrial nation-state can no longer afford the 
disruption of dominative racism. See also D. BELL, supra note 21, at 437-44 (arguing that le-
gally sanctioned segregation no longer furthers and, in fact, now harms the interests of those 
whites who make policy for the country); Klare, The Quest/or Industrial Democracy and the Struggle 
Against Racism: Perspective.sfrom Labor Law and Civil Rights Law, 61 OR. L. REV. 157 (1982) (argu-
ing that legal ideas about workers' rights and racial equality legitimate and reinforce a view of 
justice that is hospitable to domination and inequality). 
74. J. KOVEL, supra note 21, at 54-55. 
75. 
The self of the aversive racist is realized as a more socially coherent system within 
bourgeois culture, and such articulation may result in exceedingly principled activity. 
The aversive racist may behave in the most apparently constructive way, even to the 
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There is considerably less research and literature concerning the 
aversive racist than there is concerning the self-conscious racist. This is 
hardly surprising. Our culture has only recently rejected the morality 
of white supremacy; the repression of racist ideas is a relatively new 
phenomenon. It is also a more difficult phenomenon to discern and 
observe than is self-conscious racism. The researcher's subjects no 
longer readily admit their membership in the group to be studied. 
Also, those who would observe and document unconscious racism are 
not themselves immune from its blight. 
C. A Cognitive Approach to Unconscious Racism 
Cognitive psychologists offer a contrasting model for understanding 
the origin and unconscious nature of racial prejudice.76 This is essen-
tially a rational model. The cognitivists acknowledge the importance of 
emotional and motivational factors, but they do not embrace the Freud-
ian belief that instinctive drives dominate individuals' concepts, atti-
tudes, and beliefs. Instead, they view human behavior, including racial 
prejudice, as growing out of the individual's attempt to understand his 
relationship with the world (in this case, relations between groups) 
while at the same time preserving his personal integrity. But while the 
ultimate goal of the cognitive process is understanding or rationality, 
many of the critical elements of the process occur outside of the indi-
vidual's awareness.77 This is especially true when there is tension be-
extent of giving money and support to the cause of bettering the lives of Negroes, yet 
retain the characteristic aversion .... 
. . . As a consequence, the active entertainment of race fantasies is suppressed. 
The fantasies become weaker, neutral; they are sublimated. The sublimation takes 
the form of a general rationalization of the personality, a diffuse coolness in sensibil-
ity and functioning. The aversion toward black people becomes but an aspect of the 
general personality change. 
Id. at 60-61. 
76. See generally M. GOODMAN, RACE AWARENESS IN YOUNG CHILDREN (1952); G. SAENGER, 
supra note 62; Nisbett & Wilson, Telling More than We Can Know: Verbal Reports on Mental 
Processes, 84 PSYCHOLOGICAL REV. 231 (1977); Snyder, supra note 62; Tajfel, Cognitive Aspects of 
Prejudice, 25:4 J. Soc. ISSUES 79 (1969). 
Other students of human behavior, particularly developmental and social psychologists, 
have offered other explanations for the origins and mechanisms of racist behavior. One 
school of thought explains the development of racial awareness and prejudice as a pattern of 
behavior acquired by mimicking role models, especially parents, at a very young age. Psychol-
ogists who have studied racial awareness and stereotypes in young children have noted that 
while children are aware of the sources of these attitudes, they tend to forget the ideas' origins 
toward adolescence. Pushkin & Veness, The Development of Racial Awareness and Prejudice in Chil-
dren, in PSYCHOLOGY AND RACE, supra note 60, at 23,37. These studies also indicate that par-
ents frequently fail to remember giving race-preferential instructions to their children and 
that many parents who give lip service to ideas of tolerance continue to convey prejudiced 
attitudes to their children. Id.; see also notes 65-66 supra and accompanying text (racism and 
ethnocentric attitudes develop as part of a more general personality type called the "authori-
tarian personality"). 
77. Cognitive psychologists describe the development of attitudes concerning race as 
the result of three fundamental psychological processes: categorization, assimilation, and the 
search for coherence. See, e.g., Tajfel, supra note 76, at 79-97; see also notes 79-91 infra and 
accompanying text. 
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tween the individual's desire for simplification and the complexity of 
the real world or conflict between an understanding of a situation that 
preserves the individual's self-image and one that jeopardizes a positive 
view of himself. 78 
Cognitivists see the process of "categorization" as one common 
source of racial and other stereotypes. All humans tend to categorize in 
order to make sense of experience. Too many events occur daily for us 
to deal successfully with each one on an individual basis; we must cate-
gorize in order to cope.79 When a category-for example, the category 
of black person or white person-correlates with a continuous dimen-
sion-for example, the range of human intelligence or the propensity 
to violence-there is a tendency to exaggerate the differences between 
categories on that dimension and to minimize the differences within 
each category.80 
The more important a particular classification of people into groups 
is to an individual, the more likely she is to distinguish sharply the char-
acteristics of people who belong to the different groups.81 Here, cogni-
tivists integrate the observations of personality theorists and social 
psychologists with their own. If an individual is hostile toward a group 
of people, she has an emotional investment in preserving the differen-
tiations between her own group and the "others."82 Thus, the preser-
vation of inaccurate judgments about the out-group is self-rewarding.83 
This is particularly so when prejudiced judgments are made in a social 
context that accepts and encourages negative attitudes toward the out-
group. In these cases, the group judgment reinforces and helps main-
tain the individual judgment about the out-group's lack of worth. 
The content of the social categories to which people are assigned is 
generated over a long period of time within a culture and transmitted 
to individual members of society by a process cognitivists call "assimila-
tion." Assimilation entails learning and internalizing preferences and 
evaluations.84 Individuals learn cultural attitudes and beliefs about 
78. Tajfel, supra note 76, at 80. 
79. "In a rather formal way, the problem of stereotypes is that of the relation between a 
set of attributes which vary on continuous dimensions and classifications which are discontin-
uous." /d. at 82; see also G. ALLPORT, supra note 63, at 19 (categories, including ethnic catego-
ries, used to simplify experience); Tajfel, Quantitative Judgment in Social Perception, 50 BRIT. J. 
PSYCHOLOGY 16, 16-29 (1959) (values attached to ethnic categories skew perception). 
80. For example, when subjects were asked to estimate the length of randomly 
presented lines, they exaggerated the differences between a group of four shorter lines that 
were labeled A and four longer lines that were labeled B. Their judgments were considerably 
more accurate when the lines were presented to them without labels. Tajfel, The Roots of Preju-
dice: Cognitive Aspects, in PSYCHOLOGY AND RACE, supra note 60, at 76. As is apparent from this 
experiment, the tendency to stereotype categories occurs outside of the subject's awareness, 
and it occurs even when the objects of categorization lack any social or emotional relevance. 
81. Tajfel, supra note 79, at 25. 
82. Tajfel, supra note 76, at 83-85. 
83. /d. at 86. 
84. By "internalizing" I mean that one not only learns the preferences but, at the same 
time, makes them one's own. 
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race very early in life, at a time when it is difficult to separate the per-
ceptions of one's teacher (usually a parent) from one's own. In other 
words, one learns about race at a time when one is highly sensitive to 
the social contexts in which one lives.85 
Piaget, in his work on the development of moral judgment in chil-
dren, described the transition from the stage when children judge pro-
nouncements by their source rather than their content to the stage 
when children begin to cooperate with equals and to take the role of 
the other. This ability to see the same data from more than one point 
of view is the basis of intellectual and moral development. According 
to Pia get, this transition cannot take place when a child is exposed to 
only one source of information.86 These pretransition conditions, 
when the child remains in awe of the source of truth, tend to be pre-
cisely the conditions under which children learn socially sanctioned 
truths about race. Lessons learned at this early developmental stage 
are not questioned: They are learned as facts rather than as points of 
view.87 
Furthermore, because children learn lessons about race at this early 
stage, most of the lessons are tacit rather than explicit. Children learn 
not so much through an intellectual understanding of what their par-
ents tell them about race as through an emotional identification with 
who their parents are and what they see and feel their parents do. 
Small children will adopt their parents' beliefs because they experience 
them as their own. Ifwe do learn lessons about race in this way, we are 
not likely to be aware that the lessons have even taken place.88 If we 
are unaware that we have been taught to be afraid of blacks or to think 
of them as lazy or stupid, then we may not be conscious of our internal-
ization of those feelings and beliefs. 
All of these processes, most of which occur outside the actor's con-
sciousness, are mutually reinforcing. Furthermore, there is little in our 
environment to counteract them; indeed, our culture often supports 
and rewards individuals for making hostile misjudgments that exagger-
ate the differences between themselves and members of a racial out-
group. Cultural prejudice also removes the possibility of checking 
judgments against outside reality, further inhibiting the chance that the 
holder of a prejudiced belief will perceive his mistake and correct it. 
Thus, through personal and cultural experience the individual comes to 
associate characteristics such as "intelligence," "laziness," "honesty," 
85. M. GOODMAN, supra note 76, at 36-60; Tajfel, supra note 76, at 88-89. See generally K. 
CLARK, PREJUDICE AND YOUR CHILD (2d ed. 1963) (constructive ways for parents to teach their 
children about race discrimination). 
86. Holmes, Freud, Piaget and Democratic Leadership, 16 BRIT. J. SOC. 123, 135 (1965). 
87. T<tifel, supra note 76, at 87. 
88. In a study of racial awareness among nursery school children between the ages of 
three-and-one-half and five-and-one-half, psychologist Mary Goodman found that parents of 
children who expressed hostile attitudes toward blacks had no memory of having taught their 
children these attitudes. M. GOODMAN, supra note 76, at 110-18. 
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or "dirtiness" with classifications ofpeople.89 In ambiguous social situ-
ations, it will always be easier to find evidence supporting an individ-
ual's assumed group characteristics than to find contradictory evidence. 
Furthermore, whenever one is confronted with the need to interpret 
the behavior of members of a particular group en masse, there will be 
little opportunity to observe behavior that conflicts with the group's 
assumed characteristics.90 
Case studies have demonstrated that an individual who holds stere-
otyped beliefs about a "target" will remember and interpret past events 
in the target's life history in ways that bolster and support his stereo-
typed beliefs and will perceive the target's actual behavior as recon-
firming and validating the stereotyped beliefs.91 While the individual 
may be aware of the selectively perceived facts that support his catego-
rization or simplified understanding, he will not be aware of the process 
that has caused him to deselect the facts that do not conform with his 
rationalization. Thus, racially prejudiced behavior that is actually the 
product of learned cultural preferences is experienced as a reflection of 
rational deduction from objective observation, which is nonprejudicial 
behavior. The decisionmaker who is unaware of the selective percep-
tion that has produced her stereotype will not view it as a stereotype. 
She will believe that her actions are motivated not by racial prejudice 
but by her attraction or aversion to the attributes she has "observed" in 
the groups she has favored or disfavored. 
D. Unconscious Racism in Everyday Life 
Whatever our preferred theoretical analysis, there is considerable 
commonsense evidence from our everyday experience to confirm that 
we all harbor prejudiced attitudes that are kept from our consciousness. 
When, for example, a well-known sports broadcaster is carried away 
by the excitement of a brilliant play by an Afro-American professional 
football player and refers to the player as a "little monkey" during a 
nationally televised broadcast,92 we have witnessed the prototypical 
89. These SUbjective associations are, for the most part, socially based; the culture's his-
tory generates their content. See notes 178-187 infra and accompanying text. 
90. Tajfel, supra note 76, at 83. 
91. See, e.g., Snyder, supra note 62, at 187-90 (reporting a study in which participants 
were read narratives about the life history of a woman; one week later, some learned she was 
homosexual and others learned she was heterosexual; each varied his interpretation of her life 
history to accommodate the new piece of information; Snyder refers to this as "preferential 
remembering in the reconstructive process"). 
A stereotype is used as a guideline; where gaps are left, an individual wiII fill them in with 
the stereotyped beliefs. Also, the guidelines are used to interpret remembered events in ways 
that enhance their congruence with the stereotype. /d. at 190-92. Cognitive bolstering 
processes may be prospective and exert before-the-fact influences on the acquisition and in-
terpretation of information learned later about the target; or, they may be retrospective and 
exert after-the-fact influences on the remembering and reinterpretation of previously learned 
information about the target. The reality is a subjective one and social stereotypes can and do 
create their own social reality. ld. at 193. 
92. Shapiro, Cosell's Remark Raises Ire, Wash. Post, Sept. 6, 1983, at D6, col. 1. 
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parapraxes, or unintentional slip of the tongue. This sportscaster views 
himself as progressive on issues of race. Many of his most important 
professional associates are black, and he would no doubt profess that 
more than a few are close friends.93 After the incident, he initially 
claimed no memory of it and then, when confronted with videotaped 
evidence, apologized and said that no racial slur was intended.94 There 
is no reason to doubt the sincerity of his assertion. Why would he in-
tentionally risk antagonizing his audience and damaging his reputation 
and career? But his inadvertent slip of the tongue was not random.95 
It is evidence of the continuing presence of a derogatory racial stereo-
type that he has repressed from consciousness and that has momenta-
rily slipped past his Ego's censors.96 Likewise, when Nancy Reagan 
appeared before a public gathering of then-presidential-candidate Ron-
ald Reagan's political supporters and said that she wished he could be 
there to "see all these beautiful white people,"97 one can hardly imag-
ine that it was her self-conscious intent to proclaim publicly her prefer-
ence for the company of Caucasians. 
Incidents of this kind are not uncommon, even if only the miscues of 
the powerful and famous are likely to come to the attention of the 
press.98 But because the unconscious also influences selective percep-
tions,99 whites are unlikely to hear many of the inadvertent racial slights 
93. Howard Cosell was the first white reporter to respect Muhammad Ali's wish to be 
called by his Muslim, rather than his Christian, name; it was the resulting relationship with Ali 
that brought Cosell to prominence. Cj. id. (quoting Cosell as saying, "Where were they when 
I fought for Muhammad Ali's rights?"). 
94. "No man respects Alvin Garrett more than I do. I talked about that man's ability to 
be so elusive despite the smallness of his size." Id. 
95. Why, for instance, did Cosell use the word "monkey," an animal long associated 
with caricatures and stereotypes of blacks, rather than "rabbit" or "deer" or 'Jet"? 
96. In his Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, Freud pointed out that the most common 
parapraxes are slips of the tongue in which one says the precise opposite of what one in-
tended to say. S. FREUD, supra note 57, at 33. These parapraxes do have a sense of their own. 
"[P]arapraxes are the outcome of a compromise: They constitute a half-success and a half-
failure for each of the two intentions; the intention which is being challenged is neither com-
pletely suppressed nor, apart from special cases, carried through quite unscathed." !d. at 66. 
97. Mrs. Reagan made the comment at a reception in Chicago. The manager of Rea-
gan's Illinois campaign defended Mrs. Reagan by pointing out that "she was talking to her 
husband about the white snow and that's how she got mixed up." Wash. Post, Feb. 18, 1980, 
at A2, col. 1; see also R. DUGGER, ON REAGAN: THE MAN AND HIS PRESIDENCY 202 (1983). 
98. See Coast Police Chief Accused of Racism, N.Y. Times, May 13, 1982, at A24, col. 1 (re-
mark of Los Angeles police chief that some blacks might be more susceptible than "normal" 
people to injury when officers applied a choke hold); Notes on People, N.Y. Times, Dec. 3, 1977, 
at 21, col. 3 (Lieutenant Governor Lowell Thomas, Jr. of Alaska apologized for his comment 
that racial intermarriage was "against nature"); see also Remnick, Blullders that Rebolllld 011 Us 
All, Wash. Post, Dec. 26, 1983, at B2, col. 4 (racist remarks by sportscasters: First is Tom 
Brookshier's comment that the University of Louisville players (all black) have a collective IQ 
of about 40, though they can play basketball; the second remark was Howard Cos ell's, see 
note 92 supra; the third and fourth blunders were made by Rick Barry, "[r]emarking on Bill 
Russell's 'watermelon smile' and Joking' that the green ribbons worn by the Boston Celtics in 
memory of the black children murdered in Atlanta were in honor of St. Patrick's Day"). 
99. For a discussion of the phenomenon of selective perception, see R.L. ATKINSON, 
R.C. ATKINSON & E. HILGARD, INTRODUCTION TO PSYCHOLOGY 146-50 (8th ed. 1983);J. COLE-
MAN, PSYCHOLOGY AND EFFECTIVE BEHAVIOR 168-70 (1969); L. CROW & A. CROW, UNDER-
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that are made daily in their presence. IOO 
Another manifestation of unconscious racism is akin to the slip of 
the tongue. One might call it a slip of the mind: While one says what 
one intends, one fails to grasp the racist implications of one's benignly 
motivated words or behavior. For example, in the late 1950s and early 
1960s, when integration and assimilation were unquestioned ideals 
among those who consciously rejected the ideology of racism, white 
liberals often expressed their acceptance of and friendship with blacks 
by telling them that they "did not think of them as Negroes." Their 
conscious intent was complimentary. The speaker was saying, "I think 
of you as normal human beings, just like me." But he was not con-
scious of the underlying implication of his words. What did this mean 
about most Negroes? Were they not normal human beings? If the 
white liberal were asked if this was his inference, he would doubtless 
have protested that his words were being misconstrued and that he only 
intended to state that he did not think of anyone in racial terms. But to 
say that one does not think of a Negro as a Negro is to say that one 
thinks of him as something else. The statement is made in the context 
of the real world, and implicit in it is a comparison to some norm. In 
this case the norm is whiteness. IOI The white liberal's unconscious 
thought, his slip of the mind, is, "I think of you as different from other 
Negroes, as more like white people." 
One indication of the nonneutrality of the statement, "I don't think 
of you as a Negro," when spoken as a compliment by a white is the 
incongruity of the response, "I don't think of you as white." This could 
also be a complimentary remark coming from a black, conveying the 
fact that she does not think of her friend in the usual negative terms she 
STANDING OUR BEHAVIOR: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PERSONAL AND SOCIAL ADJUSTMENT 90-180 
(1956); E. ERB & D. HOOKER, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE EMERGING SELF: AN INTEGRATED IN-
TERPRETATION OF GOAL-DIRECTED BEHAVIOR 187-214 (1967). See generally H. BERNARD & W. 
HUCKINS, DYNAMICS OF PERSONAL ADJUSTMENT (1971) (development of concepts of oneself 
and others during childhood and adolescence); H. EYSENCK & M. EYSENCK, supra note 47 (gen-
eral discussion of personality development). 
100. It is common for racial minorities, especially those who find themselves relatively 
isolated in predominantly white institutions, to have white colleagues express stereotyped or 
derogatory views either by way of direct statements or by unstated but implicit assumptions. 
The most common examples of this are being mistaken for another black or Asian who looks 
nothing like you (the "they all look alike" syndrome), see Alleyne, "They All Look Alike" is No 
Joke in Court, L.A. Times, Apr. 15, 1984, pt. VI, at 5, col. 3, or the assumption that a black can 
dance and sing and grew up in the ghetto. It is obvious to the minority person that the 
speaker has not intended a racial slight-his tone is friendly and candid-and that he is una-
ware of the attitudinal source of the inadvertent derogation. And when other whites are pres-
ent, they are unlikely to hear or be sensitive to the connotations of the demeaning remark. 
101. One of my former students-a Mexican-American woman, a Harvard graduate, and 
a third-year law student at Stanford-was complimented on her verbal proficiency by a mid-
dle-aged white male who was interviewing her for ajob with his law firm. "You speak very 
good English," he said. His statement was obviously intended as a compliment. "My family 
has lived in Santa Barbara for four generations," replied the student. The interviewer was 
unconscious of the racial stereotype underlying his intended compliment-that of the poor, 
uneducated immigrant. The student heard only that stereotype. "Of course I speak English 
well," she thought, but she was careful not to say, "Haven't you read my resume?" 
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associates with whiteness. But this statement does not make sense com-
ing from an individual who would accept as complimentary a statement 
characterizing her as unlike other Negroes. If anything, the response 
only makes sense as a lighthearted but cautionary retort. It conveys the 
following message: "I understand that your conscious intent was be-
nign. But let me tell you something, friend. I think being black is just 
fine. If anything, our friendship is possible because you are unlike most 
white folks." 
Of course, the statements of both these interlocutors are ethnocen-
tric. But it is the white who has made the slip of the mind. He was 
unmindful of the ethnocentric premise upon which his "compliment" 
was based. He would find it painful to know that it is a premise in 
which he believes. His black friend's ethnocentrism is self-conscious 
and self-affirming. She is well aware of the impact of her reply. It is a 
defensive parry against the dominant society'S racism. 
Richard Wasserstrom has called this failure to see the implicit ra-
cism in a racially neutral line of reasoning "conceptual racism."102 He 
gives as an example the Supreme Court's reasoning in Brown II 103 in 
ordering school integration to proceed not immediately but "with all 
deliberate speed."104 The Court said that there were "complexities 
arising from the transition to a system of public education freed from 
racial discrimination"105 which would require time to resolve.106 
Wasserstrom calls this reasoning "a fantastic bit of nonsense."107 
He notes that the chief difficulty with immediate enforcement of Brown I 
was not the technical problems to which the Court referred but the 
resistance of whites theretofore in an unconstitutionally privileged po-
sition. The Court's reference to the technical problems of change may 
well have been a conscious rationalization for the sake of political expe-
102. 
We have a variety of ways of thinking about the legal system, and we have a variety of 
ways of thinking within the legal system about certain problems. We use concepts. 
Quite often without realizing it, the concepts used take for granted certain objection-
able aspects of racist ideology without our being aware of it. 
Wasserstrom, supra note 22. at 599. 
103. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) ("Brown IF'). There was a second 
Brown case, because, having found racially segregated schools unconstitutional in Brown v. 
Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) ("Brown F'), the Court, rather than follow the usual 
practice of ordering that the invalid practice cease immediately, treated relief as a distinct 
question to be decided separately. Id. at 495-96. 
104. Brown II, 349 U.S. at 301. 
105. Id. at 299. 
106. More specifically, the Court indicated that time might be necessary to carry out the 
ruling because of: 
problems related to administration, arising from the physical condition of the school 
plant, the school transportation system, personnel, revision of school districts and 
attendance areas into compact units to achieve a system of determining admission to 
the public schools on a nonracial basis, and revision of local laws and regulations 
which may be necessary in solving the foregoing problems. 
Id. at 300-01. 
107. Wasserstrom, supra note 22, at 600. 
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diency,IOB but Wasserstrom suggests that it may also have involved un-
conscious racism: The Justices may have relied on some assumptions 
that were significant in the dominant racist ideology. They may have 
tacitly reasoned that the black schools were wretched, that white chil-
dren could not attend those schools, and thus, while it was unfair to 
deprive blacks by making them go to inferior segregated schools, they 
would have to wait until the black schools were either eliminated or 
sufficiently improved for everybody to attend. 109 
A crucial factor in the process that produces unconscious racism is 
the tacitly transmitted cultural stereotype. If an individual has never 
known a black doctor or lawyer or is exposed to blacks only through a 
mass media where they are portrayed in the stereotyped roles of come-
dian, criminal, musician, or athlete, he is likely to deduce that blacks as 
a group are naturally inclined toward certain behavior and unfit for cer-
tain roles. llo But the lesson is not explicit: It is learned, internalized, 
and used without an awareness of its source. Thus, an individual may 
select a white job applicant over an equally qualified black and honestly 
believe that this decision was based on observed intangibles unrelated 
to race. The employer perceives the white candidate as "more articu-
late," "more collegial," "more thoughtful," or "more charismatic." He 
is unaware of the learned stereotype that influenced his decision. 
Moreover, he has probably also learned an explicit lesson of which he is 
very much aware: Good, law-abiding people do not judge others on the 
basis of race. Even the most thorough investigation of conscious mo-
tive will not uncover the race-based stereotype that has influenced his 
decision. 
This same process operates in the case of more far-reaching policy 
decisions that come to judicial attention because of their discriminatory 
impact. For example, when an employer or academic administrator dis-
covers that a written examination rejects blacks at a disproportionate 
rate, she can draw several possible conclusions: that blacks are less 
qualified than others; that the test is an inaccurate measure of ability; or 
that the testers have chosen the wrong skills or attributes to mea-
sure. 111 When decisionmakers reach the first conclusion, a predisposi-
tion to select those data that conform with a racial stereotype may well 
have influenced them. Because this stereotype has been tacitly trans-
mitted and unconsciously learned, they will be unaware of its influence 
on their decision. 
If the purpose of the law's search for racial animus or discriminatory 
intent is to identify a morally culpable perpetrator, the existing intent 
requirement fails to achieve that purpose. There will be no evidence of 
108. See Steel, A Critic's View of the Warren Court-Nine Men in Black Who Think While, N.Y. 
Times, Oct. 13, 1968, § 6 (Magazine), at 56. 
109. Wasserstrom, supra note 22, at 600. 
110. See notes 252-253 infra and accompanying text. 
Ill. See notes 276-278 illfra and accompanying text. 
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self-conscious racism where the actors have internalized the relatively 
new American cultural morality which holds racism wrong or have 
learned racist attitudes and beliefs through tacit rather than explicit les-
sons. The actor himself will be unaware that his actions, or the racially 
neutral feelings and ideas that accompany them, have racist origins. 
Of course, one can argue that the law should govern only con-
sciously motivated actions-that societal sanctions can do no more than 
attempt to require that the individual's Ego act as society's agent in 
censoring out those unconscious drives that society has defined as im-
moral. Under this view, the law can sanction a defective Ego that has 
not fully internalized current societal morality and has, therefore, al-
lowed illegal racist wishes to reach consciousness and fruition in an ille-
gal act. But the law should not hold an individual responsible for 
wishes that never reach consciousness, even if they also come to frui-
tion in discriminatory acts. 
The problem is that this argument does not tell us why the law 
should hold the individual responsible for racial injury that results from 
one form of Ego disguise but not the other. I believe the law should be 
equally concerned when the mind's censor successfully disguises a so-
cially repugnant wish like racism if that motive produces behavior that 
has a discriminatory result as injurious as if it flowed from a consciously 
held motive. 
II. A TALE OF Two THEORIES 
The second likely challenge to my proposal acknowledges the exist-
ence of unconscious racism but questions whether it is important or 
even useful to take it into account in interpreting and applying the 
equal protection clause. This question can best be answered by posing 
a more general question: What is the wrong that the equal protection. 
clause seeks to address? More specifically, what wrong do we seek to 
address in applying heightened scrutiny to racial classifications? If we 
can determine the nature of this wrong, we can determine whether 
identifying the existence of unconscious racial motivation is important 
to its prevention or remediation. 
Two theories have attempted to specify the central function of sus-
pect classification doctrine. 112 The first, the "process defect" theory, 
sees the judicial intervention occasioned by strict scrutiny of suspect 
112. I refer here to substantive, as opposed to structural, theories of equal protection. 
The Supreme Court has avoided articulating any substantive content of the equal protection 
clause. See note 299 infra. Instead, it relies heavily on a structural approach that Tussman and 
tenBroek first described, see Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAUF. L. 
REV. 341 (1949), and that Gerald Gunther further elaborated, see Gunther, Foreword: III Search 
of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Modelfor a Newer Equal Protectioll, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1 
(1972); see also Freeman, supra note 3, at 1058-59 (asserting that this approach implicitly de-
pends on value choices); Karst & Horowitz, supra note 14, at 23-24 (noting that the Court's 
structural approach is inadequate because it fails to articulate clearly the substantive meaning 
of equal protection). 
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classifications as an appropriate response to distortions in the demo-
cratic process. I IS The second theory cites racial stigma as the primary 
target of suspect classification doctrine. I 14 By examining whether and 
why the determination of self-conscious motive is important to each of 
these theories, we will be able to determine whether recognizing the 
presence of unconscious motive furthers the central rationale of each 
theory.l15 
A. The Process Deject Theory 
The chief proponent of the process defect theory has been John 
Ely.l16 He identifies the systematic exclusion ofa group from the nor-
mal workings of the political process as the harm that heightened judi-
cial scrutiny for suspect classifications seeks to prevent or remedy. The 
theory begins with Justice Stone's Carotene Products footnote four,ll7 
which states that "discrete and insular" minorities deserve special con-
stitutional protection. Ely notes that if "minority" referred solely to the 
fact that the group in question was on the losing side of a particular 
political battle, or if "discrete and insular" referred only to its position 
on the wrong side of the statutory line and its inability to gather 
enough allies to defeat legislation, then Stone's category would be in-
determinate. lIB Justice Stone's reference, argues Ely, was rather to 
"the sort of 'pluralist' wheeling and dealing" by which minorities in our 
society typically interact to protect their interests: It denotes those mi-
norities for which "'mutual defense pacts' will prove recurrently 
unavailing."1l9 
The general idea of this theory is clear enough: Courts should pro-
tect those who cannot protect themselves politically. What Ely has 
113. See notes 1 16-140 iTifra and accompanying text. Justice Stone first articulated this 
theory in his famous footnote four to United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 
nA (1938). 
114. See notes 141-175 iTifra and accompanying text. Justices Brennan and Marshall have 
been the Court's chief proponents of this theory. See, e.g., City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 
U.S. 100, 135 (1981) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 
265,324 (1978) (Brennan,]., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
115. A third substantive theory of equal protection suggests that racial groups should be 
treated as moral entities with group rights to distributive and compensatory justice. It holds 
that it is prima facie unjust for one racial or ethnic group to be substantially worse off than 
another. This "group disadvantaging principle" requires re1ieffor any group that constitutes 
a "perpetual underc1ass" and argues that such redistribution would express an ethical view 
disfavoring caste. See Fiss, supra note 13, at 150-51. This article will not discuss this approach. 
Fiss' theory is essentially indifferent to the motives and history that have led to unequal distri-
bution and is, therefore, sufficiently sensitive to the correction of disadvantage resulting from 
unconscious racism without the assistance of my analysis. 
116. See J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 135-79 (1980); Ely, The Constitutionality of Re-
verse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 723 (1974); Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Com-
ment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE LJ. 920, 933 (1973) [hereinafter Ely, Crying Wolf]; Ely, supra 
note 9, at 1228-30, 1254-60. 
117. Caro/me Prods., 304 U.S. at 152 nA. 
118. J. ELY, supra note 116, at 151. 
119. !d. 
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added to Justice Stone's hypothesis is an explanation for why the Court 
should interfere with a political majority's normally legitimate choices 
in some instances and not in others. It invokes special scrutiny when 
the minority in question is one that keeps finding itself on the wrong 
end oflegislative classifications because of the distorting effect ofpreju-
dice on the judgment of political decisionmakers.12o 
Ely notes that prejudice distorts the political process in two ways: 
First, it bars groups that are the objects of widespread vilification from 
the "pluralists' bazaar" that Madison believed would allow groups with 
overlapping interests to create mctiorities on given issues. The adverse 
reaction to the vilified minority prevents groups from recognizing and 
acting upon common interests that would othenvise lead them to form 
coalitions with the minority on certain issues. 121 Second, prejudice 
causes the governmental decisionmakers to misapprehend the costs 
and benefits of their actions,122 because they seize upon positive myths 
about the group to which they belong and negative myths about those 
groups to which they do not. 123 The first defect keeps the political pro-
cess from giving certain minorities in our nation of minorities a chance 
to protect themselves within that process. The second defect prevents 
those who have gained control of the process from rationally and accu-
rately assessing the most efficacious means of achieving even constitu-
tionally legitimate goals. 
Motive and intent are at the center of Ely's theory. The function of 
suspect classification doctrine is to expose unconstitutional motives 
that may have distorted the process.124 A statute that classifies by race 
is strictly scrutinized, because the requirement of "close fit" between 
end sought and means used will reveal those instances where the actual 
motive of the legislature was to disadvantage a group simply because of 
120. 
[P]rejudice is a lens that distorts reality. We are a nation of minorities and our sys-
tem thus depends on the ability and willingness of various groups to apprehend 
those overlapping interests that can bind them into a majority on a given issue; prej-
udice blinds us to overlapping interests that in fact exist .... "Race prejudice divides 
groups that have much in common (blacks and poor whites) and unites groups 
(white, rich and poor) that have little else in common than their antagonism for the 
racial minority. Race prejudice, in short, provides the 'm.yority of the whole' with 
that 'common motive to invade the rights of other citizens' that Madison believed 
improbable in a pluralistic society." 
/d. at 153 (quoting Goodman, supra note 10, at 315). 
121. See note 120 supra and accompanying text. 
122. J. ELY, supra note 116, at 153-58. 
123. Id. at 158-60. 
It is inconsistent with constitutional norms to select people for unusual deprivation 
on the basis of race, religion, or politics, or even simply because the official doing the 
choosing doesn't like them. When such a principle of selection has been employed, 
the system has malfunctioned: indeed we can accurately label such a selection a de-
nial of due process. 
Id. at 137 (footnote omitted); see also Ely, CryilZg JVoif, supra note 116. 
124. J. ELY, supra note 116, at 146, 153; see also note 9 supra. 
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its race}25 
Under present doctrine, the courts look for Ely's process defect only 
when the racial classification appears on the face of the statute or when 
self-conscious racial intent has been proved under the Davis test.126 
But the same process distortions will occur even when the racial preju-
dice is less apparent. Other groups in the body politic may avoid coali-
tion with blacks without a conscious awareness of their aversion to 
blacks or of their association of certain characteristics with blacks. 
They may take stands on issues without realizing that their reasons are, 
in part, racially oriented. Likewise, the governmental decisionmaker 
may be unaware that she has devalued the cost of a chosen path, be-
cause a group with which she does not identify will bear that cost. In-
deed, because of her lack of empathy with the group, she may have 
never even thought of the cost at all. 
Process distortion exists where the unconstitutional motive of racial 
prejudice has influenced the decision. It matters not that the deci-
sionmaker's motive may lie outside her awareness. For example, in Vil-
lage oj Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.,127 a 
predominandy white, upper middle class Chicago suburb prevented the 
construction of a proposed housing development for low and moderate 
income families by refusing to rezone the projected site to allow multi-
family units. The Supreme Court agreed that the decision not to re-
zone had racially discriminatory effects,128 but it rejected the black 
plaintiffs' equal protection claim on the ground that they had "simply 
failed to carry their burden of proving that discriminatory purpose was 
a motivating factor in the Village's decision."129 The Court focused on 
the lack of any evidence of conscious intent to discriminate on the part 
of either the city council in enacting the zoning ordinance that re-
stricted use to single family homes or the planning commission in ad-
ministering the ordinance.13o 
125. J. ELY, supra note 116, at 145-48. 
126. Ely has limited his analysis to demonstrating that suspect classification doctrine 
functions "as a handmaiden of motivation analysis": He shows that when it is impossible to 
confidently demonstrate unconstitutional motive, a suspect classification wiII face serious con-
stitutional difficulty because of the close fit required by strict scrutiny. Obviously, a legislature 
cannot invoke an unconstitutional goal in a statute's defense. Thus, where the legislature's 
real goal was unconstitutional, it wiII probably not be able to invoke the goal that fits the 
classification best; the classification wiII have to be defended in terms of other goals to which it 
relates more tenuously. Id. at 145-46. 
But Davis requires that the plaintiff prove an unconstitutional motive in order to establish 
the presence of a suspect classification. This renders Ely's analysis useless where the suspect 
classification is not apparent on the face of the statute or governmental action. This is the 
usual case, because the governmental actor who is attempting to disguise unconstitutional 
motives wiII also avoid using an obvious suspect classification. 
127. 429 U.S. 252 (1977). 
128. Id. at 269. 
129. Id. at 270. 
130. Id. at 269-70; see Lotero, The Village of Arlington Heights: Equal Protection in the Suburban 
Zone, 4 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q, 361, 373-74 (1977). 
348 STANFORD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:317 
We can enVISIon several possible scenarios that demonstrate the 
possible process-distorting effects of unconscious racism on a govern-
mental decision like that in Arlington Heights: 
(1) The city council refused to rezone for the sole purpose of stig-
matizing and denying housing to blacks. This case resembles Plessy v. 
Ferguson 131 and Gomillion v. Lightfoot,132 in which the only motives were 
unconstitutional, and the ordinances were, therefore, per se 
unconstitutional. 133 
(2) The city claims a legitimate economic or environmental pur-
pose, but evidence shows that it sought to exclude blacks in order to 
achieve that purpose. This case is the same as a classification by race on 
the face of a statute for which a legitimate goal is claimed. It is the case 
Ely describes where blacks are consciously excluded from the political 
process and devalued in the assessment of costs and benefits. When 
this self-conscious motive can be proved, the resulting classification is 
subject to strict scrutiny under existing doctrine. 134 
(3) The purpose of the ordinance was economic-i.e., to keep 
property values up by keeping poor people out-but the deci-
sionmakers associated poverty with blacks and would have weighed the 
costs and benefits differently if the poor people they envisioned exclud-
ing were elderly white people on social security. This "selective sympa-
thy or indifference" 135 could have occurred at a conscious or 
unconscious level. 136 It is more than likely that the decisionmakers 
knew that the poor people they were excluding were black, but they 
would not be likely to have known that they undervalued the cost to 
poor people because they thought of them as black rather than white. 
(4) A constituency within Arlington Heights-for example, elderly 
whites-did not actively campaign for the rezoning because of aversion 
to blacks who might have benefited from it. This occurred despite the 
fact that this constituency's interest in low income housing would 
otherwise have outweighed its interest in property values. This inabil-
ity or unwillingness to apprehend and act upon an overlapping interest 
is precisely the kind of process distortion through group vilification that 
131. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
132. 364 U.S. 339 (1960). 
133. In Gomillion, the Court set aside the Alabama legislature's action changing the 
shape of Tuskegee from a square to a "strangely irregular twenty-eight-sided figure," thereby 
removing from the city all but a handful of black voters but not one white. The Court found 
these facts "[t]antamount for all practical purposes to a mathematical demonstration, that the 
legislation is solely concerned with ... fencing Negro citizens out of the town." [d. at 341. 
134. See Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 264-65; Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-42 
(1976). 
135. "By the phenomenon of racially selective sympathy and indifference I mean the 
unconscious failure to extend to a minority the same recognition of humanity, and hence the 
same sympathy and care, given as a matter of course to one's own group." Brest, supra note 7, 
at 7-8. 
136. See notes 231-238 infra and accompanying text. 
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Ely describes. I37 It is as likely as not that these elderly voters are 
largely unaware of the vilification and resulting aversion that pre-
empted their potential coalition with blacks. 
(5) No one in Arlington Heights thought about blacks one way or 
the other-i.e., it was a fight between environmentalists and develop-
ers-but an inadvertent devaluing of black interests caused inattention 
to the costs blacks would have to bear. If one asked the decisionmakers 
how they had valued the cost to blacks of the exclusionary zoning, they 
might have responded, "I never thought of that." This is an example 
of selective indifference or misapprehension of costs that occurs en-
tirely outside of consciousness. 
The process defect theory sees suspect classification doctrine as a 
roundabout way of uncovering unconstitutional motive by suspecting 
those classifications that disadvantage groups we know to be the object 
of widespread vilification. But by only suspecting laws that classify by 
race on their face or are the result of overtly self-conscious racial moti-
vation, the theory stops an important step short of locating and elimi-
nating the defect it has identified. I3s Where a society has recently 
adopted a moral ethic that repudiates racial disadvantaging for its own 
sake, governmental decisionmakers are as likely to repress their racial 
motives as they are to lie to courts or to attempt after-the-fact rational-
izations of classifications that are no.t racial on their face but that do 
have disproportionate racial impact. I39 Unconscious aversion to a 
group that has historically been vilified distorts the political process no 
less than a conscious decision to place race hatred before politically 
legitimate goals. 
Moreover, unconscious prejudice presents an additional problem in 
that it is not subject to self-correction within the political process. 
When racism operates at a conscious level, opposing forces can attempt 
to prevail upon the rationality and moral sensibility of racism's propo-
nents; the self-professed racist may even find religion on the road to 
Damascus and correct his own ways. But when the discriminator is not 
aware of his prejudice and is convinced that he already walks in the path 
of righteousness, neither reason nor moral persuasion is likely to suc-
ceed. I40 The process defect is all the more intractable, and judicial 
scrutiny becomes imperative. 
B. The Stigma Theory 
A second theory posits elimination of racially stigmatizing actions as 
137. See note 121 supra and accompanying text. 
138. See notes 16,46-111 supra and accompanying texts. 
139. See notes 76-91 supra and accompanying text. 
140. Many blacks find it more difficult to deal with the self-convinced liberal than with 
the admitted racist in working for racial justice. See, e.g., M. KING, WHY WE CAN'T WAIT 87-93 
(1963). 
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the central concern of the equal protection clause. 141 Under this the-
ory, racial classifications should be strictly scrutinized when they oper-
ate to shame and degrade a class of persons by labeling it as inferior. 142 
Stigmatization is the process by which the dominant group in society 
differentiates itself from others by setting them apart, treating them as 
less than fully human, denying them acceptance by the organized com-
munity, and excluding them from participating in that community as 
equals.143 If the equal protection clause guarantees the right to be 
treated as an equal,144 "the constitutional claim in question can be re-
duced to a claim to be free from stigma."145 This theory acknowledges 
a historical experience in which the dominant group has systematically 
used stigmatizing labels against blacks and other nonwhites and has de-
veloped a social system oflaws, practices, and cultural mores that looks 
down upon these groups, treating them as different from, and inferior 
to, the norm.146 
The prevention of stigma was at the core of the Supreme Court's 
unanimous declaration in Brown v. Board oj Education 147 that segregated 
public schools are inherently unequal.148 In observing that the segre-
gation of black pupils "generates a feeling of inferiority as to their sta-
tus in the community,"149 Chief Justice Warren recognized what a 
majority of the Court had ignored almost sixty years earlier in Plessy v. 
Ferguson:150 The social meaning of racial segregation in the United 
States is the designation of a superior and an inferior caste, and segre-
gation proceeds "on the ground that colored citizens are ... inferior 
141. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880) (striking down a state law ex-
cluding blacks from juries). In that case, justice Strong, writing for the court, held that the 
fourteenth amendment protects blacks "from legal discriminations, implying inferiority in 
civil society," and that the West Virginia statute was "practically a brand upon them" and "an 
assertion of their inferiority." !d. at 308; see also Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 560, 562 
(1896) (Harlan,j., dissenting) (referring to the segregation of railway passengers as a "badge 
of servitude" which proceeded "on the ground that colored citizens are ... inferior and de-
graded"); Brest, supra note 7, at 8-12; Karst, supra note 3, at 5-11; Karst, Why Equality Matters, 
17 GA. L. REV. 245 (1983). 
142. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 361-62 (1978) (Brennan,j., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
143. "Erving Goffman, in his profound little book on the subject, shows how stigmatiza-
tion is a process by which we (the so-called 'normals') differentiate them (the stigmatized) 
from us, setting them apart and treating them as not quite human." Karst, supra note 141, at 
248-49 (citing E. GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY 1-9 
(1963»; see also Delgado, supra note 21, at 136-46. 
144. See R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 227 (1977); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CON-
STITUTIONAL LAw 993 (1978). 
145. Karst, supra note 141, at 249. 
146. See Black, The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE LJ. 421, 424 (1960); see 
also C. WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 31-65 (1966); Karst,supra note 141, at 
274; Lawrence, Segregation "Misunderstood"; The Milliken Decision Revisited, 12 U.S.F. L. REV. 15 
(1977). 
147. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
148. "We conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine of 'separate but 
equal' has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal." [d. at 495. 
149. [d. at 494. 
150. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
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and degraded."151 
Stigmatizing actions harm the individual in two ways: They inflict 
psychological injury by assaulting a person's self-respect and human 
dignity,152 and they brand the individual with a sign that signals her 
inferior status to others and designates her as an outcast. 153 The 
stigma theory recognizes the importance of both self-esteem and the 
respect of others for participating in society's benefits and 
responsibilities. 154 
Proponents of this theory have also observed that racial stigma is 
self-perpetuating. Labeling blacks as inferior denies them access to so-
cietal opportunities; as a result, inadequate educational preparation, 
poverty of experience, and insufficient basic necessities limit their abil-
ity to contribute to society, and the prophecy of their inferiority is ful-
filled. 155 Furthermore, separate incidents of racial stigmatization do 
not inflict isolated injuries but are part of a mutually reinforcing and 
pervasive pattern of stigmatizing actions that cumulate to compose an 
injurious whole that is greater than the sum of its parts. 156 
The injury of stigmatization consists of forcing the injured individ-
ual to wear a badge or symbol that degrades him in the eyes of society. 
But in most cases the symbol is not inherently pejorative. Rather, the 
message obtains its shameful meaning from the historical and cultural 
context in which it is used and, ultimately, from the way it is interpreted 
by those who witness it. Thus the woman who is asked to use a sepa-
rate public bathroom from her husband is unlikely to be stigmatized by 
that action: Our society does not ordinarily interpret sex-segregated 
toilet facilities as designating the inferiority of women. 157 By contrast, 
151. [d. at 560 (Harlan,]., dissenting); see also Black, supra note 146, at 427; Brest, supra 
note 7, at 8-9; Cahn,Jurisprudence, 30 N.Y.U. L. REV. 150, 158-59 (1955); Lawrence, supra note 
146, at 26. Note that while formal, legally sanctioned segregation was the chief form of 
stigmatization prior to Brown and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 
241 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1447, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1975a-1975d, 2000a-
2000h-6 (1982», the system has yet to be dismantled, and other stigmatizing mechanisms-
including the exclusion of blacks from private clubs, privately enforced housing discrimina-
tion, and deprecating portrayals of blacks in the media-have reinforced its effects. See Law-
rence, Negroes in Contemporary Society, in MAN, CULTURE AND SOCIETY 52, 59 (C. Lawrence ed. 
1962). For a discussion of segregation as an institutionalized, self-perpetuating mechanism of 
stigmatization, see Lawrence, supra note 146. 
152. See Delgado, supra note 21, at 135-46. 
153. See id. at 135-37, 144-45; Lawrence, supra note 146, at 23-30. 
154. See Karst, supra note 3, at 7 ("Inequality, when 'taken personally' as an index of 
personal worth, directly harms the primary good of self respect. . . . But the harms from 
stigma are not merely psychological. The society also acts toward the stigmatized person on 
the basis of the stigma."); see also Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term-Foreword: On Pro-
tecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARv. L. REv. 7,49 (1969). 
155. See Delgado, supra note 21, at 139-42, 146-47; Lawrence, supra note 146, at 37-38. 
Gunnar Myrdal has identified the circular, self-perpetuating nature of racial prejudice and 
discrimination as the principle of "cumulative causation." See G. MYRDAL, supra note 62, at 75-
76; see also Lawrence, supra note 151, at 55-56. 
156. See Brest, supra note 7, at 10-12; see also Delgado, supra note 21, at 146; Karst, supra 
note 3, at 50-51. 
157. Wasserstrom, supra note 22, at 593. 
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the black who is asked to use a different public bathroom from that of a 
white companion of the same gender is stigmatized. As Richard Was-
serstrom has noted, racially segregated bathrooms were an important 
part of the system of segregation. That system's ideology held not only 
that blacks were less than fully human but also that they were dirty and 
impure. Racially segregated bathrooms ensured that blacks would not 
contaminate the facilities used by whites. I5s 
If stigmatizing actions injure by virtue of the meaning society gives 
them, then it should be apparent that the evil intent of their authors, 
while perhaps sufficient, is not necessary to the infliction of the in-
jury.I59 For example, a well-meaning if misguided white employer, 
having observed that her black employees usually sat together at lunch, 
might build a separate dining room for them with the intent of making 
them more comfortable. This action would stigmatize her black em-
ployees despite her best intentions. 160 Similarly, when the city of Jack-
son, Mississippi closed its public pools after a federal court ordered it 
158. [d. at 592. 
159. Professor Larry Simon has argued that the constitutional harm of stigma cannot 
exist without reference to the motive of the actor who has inflicted the alleged result. Simon, 
Racially Prejudiced Governmental Actions, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1041, 1052-53 (1978). 
[d. 
The difference between insult as a synonym for hurt feelings and as a normative term 
seems to be this: We regard actions taken by others as insults in the latter sense only 
when, in addition to having hurtful effects upon self-respect or pride, we infer that 
the actor made the statement partly because he disliked us or wanted to hurt our 
feelings. Thus, the context in which another acts or speaks often determines 
whether we regard it as insulting. A friend might criticize someone with the avowed 
goal of helping her get along better with others. The criticism might hurt her 
friend's feelings, but it would not be understood as an insult so long as the one 
criticized accepted her friend's account of her goal or motive. Ifan enemy had made 
the same statement without explanation, it might well be taken as an insult. In other 
words, insult and cognate terms imply assessments of attitudes or goals-hence the 
excusing phrase "not intended as an insult." Consequently, if a third person (or a 
court) were called in to resolve a disagreement about whether one person had in-
sulted another, the arbiter could not perform this task without assessing the attitudes 
or goals that underlie the action at issue. 
Simon's analysis incorrectly identifies the governmental actor's injurious intent as distin-
guishing mere "hurt feelings" from the normative injury of stigma. The contextual factor that 
is crucial in determining the presence of stigma is not the actor's intent but the meaning 
others will give the actor's words or actions. A friend's criticism might be made with benign 
motives, but if an observing public understands the words as derogatory, the lack ofintent is 
irrelevant. Likewise, an intended insult that is understood as benign or disregarded by others 
will not be stigmatizing. Simon notes that "some actions or statements become, through ex-
perience, so identified with racial prejudice that we regard them as almost per se racially 
insulting; but this phenomenon occurs only because our experience suggests that such actions 
or statements rarely are taken or made apart from racially prejudiced attitudes. The word 
nigger is an example." [d. at 1053. But the word "nigger" is almost always stigmatizing, be-
cause third parties as well as the individual to whom it is directed will almost always give it a 
derogatory meaning. That it is almost always intended as an insult may determine the mean-
ing it is given, but it is not the significant source of the stigma. See notes 177-296 infra and 
accompanying text. 
160. Cj. note 292 infra (noting some situations where racially segregated facilities may 
not be given stigmatizing meaning). 
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to integrate them,161 the action stigmatized blacks regardless of 
whether the government's purpose was racial or economic. 
Given that stigma occurs whether there is racial animus or not, the 
answer to our initial question, "Is knowledge about the intent of the 
governmental actor significant to the achievement of the equal protec-
tion clause's purpose?" would seem an obvious "No." But many of the 
stigma theory's advocates find themselves in a quandary when faced 
with the question of how the Court should approach laws that are not 
apparently "race-dependent"162 but that result in disparate and stigma-
tizing effects. Kenneth Karst, for example, notes the Supreme Court's 
recent inhospitality to constitutional claims of disproportionate ef-
fect163 and argues that "[s]urely it is still a responsible form of advo-
cacy to argue that some racially disproportionate effects of governmental 
action ought to be subjected to judicial scrutiny at a level higher than 
minimum rationality."I64 He does not, however, elaborate on how the 
Court should determine which cases to include among that "some."165 
Moreover, the origin of his reluctance to advocate increased scrutiny of 
all racially discriminatory impact lies in the disproportionate presence 
of blacks among the poor. He argues that, because the persistence ofa 
racially identifiable economic underclass is probably beyond the capac-
ity of courts to remedy, it is unrealistic to expect the Supreme Court to 
endorse this increased use of strict scrutiny in the near future. 166 
Similarly, Paul Brest, having persuasively argued the need to elimi-
nate racially disproportionate impact that stigmatizes,167 cautions that 
the impact doctrine "cannot reasonably be applied across the board" 
and urges that the doctrine be used "selectively."168 He warns that 
"remedies for disproportionate impact may impose heavy costs on in-
161. See Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971). 
162. I refer to Professor Brest's use of the term "race-dependent," which includes "deci-
sions and conduct ... that would have been different but for the race of those benefited or 
disadvantaged by them." Brest, supra note 7, at 6. 
163. Karst, supra note 141, at 275. 
164. Id. (emphasis added). 
165. Karst identifies some effect cases he would subject to a higher level of scrutiny. He 
refers to Brest's Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, supra note 7, at 10-11; Eisenberg's 
Disproportionate Impact and Illicit Motive, supra note 5, at 36; and his own Equal Citizenship, supra 
note 3, at 49-52. Karst, supra note 141, at 275 n.146. But each of these authors proposes a 
somewhat different approach. Compare Eisenberg, supra note 5, at 89-98 (criticizing Brest's 
view) with Brest, supra note 7, at 6-53. 
166. Karst, supra note 141, at 275. 
167. For Brest, the intent requirement is especially troubling in those cases where race-
dependent decisions are strongly suspected but cannot be proved or where the stigmatic 
harm of past intentional discrimination continues into the present. See Brest, supra note 7, at 
28-29, 35-36. 
168. /d. at 29. Brest argues that the disproportionate impact doctrine sometimes serves 
the antidiscrimination principle by creating a rebuttable presumption of intentional discrimi-
nation. But he stops short of applying a pure uneven impact test "for the reasons suggested 
by Mr. Justice White's parade of horribles in Washington v. Davis." It!. Instead, he expressly 
applies the presumption only in school desegregation and employment discrimination cases. 
It!. at 29-30. 
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stitutions and individuals, and cannot be tailored narrowly to compen-
sate all those and only those whose present situation is the result of 
past discrimination."169 Brest's reference to the overbreadth ofreme-
dies for disproportionate impact adds to the general concern about un-
duly limiting legislative discretion and the particular concern about the 
legitimacy of courts imposing costs on "blameless" individuals and 
conferring benefits on those who have not been directly harmed. I70 
The consideration of unconscious intent responds to both of these 
concerns. Identifying stigmatizing actions that were affected by the ac-
tor's unconscious racial attitudes achieves two benefits. First, it signifi-
cantly decreases the absolute number of impact cases subject to 
heightened scrutiny without eviscerating the substantive content of the 
equal protection clause. The bridge toll, the sales tax, and the filing fee 
can no longer be numbered among the parade ofhorribles that Justice 
White suggested in Davis. I7l At the same time, cases where racially dis-
criminatory impact results directly from past intentional discrimination 
or from current but unprovable racial animus will be well within judicial 
reach. I72 A law does not stigmatize blacks simply because exclusion 
itself is stigmatizing, and, in this instance, they are disproportionately 
represented among the excluded group. Instead, the stigma stems at 
least in part from society's predisposition to exclude blacks. I73 The 
fact that unconscious racial attitudes affected a governmental action is 
evidence that the racially stigmatizing symbolism preexisted the pres-
ent impact. 
Second, consideration of unconscious motivation provides a neutral 
principle for judicial intervention-i.e., the identification of a process 
defect. I74 This counters the argument made against the impact test 
that the judiciary has no principled basis for imposing a priority for the 
removal of racial stigma over other social goods to which the political 
branch might choose to give preeminence. In short, stigma often oc-
curs regardless of the intent of those who have engaged in the stigma-
tizing action. Thus, it is arguable that under the stigma theory neither 
169. /d. at 36; see also N. GLAZER, supra note 31. 
170. See note 10 supra and accompanying text; see also Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 
545-51 (1972) (holding that the fourteenth amendment does not require AFDC funding re-
ductions to be equal to those of other government benefit programs so long as the legisla-
ture's judgment is not "invidious or irrational"). 
171. 426 U.S. 229, 248 & n.14 (1976) (citing Goodman, supra note 10, at 300); see also 
notes 225-228 infra and accompanying text. 
172. These are the two areas where Brest expresses particular concern about the need 
for an impact test. Brest, supra note 7, at 28-31. 
173. For example, there is an important distinction between stigma that is given racial 
meaning by a present contextual setting (Le., a higher percentage of blacks are excluded from 
a neighborhood because a higher percentage of blacks are poor and the cost of housing ex-
cludes them) and stigma that is also influenced by blacks' previous racial stigmatization (Le., a 
higher percentage of blacks are excluded from a neighborhood because the cost of housing 
excludes the poor and because it is a neighborhood where blacks have previously been ex-
cluded solely because of their race). See notes 209-228 infra and accompanying text. 
174. See notes 297-322 infra and accompanying text. 
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conscious nor unconscious intent should be considered, and height-
ened judicial scrutiny should apply in all cases when governmental ac-
tion produces a stigmatizing effect. Nonetheless, recognizing 
unconscious racism provides a mechanism for effectively responding to 
continuing race-based inequalities while minimizing the costs of judi-
cial overreaching. 
While the cultural meaning test identifies the same elements of the 
injury of racial discrimination as does the stigma theory, it differs from 
that theory in two regards. First, it identifies the iJtiury at a different 
point in the constitutional analysis. The stigma theory explains why 
recognized racial classifications-i.e., laws whose racial classification is 
apparent on their face or laws whose racial motive has been proved-
should be subject to heightened judicial scrutiny. In noting that the 
harm of stigma occurs irrespective of the presence of conscious motive, 
the cultural meaning test refocuses the stigma theory's inquiry to a dif-
ferent point in time. The presence of racial stigma is viewed as evi-
dence of the existence of a racial classification, not simply as a 
justification for the heightened scrutiny of such classifications.175 
Second, the cultural meaning test adds content to the stigma the-
ory's analysis. It locates the origin of racial stigma in the accumulation 
of the individual unconscious and finds the origin of unconscious ra-
cism in the presence of widely shared, tacitly transmitted cultural val-
ues. 176 The recognition of these mutually reciprocal origins joins the 
theoretical description of human action as arising out of autonomous 
individual choice with the view that such action is socially determined. 
The cultural meaning theory thus describes a dialectic rather than a 
dichotomy. It demonstrates that ultimately the proponents of the pro-
cess defect theory and the stigma theory have identified different mani-
festations of the same cultural phenomenon. 
III. READING THE MIND'S SYMBOLS: How Do WE IDENTIFY 
UNCONSCIOUS RACISM IN SPECIFIC CASES? 
A. The "Cultural Meaning" Test 
This article's discussion of the stigma theory has anticipated the 
third likely challenge to my thesis that equal protection doctrine must 
address the unconscious racism that underlies much of the racially dis-
proportionate impact of governmental policy. This challenge questions 
how a court would identify those cases where unconscious racism oper-
ated in order to determine whether to subject an allegedly discrimina-
tory act to strict scrutiny. 
I propose a test that would look to the "cultural meaning" of an 
allegedly racially discriminatory act as the best available analogue for 
175. See notes 177-187 infra and accompanying text. 
176. See notes 55·91 supra and accompanying text. 
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and evidence of the collective unconscious that we cannot observe di-
rectly. This test would evaluate governmental conduct to see if it con-
veys a symbolic message to which the culture attaches racial 
significance. The court would analyze governmental behavior much 
like a cultural anthropologist might: by considering evidence regarding 
the historical and social context in which the decision was made and 
effectuated. If the court determined by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that a significant portion of the population thinks of the govern-
mental action in racial terms, then it would presume that socially 
shared, unconscious racial attitudes made evident by the action's mean-
ing had influenced the decisionmakers. As a result, it would apply 
heightened scrutiny. 177 
The unconscious racial attitudes of individuals manifest themselves 
in the cultural meaning that society gives their actions in the following 
way: In a society that no longer condones overt racist attitudes and 
behavior, many of these attitudes will be repressed and prevented from 
reaching awareness in an undisguised form.17S But as psychologists 
have found, repressed wishes, fears, anger, and aggression continue to 
seek expression, most often by attaching themselves to certain symbols 
in the external world. 179 Repressed feelings and attitudes that are com-
monly experienced are likely to find common symbols particularly fruit-
ful or productive as a vehicle for their expression. Thus, certain 
actions, words, or signs may take on meaning within a particular culture 
as a result of the collective use of those actions, words, or signs to rep-
resent or express shared but repressed attitudes. ISO The process is cyc-
lical: The expression of shared attitudes through certain symbols gives 
those symbols cultural meaning, and once a symbol becomes an endur-
ing part of the culture, it in tum becomes the most natural vehicle for 
the expression of those attitudes and feelings that caused it to become 
an identifiable part of the culture. lSI 
177. We can assume that governmental officials are well-integrated members of the cul-
ture-not deviants-and that they, therefore, share the collective unconscious. 
178. See notes 55-75 supra and accompanying text. 
179. See J. KOVEL, supra note 21, at 93-105. See generally S. FREUD, CIVILIZATION AND ITS 
DISCONTENTS, in 21 THE COMPLETE WORKS, supra note 46, at 59; H. MARCUSE, ONE-DIMEN-
SIONAL MAN (1964); H. MARCUSE, EROS AND CIVILIZATION (1955). 
180. See note 179 supra. 
181. Dr. Margaret Lawrence has summarized Dr. Sandor Rado's observations, together 
with her own, regarding the source of "dated emotions" and their role in the creation of 
cultural meaning. Sandor Rado used the term "dated emotions" to refer to those "nonre-
porting" or unconscious aspects of the mind that eventually find outlets in the daily life of an 
individual, including his cultural attitudes: 
"Dated emotions" have their origin early in the life of the individual and represent a 
child's feeling response or responses in his or her day to day relationships with the parent .... 
These early emotions are for good reason kept out of awareness .... 
Emotional responses so derived remain intact during the child's development to adult life 
but on a level of unawareness. They erupt throughout life as dated emotions with teachers, 
husband, and therapist .... 
"Dated emotions" may find their object in a group setting in identification with group 
attitudes towards a common enemy or in identification with a common cause. Members of the 
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Cognitive theory provides an alternative explanation of why the ra-
cial meaning the culture gives an action will be evidence of the actor's 
unconscious racial motivation. According to cognitive theory, those 
meanings or values that are most deeply ingrained in the culture are 
commonly acquired early in life through tacit lessons. They are, there-
fore, less recognizable and less available to the individual's conscious-
ness than other forms of knowledge. Looked at another way, if the 
action has cultural meaning, this meaning must have been transmitted 
to an individual who is a member of that culture. If he professes to be 
unaware of the cultural meaning or attitude, it will almost surely be 
operating at an unconscious level. 182 
Thus, an action such as the construction of a wall between white and 
black communities in Memphis183 would have a cultural meaning grow-
ing out of a long history of whites' need to separate themselves from 
blacks as a symbol of their superiority. Individual members of the city 
council might well have been unaware that their continuing need to 
maintain their superiority over blacks,184 or their failure to empathize 
with how construction of the wall would make blacks feel, influenced 
their decision. 185 But if one were to ask even the most self-deluded 
group share common symbols which are universal defensive choices, related to their own 
dated emotions. In his various roles in society the individual's dated emotions generationally 
achieved contribute to the society, its history and the culture to which the individual belongs. 
Of this the individual is for the most part unaware .... 
Letter from Margaret Morgan Lawrence to Charles R. Lawrence III (Oct. 5, 1985) (includes 
summary of her notes from unpublished lectures delivered by Sandor Rador at the Columbia 
Psychoanalytic Center, New York, New York, 1948-1951) (on file with author). 
182. See notes 76-91 supra and accompanying text. A theory that views stigma as the 
chief substantive harm against which the equal protection clause is directed might well adopt 
a racial meaning test without attempting to demonstrate a connection between the uncon-
scious of the decisionmaker and the meaning society attaches to his action. Under such a 
theory, intent is arguably irrelevant. It is sufficient that the meaning given the action further 
expands the pervasive system of racial stigma. See notes 141-176 supra and accompanying 
text. 
183. City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100 (1981). 
184. Several scholars have criticized Memphis as a poor application of the intent test: 
The closing was effected by the erection of a barrier at the point of separation be-
tween the black and white neighborhoods. It was a unique step, not part of a uni-
form city planning effort, taken at the request of white property owners who 
expressed concern about excess traffic and danger to children. One person soliciting 
signatures for a petition in favor of the street closing had referred to the traffic as 
"undesirable traffic." 
The Court refused to probe beneath the surface of the residents' expressed pur-
poses, asserting that, because the plaintiffs had sued the mayor and city council, it is 
the latter's motivation that must be ascertained. The Court similarly refused to hold 
that the history of resistance to desegregation in Memphis, the fact that the white 
neighborhood in question developed as a result of pre-World War II segregation, 
and evidence of present racial animus required the district court to find that the city 
council's action was racially motivated, since there was no showing that "the resi-
dents of Hein Park would have welcomed the heavy flow of transient traffic through 
their neighborhood if the drivers had been predominantly white." 
Weinzweig, supra note 5, at 330. 
185. Even whites who might admit in an unguarded moment of candor that they con-
tinue to harbor feelings of superiority over blacks would be likely to have convinced them-
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among them what the residents of Memphis would take the existence of 
the wall to mean, the obvious answer would be difficult to avoid.186 If 
one told the story leading to the wall's construction while omitting one 
vital fact-the race of those whose vehicular traffic the barrier ex-
cluded-and then asked Memphis citizens to describe the residents of 
the community claiming injury, few, if any, would not guess that they 
were black. 
The current racial meanings of governmental actions are strong evi-
dence that the process defects of group vilification and misapprehen-
sion of costs and benefits have occurred whether or not the 
decisionmakers were conscious that race played a part in their decision-
making. Moreover, actions that have racial meaning within the culture 
are also those actions that carry a stigma for which we should have spe-
cial concern. This is not the stigma that occurs only because of a coin-
cidental congruence between race and poverty. The association of a 
symbol with race is a residuum of overtly racist practices in the past: 
The wall conjures up racial inferiority, not the inferiority of the poor or 
the undesirability of vehicular traffic. And stigma that has racial mean-
ing burdens all blacks and adds to the pervasive, cumulative, and mutu-
ally reinforcing system of racial discrimination.187 
B. Cultural Meaning as Social Text 
Some may question the competence of courts to apply a test that 
asks them to interpret the meaning of human behavior. Although some 
legal scholars have warmly embraced economics, most remain skeptical 
about the utility of social sciences and the ability of courts to under-
stand and interpret complex social science data. But the interpretation 
of cultural meaning is not so foreign a task for courts as it first appears. 
Indeed, construction of text is the most basic of judicial tasks. And 
while most judicial interpretation involves determining the meaning of 
written text, legal theorists have recognized that meaningful human be-
havior can be treated as a "text-analogue."188 The context in which 
both written and social text is read can give it meaning beyond its au-
thors' original intention:189 The social text of human action, like the 
selves that this particular decision was not influenced by those feelings. Justice Stevens' 
opinion in Memphis is itself an example of how a decision need not involve self-conscious 
racial animus to be race-dependent. Stevens' failure to recognize racial intent in the Memphis 
city council's decision is certainly not the result of conscious racial bias, but it may well be the 
product of unconscious selective sympathy. 
186. See Black, supra note 146, at 424. 
187. See note 156 supra; notes 209-224 infra and accompanying text. 
188. See Grey, The Constitution as Scripture, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1,4-5 (1984). 
189. 
In spoken discourse, the subjective intention of the speaker and the objective mean-
ing of the discourse overlap, while with written discourse the meaning of the text is 
disassociated from the mental intention of the author and the two no longer coin-
cide. Likewise, spoken discourse ultimately refers to the contextual situation com-
mon to the speaker and the listener. Texts, on the other hand, speak about the 
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written text, is judged not just by those who are present when it takes 
place but by all who come to know of it. 190 
In fact, courts frequently interpret the meaning of social phenom-
ena. In establishment clause cases, the Court determines whether a 
governmental practice advances or inhibits religion by inquiring into 
the meaning the culture gives that practice: When a municipality in-
cludes a creche in its annual Christmas display, will most observers un-
derstand the creche as "a symbol of Christian beliefs and a symbol of 
the city's support for those beliefs,"191 or will they interpret the display 
as merely depicting "the historical origins of [a] traditional event long 
recognized as a National Holiday"?192 In determining the scope of the 
"zones of privacy"193 that the fourteenth amendment's due process 
clause protects, the Court has interpreted the concept of the family by 
referring to the meaning that the history and traditions of our culture 
have given it.194 The Court has also defined the scope of the fourth 
amendment's protection against warrantless search and seizure by ask-
ing whether an individual has a "reasonable expectation of privacy" in 
the searched premises. 195 
world. The text frees itself from the reference of the particular situation in which its 
author speaks and creates its own universe of references. 
P. RICOEUR, HERMENEUTICS AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES 200-02 (1981); see also Taylor, Interpreta-
tion and the Sciences of Man, in UNDERSTANDING AND SOCIAL INQUIRY 101 (F. Dallmayr & T. 
McCarthy eds. 1977). 
190. See Brest, Interpretation and Interest, 34 STAN. L. REv. 765, 767-68 (1982). See generally 
P. RICOEUR, supra note 189. In the same way that a text is detached from its author, an action 
is detached from the actor and develops consequences of its own. This autonomy of human 
action constitutes the social dimension of action. 
To what extent may we say that what is done is inscribed? Certain metaphors may be 
helpful at this point. We say that such-and-such event left its mark on time. We speak 
of marking events. Are not there "marks" on time, the kind of thing which calls for a 
reading, rather than for a hearing? 
Id. at 205-06. Furthermore, action shares with text the characteristic of being addressed to an 
infinite range of possible readers or interpreters. 
[L]ike a text, human action is an open work, the meaning of which is "in suspense." 
It is because it "opens up" new references and receives fresh relevance from them, 
that human deeds are also waiting for fresh interpretations which decide their mean-
ing. All significant events and deeds are, in this way, opened to this kind of practical 
interpretation through present praxis. Human action, too, is opened to anybody who 
can read. 
Id. at 208. 
191. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 705 (1984) (Brennan,j., dissenting). 
192. /d. at 680; see also Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (statute requiring posting of 
ten commandments on public school classroom walls); School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 
(1963) (Bible reading as opposed to Bible study). 
193. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973). 
194. See, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494,503-05 (1977) (finding that 
a municipal housing ordinance that limited occupancy of a dwelling unit to certain categories 
offamily members unnecessarily intruded upon the freedom of personal choice in matters of 
family life: "Ours is by no means a tradition limited to respect for the bonds uniting the 
members of the nuclear family. The tradition of uncles, aunts, cousins, and especially grand-
parents sharing a household along with parents and children has roots equally venerable and 
equally deserving of constitutional recognition."). 
195. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, j., concurring); see, e.g., 
360 STANFORD LA W REVIEW [Vol. 39:317 
In considering the constitutionality of statutes and regulations chal-
lenged on sex discrimination grounds, the Court has held that the legis-
lature may not make overbroad generalizations that "demean the 
ability or social status of the affected class."196 It determines whether 
legislation transgresses this prohibition by asking whether the law 
"tends to perpetuate the stereotyped view" of women.197 This ques-
tion is not answered by determining whether the legislature intended to 
stereotype women but by interpreting the contemporary community 
consensus regarding the message the legislation conveys-that is, its 
cultural meaning. The legislation can only perpetuate a stereotype if it 
triggers existing preconceptions in the culture: men as breadwinners 
and women as dependents,198 men as property managers and women 
as homemakers,199 young men as sexually aggressive and women as 
weak and in need ofprotection,2oo women as nurses and men as not.201 
Given that courts engage in cultural anthropological inquiry so 
often, why is there such resistance to a similar inquiry in racial discrimi-
nation cases? One possible explanation lies in the fact that social scien-
tists can rarely prove the causal relationships that support their 
hypotheses. For example, courts have looked to social science to prove 
whether or not integrated schools will improve the educational achieve-
ment of black children202 and whether or not differential school ex-
penditures will make a difference in students' educational 
opportunities.203 Our misgivings about allowing judicial decisions to 
turn on social science evidence are prompted, in large part, by social 
California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985) (anthropological inquiry into whether a "Dodge 
Mini Motor Home" is a vehicle or a home). 
196. Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 469 (1981) (quoting Parham v. 
Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 354 (1979». 
197. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 729 (1982). 
198. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 681 (1973). 
199. Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 459 (1981); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 74 
(1971). 
200. Michael M., 450 U.S. at 467-69. 
201. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 723-27. 
202. Despite the centrality of social science research in the Court's opinion in Brown I, see 
note 204 infra, courts have rarely relied directly upon social science research to determine 
whether segregation is unconstitutional. They have, however, referred to social science re-
search in determining the nature and extent of remedies. See Levin, School Desegregation Reme-
dies and the Role of Social Science Research, 42 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (1978). The social 
science literature on the effects of desegregation is immense. For an overview of this litera-
ture, see D. KIRP & M. YUDOF, EDUCATIONAL POLICY AND THE LAw 494-507 (2d ed. 1982). 
203. Serrano v. Priest, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 557 P.2d 929, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1976), mt. 
denied, 432 U.S. 907 (1977); see also Lujan v. Colorado State Bd. ofEduc., 649 P.2d 1005 (Colo. 
1982) (en bane); Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 376 A.2d 359 (1977); Caldwell v. State, 
No. 50616 Uohnson County Dist. Ct., Kan., Aug. 30, 1972); Robinson v. Cahill, 62 NJ. 473, 
303 A.2d. 273, ccrt. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973); Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 94 Misc. 2d 466, 
408 N.Y.S.2d 606 (1978), modified, 83 A.D.2d 217, 443 N.Y.S.2d 843 (1981), modified, 57 
N.Y.2d 27, 439 N.E.2d 359, 453 N.Y.S.2d 643 (1982), appeal dismissed, 459 U.S. 1138 (1983); 
Pauley v. Kelly, 162 W. Va. 672, 255 S.E.2d 859 (1979); Washakie County School Dist. No.1 
v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo. 1980). 
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science's inability to prove or disprove such propositions.204 
If the proposed cultural meaning test required the courts to rely 
upon social scientists to conclusively demonstrate causal relationships 
between challenged governmental actions and harm to blacks, it would 
be subject to similar criticism concerning the inadequacy of social sci-
ence methodology. But there is another kind of judgment or analysis 
that historians, economists, sociologists, anthropologists, and other so-
cial scientists make. This is interpretive judgment. As Ronald Dworkin 
has explained, causal judgments assert a causal connection between 
two independently specifiable social phenomena. An interpretive judg-
ment, on the other hand, locates a particular phenomenon within a cat-
egory of phenomena by specifying its meaning in the society within 
which it occurs.205 
Two of the more successful defenders of the Brown decision, 
Charles Black and Edgar Cahn, have argued that the question of the 
Court's reliance on social science evidence was beside the point: The 
constitutional rights at stake rested not upon that evidence but upon 
the insulting and degrading quality of segregation itsel£ 206 But Dwor-
kin points out that to argue that segregation is unconstitutional because 
it is an insult is not to argue that Brown was based on a value judgment 
distinct from a social science judgment. He notes that what Black and 
Cahn meant was that the decision rested on interpretive, not causal, 
judgments. To say that we don't need evidence for the proposition that 
segregation is an insult to the black community is not to say that we 
don't need to know it or that there is nothing to know. "There is a fact 
of the matter, namely that segregation is an insult, but we need no evi-
dence for that fact-we just know it. It's an interpretive fact."207 
It is this type of interpretive judgment that the cultural meaning test 
requires. The search for cultural meaning is necessarily an interpretive 
task. The distinction between causal and interpretive analysis is crucial, 
204. Social scientists typically argue for or against causal judgments by means ofstatisti-
cal correlations. Physical scientists, in contrast, can usually produce a mechanical model that 
explains cause and effect. When causal judgments are based upon correlations among ob-
served phenomena, an element of arbitrariness is necessarily introduced by the choice of cate-
gories that are correlated and by the selection of samples from which the data is gathered. 
Moreover, the data or behavior that produce the correlation are subject to rapid change. 
One example of this kind of criticism of the judicial use of social science data was the 
reaction to the Brown Court's reliance on data produced by social psychologist Dr. Kenneth 
Clark about the effects of school segregation on the self-image of black children. See Brown v. 
Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 n.ll (1954) (citing K. Clark, Effect of Prejudice and Dis-
crimination on Personality Development (Mid-century White House Conference on Children 
and Youth, 1950». Chief Justice Warren was attacked for "relying more on social scientists 
than on legal precedents." See R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 711 (1976) (quoting columnist 
James Reston as saying that "[t]he Court's opinion read more like an expert paper on sociol-
ogy than a Supreme Court opinion"). 
205. Dworkin, Social Sciences and Constitutional Rights: The Consequences of Uncertainty, 6 J.L. 
& EDUC. 3 (1977) (noting that causal and interpretive judgments are not mutually exclusive 
but are distinguishable, and that the distinction is important). 
206. See id. at 5,21; see also Black, supra note 146; Cahn, supra note 151, at 157-68. 
207. Dworkin, supra note 205, at 5. 
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because the objections to the use of social science evidence to prove 
causal relationships do not apply to interpretive judgments such as the 
judgment that a particular practice will have a racially insulting mean-
ing. Moreover, much of what judges do entails this kind of interpreta-
tion: It requires the same skills they employ when they decide a case by 
characterizing or interpreting a line of precedent in the way that seems 
most true to them.208 
C. Some Easy Cases 
Applying the cultural meaning test to a series of cases is the best 
way to examine its operative effect.209 These first cases are "easy" in 
that there will be little disagreement about whether the governmental 
action in question has racial meaning in our culture. They are cases 
like the segregated beach, which clearly has racial meaning, and the 
increased bridge toll, which clearly does not. These cases are instruc-
tive for two reasons: The lack of ambiguity in the meaning that will 
attach to the governmental action allows us to see more clearly the rela-
tionship between cultural meaning and unconscious intent; further-
more, these cases demonstrate the usefulness of a test that 
distinguishes governmental actions that have racial meaning in addition 
to racially disparate impact from those that have only racially disparate 
impact. 
1. Brown v. Board oj Education. 2 10 
Charles Black first discussed the "social meaning" of segregation in 
his brilliantly simple and succinct defense of Brown, The Lawfulness of the 
Segregation Decisions. 211 He begins with history,212 and notes that segre-
gation was the direct descendant of slavery and the black codes and an 
"integral part of the movement to maintain white supremacy."213 Seg-
regation was not a case of mutual separation but a system that one 
group imposed on another. Black points to its contextual association 
208. Several authors have argued that the judiciary's task is and should be interpretive. 
See, e.g., Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057 (1975); Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten 
Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703 (1975). More recently, Grey has argued that all plausible 
constitutional theories are "interpretivist." See Grey, supra note 188; see also Brest, The Miscon-
ceived Questfor the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REV. 204, 204 n.l (1980). 
209. I have used both real and hypothetical cases to facilitate my discussion. 
210. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
211. Black, supra note 146. 
212. Actually, he begins with "laughter" at the idea that anyone could seriously advance 
the argument that segregation could provide equal treatment. Black then refers to his own 
experience: 
I was raised in the South, in a Texas city where the pattern of segregation was firmly 
fixed. I am sure it never occurred to anyone, white or colored, to question its mean-
ing. The fiction of "equality" is just about on a level with the fiction of "finding" in 
the action of trover. I think few candid southerners deny this. 
[d. at 424. 
213. /d. at 424-25. 
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with other "indisputably and grossly" discriminatory practices, such as 
exclusion from the vote, and to the manner in which segregation as a 
pattern of law often combined with extralegal patterns of discrimina-
tion.214 That "separate but equal" facilities were almost never really 
equal is evidence not just of the material inequality they imposed but 
also of the meaning of segregation to the people who imposed it.215 
He cites the facts that it was actionable defamation in the South to call a 
white man a Negro and that "a small proportion of Negro 'blood' put 
one in the inferior race for segregation's purposes" as further evidence 
of segregation's meaning.216 
Professor Black closes his catalogue of particulars with the observa-
tion that the points he has made "are matters of common knowledge, 
matters not so much for judicial notice as for the background knowl-
edge of educated men who live in the world."217 Given this common 
knowledge, it is difficult, if not impossible, to envision how a govern-
mental decisionmaker might issue an order to segregate without in-
tending, consciously or unconsciously, to injure blacks. Could the 
defendants in Brown have escaped this meaning? Could anyone who 
grew up in the system Charles Black describes have made a decision to 
put black and white children in separate schools without that decision 
being influenced by race? 
The "common knowledge," or clear meaning, Black describes is evi-
dence of shared cultural attitudes that have expressed themselves in 
cultural symbols. The actions involved could have nothing other than a 
racial meaning within our society.218 But for purposes of our present 
analysis, the most important thing to recognize is that an action's mean-
ing derives from a long-term and pervasive association of certain feel-
ings or thoughts with that action. Feelings and thoughts that have 
become sufficiently widespread and internalized to express themselves 
in a system of social symbols or meanings do not disappear with the 
enactment of civil rights legislation. The feelings may be repressed 
from consciousness, but so long as the symbols they have created retain 
their meaning, the feelings continue to exist and to shape behavior. 
2. Memphis v. Greene.219 
This case is almost as easy as Brown. Memphis is a city whose public 
facilities were segregated by law until 1965. It has the same historical 
background as that described by Professor Black, and its social mores 
214. Id. at 425. Although these extralegal patterns of discrimination are generally not 
state actions, they can nevertheless assist us in understanding the meaning and assessing the 
impact of state actions. 
215. See notes 147-151 supra and accompanying text. 
216. Black, supra note 146, at 425-26. 
217. Id. at 426. 
218. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242-43, 244 n.12 (1976) (citing cases where 
impact is sufficient to demonstrate intent). 
219. City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100 (1981). 
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have changed only slightly in the twenty-five years since Black wrote.220 
What does it mean to construct a barrier between all-white and all-black 
sections of Memphis? In a city where just twenty years ago such barri-
ers were built down the middle of rest rooms and restaurants with signs 
on them that read "white" and "colored," won't there be considerable 
consensus as to whether the barrier speaks in racial terms? Won't there 
be a cultural memory that gives the barrier the same meaning even in 
the absence of the now-outlawed signS?221 Is it possible that a council 
member in this city would not have remembered the message conveyed 
by those earlier barriers when he voted to construct the present one? 
I think it is impossible.222 Race cannot have been irrelevant in a 
decision that all know has a racial meaning-one that signifies the infer-
iority of blacks. That meaning says that the peace and quiet of a white 
neighborhood has been weighed against the stigmatization of blacks. 
The decision to build the barrier issues the statement that white tran-
quility is more important than black pride. In the contextual reality of 
Memphis, the message is as clear as if the declaration were painted on 
the wall itself. 
This is a racial classification; as a consequence, it has a much greater 
constitutional significance than either a declaration that rich people's 
tranquility is more important than poor people's pride223 or a declara-
tion that downtown residents' tranquility is more important than up-
town residents' vehicular access.224 If the governmental decisionmaker 
has somehow blinded herself to the inevitable intrusion of the issue of 
race on the process by relegating the issue to her unconscious, the 
court should not follow suit. 
3. Nonracial actions. 
At the opposite end of the spectrum is a hypothetical increase in the 
municipal railway fare in a racially and economically diverse municipal-
ity. It may be more burdensome on the relatively poor person who 
must use that transportation than on the relatively rich individual. It 
may also be true that nonwhites are disproportionately represented 
among the poor and that, therefore, the increase has a racially disparate 
220. See Henderson, A Failed Revolution: Civil Rights in the South; Jim Crow Lives On in Dixie, 
S.F. Examiner, Apr. 6, 1982, at 4, col. 1. 
221. Like the "freedom of choice" plan struck down in Green v. County School Bd., 391 
u.S. 430 (1968), the signs have been removed, but those who live in the county will continue 
to see "white" and "colored" schools. See Lawrence, supra note 146, at 34-39 (criticizing Green 
in light of the history of segregation). 
222. The council member may, however, have repressed the memory of this message in 
his decision to construct the wall. 
223. Unlike classifications based on race, wealth classifications have been held not sus-
pect. See San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
224. The Supreme Court minimally scrutinizes laws that are racially neutral and that 
regulate economic activity. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Rail-
way Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949). 
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impact.225 But there is no history of using bus or train fares as a way to 
designate nonwhites as inferior,226 and, most importantly, we do not 
think of fare increases in racial terms. 
The same would be true of an increase in the sales tax, the fee for 
obtaining a driver's license, or the cost of a building permit. These are 
all cases where the impact on blacks in a particular instance may be 
greater than it is on whites. They are also cases where some stigma may 
attach to those who are excluded by the governmental action. But we 
are likely to think of the in-group and out-group in economic rather 
than racial terms. These actions do not contribute directly to the sys-
tem of beliefs that labels blacks as inferior.227 Where the culture as a 
whole does not think of an action in racial terms, it is also unlikely that 
unconscious attitudes about race influenced the governmental 
decisionmaker. 
The easy cases at this end of the spectrum are precisely the kind of 
cases to which Justice White alluded in Davis when he warned that a 
discriminatory impact standard might invalidate "a whole range of tax, 
welfare, public service, regulatory, and licensing statutes that may be 
more burdensome to the poor and to the average black than to the 
more affluent white."228 The cultural meaning test, by distinguishing 
racially stigmatizing statutes from those that only stigmatize indirectly 
through their economic impact, would go a long way toward obviating 
Justice White's concern. 
D. Some Harder Cases 
Where there is less agreement about the social meaning of allegedly 
discriminatory governmental action, the application of the cultural 
meaning test will, of course, be more difficult. But the process of apply-
ing the test and its underlying rationale will be the same. By looking at 
225. "Disparate impact" is a tenn of art which the Supreme Court has adopted in deci-
sions interpreting Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982). Disparate 
impact cases "involve employment practices that are facially neutral ... but that in fact fall 
more harshly on one group than another and cannot be justified by business necessity." In-
ternational Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 n.15 (1977). 
226. Cf Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (declaring poll tax 
unconstitutional). Because of the historical use of the poll ta.'i: as a racially exclusionary device 
and because of the systematic exclusion of blacks from the judicial system in certain areas, 
increasing the fees necessary to gain access to the political process or judicial system may have 
racial meaning. 
227. There is, of course, an indirect route whereby the disparate impact confinns the 
belief in racial inferiority, but I am attempting to limit the merging of economic and racial 
discrimination by distinguishing direct racial insult from the indirect stigma of economic 
discrimination. 
228. Davis, 426 U.S. at 248; see al50Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 549 (1972). Fora 
discussion suggesting that disproportionate impact analysis might invalidate tests and qualifi-
cations for voting, draft defennent, public employment, jury service, and other government-
conferred benefits as well as sales ta.'i:es, bail schedules, bridge tolls, license fees, and other 
government-imposed charges, see Goodman, supra note 10, at 300; see also Demsetz, Minorities 
in tile Markel Place, 43 N.C.L. REV. 271 (1965); Silvennan, Equal Protection, Economic Legislation, 
and Raaal Discrimination, 25 VAND. L. REV. 1183 (1972). 
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how the test might be applied to several more difficult cases, this sec-
tion explores in greater detail how a court might gather and interpret 
evidence of cultural meaning. 
1. Arlington Heights.229 
In Arlington Heights, a nonprofit development corporation obtained a 
purchase option on fifteen acres ofland on which it planned to develop 
a federally subsidized, racially integrated, low and moderate income 
townhouse project. The proposed site of the project was in the Village 
of Arlington Heights, a Chicago suburb of over 64,000 residents of 
whom, as of 1970, twenty-seven were black.23o Because the site was 
zoned for single family dwellings, the development corporation peti-
tioned the village to rezone the property for multiple family use. When 
the village board of trustees, following the recommendation of the 
planning commission, denied the rezoning request, the developer and 
three blacks who were prospective tenants of the proposed project filed 
suit in federal district court. 
Several kinds of evidence would be available to demonstrate that 
denying the zoning variance in these circumstances has a cultural 
meaning that demeans blacks. Initially, plaintiffs could present evi-
dence of the historical and contemporaneous meaning of residential 
segregation in the culture as a whole. This would include the history of 
statutorily mandated housing segregation231 as well as the use of re-
strictive covenants among private parties that aim to prevent blacks 
from purchasing property in white neighborhoods.232 Studies of ra-
cially segregated housing patterns throughout the United States and in 
the areas surrounding Arlington Heights233 as well as data and attitudi-
229. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 
(1977). 
230. Id. at 255. 
231. See Harmon v. Tyler, 273 U.S. 668 (1927); Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917); 
see also L. LITWACK, NORTH OF SLAVERY: THE NEGRO IN THE FREE STATES 1790-1860, at 168-70 
(1961); D. McKAy, HOUSING AND RACE IN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY 45-77 (1977). 
Note that the Supreme Court in Arlington Heights, listed "historical background of the 
decision" as one of the evidentiary factors appropriate to a determination of the presence or 
absence of discriminatory purpose, but the Court then went on to limit its historical inquiry to 
the immediate legislative and administrative history of the decision, omitting any mention of 
broader historical context. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 267. The historical use ofa cultural 
symbol is even more directly related to a determination of contemporary social meaning and 
unconscious motivation. 
232. See Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953); Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948); 
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); see also C. ABRAMS, FORBIDDEN NEIGHBORS 224-25 
(1955) (describing a seemingly inexhaustible series of devices to protect the exclusiveness of 
white residential areas). 
233. See generally J. KUSHNER, APARTHEID IN AMERICA (1980); SEGREGATION IN RESIDEN-
TIAL AREAS (A. Hawley & V. Rock eds. 1973); Farley, Residential Segregation and its Implications/or 
School Integration, 39 L<\w & CONTEMP. PROBS. 164 (1975); Grodzins, Metropolitan Segregation, 
SCI. AM., Oct. 1957, at 33; u.S. Housing Segregated and Unequa~ Report Says, S.F. Examiner, Feb. 
11, 1985, at A6, col. 1. 
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nal surveys on residential segregation and "white flight"234 would also 
be relevant. Such studies have indicated that collective and individual 
tolerances for black neighbors vary from community to community.235 
While they ascribe the intolerance to different causes,236 they agree 
substantially on the prominence ofrace in the minds of both those who 
flee and those who stay. They also note whites' continuing aversion to 
housing integration.237 
The body of evidence that documents our culture's frequent attach-
ment of racial meaning to the very existence of segregated housing is 
extensive and should be more than sufficient to establish the cultural 
meaning of the Arlington Heights city officials' action. We have rarely 
come to live in racially segregated enclaves as the result of happen-
stance or out of mutual choice. We live in segregated neighborhoods 
because whites have believed that living with or close to blacks lowers 
their own status. Where one lives is an important index of one's status 
in our culture, and to live in proximity to those who are looked down 
upon is to be looked down upon oneself. 238 
This evidence of what racially segregated housing patterns mean in 
our culture would not be the only evidence available to the court. 
There is also direct evidence of the meaning Arlington Heights resi-
dents attached to the city's decision denying the zoning variance. The 
planning commission considered the proposal at a series of three pub-
lic meetings which drew large crowds. Many of those in attendance 
were quite vocal and demonstrative in their opposition to the project, 
although some spoke in support of rezoning. But both opponents and 
supporters referred to the "social issue"-the desirability or undesir-
ability of introducing low and moderate income housing that would 
probably be racially integrated into this area of Arlington Heights.239 
The Supreme Court in Arlington Heights noted this evidence and ob-
served that some opponents of the housing project "might have been 
234. For a discussion of several studies and opinion polls indicating substantial white 
resistance to housing integration and documenting the phenomenon of "white flight," see 
Ackerman, Integration/or Subsidized Housing and the QJrestion of Racial Occupancy Controls, 26 STAN. 
L. REv. 245, 253-54 (1974). 
235. Studies of "white flight" have explored both the racial transition of neighborhoods 
directly attributable to residential integration and the movement of whites to the suburbs as a 
result of school desegregation. The former phenomenon is known as the "tipping principle," 
according to which white families will leave a neighborhood when the black percentage of the 
population exceeds a certain point, usually somewhere between 30% and 50%. See id. at 251-
55. 
236. See id. at 251-66. 
237. See Pettigrew, Attitudes on Race and Housing, in SEGREGATION IN RESIDENTIAL AREAS, 
supra note 233, at 21-29; see also Fremger, Housing Discrimination: A Problem that Won't Go Away, 
Wash. Post,July 17, 1982, at El, col. 1. 
238. See D. BELL, supra note 21, at 475 ("Housing is not only shelter, it represents status, 
and the general view is that blacks residing in a neighborhood will lower the status and hence 
the value of property in the area."); see also K. CLARK, DARK GHETTO 32-33 (1965). 
239. Arlington Heights, 429 u.S. at 257-58. 
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motivated by opposition to minority groupS."240 But the Court went 
on to affirm the trial court's holding that the evidence "[did] not war-
rant the conclusion that this [racial opposition] motivated the defend-
ants."241 If, however, this same evidence is considered for the purpose 
of determining the cultural meaning of the city's action, it is far more 
probative. Even the court's terse description of the public meetings 
makes clear that race was prominent in the minds of both opponents 
and proponents of the project. The trial court, in its search for discrim-
inatory purpose, found that the obvious prominence of the race issue 
did not warrant a finding of racial motivation.242 But, if the court's in-
quiry had focused on the meaning this community attached to the deci-
sion to exclude the project, this evidence of heated debate on the 
question of race would necessarily carry a great deal more weight.243 
A final source of evidence regarding the racial meaning of the city's 
action is the unreasonableness of the nonracial criteria upon which the 
zoning board relied. Single family residences constituted the dominant 
and preferred land use in the village; the board invoked a "buffer pol-
icy" that restricted multiple family residences to areas between single 
family zones and commercial or industrial zones as its reason for deny-
ing the rezoning request.244 But the proposed multiple family resi-
dences were not high-density apartments. The project would have 
consisted of twenty two-story buildings on fifteen acres ofland, 60 per-
cent of which would have remained open space; a screen of trees and 
shrubs would have separated the project from neighboring houses.245 
There would have been little to distinguish the project from the tracts 
of small lot, single family dwellings in the area. Applying the "buffer 
policy" in this case, where none of the legitimate purposes underlying 
the policy existed, should cast some doubt on whether these "normal 
criteria" were applied for "normal"-that is, nonracial-reasons.246 
Alternatively, it may indicate the decisionmakers' unconscious, stereo-
typed view of housing occupied by nonwhites: Their image of what the 
project would look like may have been influenced as much by their ex-
240. /d. at 269. 
241. /d. at 269. 
242. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 373 F. Supp. 208, 
211 (N.D. Ill. 1974), rev'd, 517 F.2d 409 (7th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 429 U.S. 252 (1977). 
243. By asking whether race was a motivating factor, the Supreme Court discounted the 
evidence of racial bias with evidence of racially neutral intentions and normal procedures. 
Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 269, 270 n.21. But under a cultural meaning approach, such 
discounting would not be appropriate. Even if we accept the Court's conclusions that the 
decisionmakers ultimately based their decision on noninvidious factors, the tenor of the pub-
lic meetings and the views expressed therein are strong evidence of how the community inter-
preted the decision and of the unconscious attitudes that were manifested by that decision. 
244. [d. at 270-71. 
245. /d. at 257-58. The Supreme Court found that no novel criteria had been applied to 
the project, but it did not consider the reasonableness of the application of the criteria that 
were used. 
246. See Lotero, supra note 130, at 376-77. 
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pectations about housing occupied by blacks as by the actual plan and 
drawings presented. 
Our culture attaches racial meaning to residential segregation. 
When we see an all-white neighborhood in close proximity to an all-
black one, we do not imagine that it is white because its inhabitants' 
forebears settled there generations ago or that blacks have chosen not 
to live there.247 Our initial thought is that it is white because nonwhites 
have been excluded. This cultural meaning is evidence that no one 
who is a part of this culture could have made a decision like that made 
in Arlington Heights without race on his mind, the effectiveness of our 
psychodynamic censors notwithstanding. Furthermore, this cultural 
meaning is considerably more relevant to the stigmatizing injury that 
blacks suffer than is the conscious intent of the decisionmakers. If our 
culture interprets a decision to exclude blacks from a neighborhood as 
evidence of blacks' continued untouchability, that decision becomes 
part of the system of mutually reinforcing racial stigma that denies 
blacks the status of full humanity.248 
2. Washington v. Davis.249 
Davis presents a more difficult case than Arlington Heights. Two un-
successful black candidates for positions in the District of Columbia 
Metropolitan Police Department alleged that some of the Department's 
hiring practices-particularly "Test 21," a written test that blacks failed 
at a rate roughly four times that of whites25°-discriminated against 
blacks and violated the guarantee of equal protection implicit in the 
fifth amendment's due process clause. "Test 21," which was used 
throughout the federal civil service, was designed to test verbal ability, 
vocabulary, reading, and comprehension. While the Court found that 
the test was a useful indicator of success in police training school, there 
was no proof that either the test scores or the school's examination 
scores predicted job performance or measured success in job-related 
training.251 
What evidence might the plaintiffs have presented to establish that 
the government's action in this case had racial meaning? Unlike segre-
gated housing, we do not ordinarily associate the use of civil service 
exams with race. But an action that has no racial meaning in one con-
text may have significant racial meaning in another. We have seen that 
human behavior must be examined in context, as it may well derive its 
meaning from the specific historical and cultural milieu in which it takes 
247. There are many places where both of these possibilities are likely to be true, includ-
ing North Dakota, Minnesota, and Idaho. But these are not the locations where housing dis-
crimination cases have arisen. 
248. See note 156 supra and accompanying text. 
249. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
250. [d. at 237. 
251. [d. at 256-70 (Brennan, j., dissenting). 
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place. Despite the race-neutral origins of civil service exams as a ge-
neric entity, one has an intuitive sense that their use in this case has 
racial connotations-that this case is more like the Memphis wall than it 
is like an increased bus fare or a regressive tax. It is important to pay 
heed to one's intuitions at this juncture. One individual's gut feeling is 
hardly conclusive evidence of cultural meaning, but such feelings often 
derive from feelings that are more widely shared, and they may well 
indicate that more substantial testimony is available. 
At this point, it is helpful to consider the setting in which "Test 21" 
was employed. Can one identify the contextual elements that have at-
tracted the attention of our intuition? Are there elements not present 
in other civil service cases, elements that speak in terms of race? The 
most obvious racial element is the exam's racially disproportionate im-
pact. One can argue that the government's action racially stigmatizes 
because blacks fail the exam in larger numbers than whites. But not 
every case of racially disparate impact has racial meaning. An increased 
bus fare may burden a larger percentage of blacks than whites, but we 
do not think of the fare increase as a direct stigmatization of blacks. It 
does not convey a message of racial inferiority.252 Thus, if the govern-
mental action in Davis conveys a racial message, it must derive that 
meaning from something other than, or in addition to, its racial impact. 
Like the traffic barrier in Memphis v. Greene, there must be something in 
the particulars of its historical and cultural context that causes us to 
interpret this action-at least intuitively-in racial terms. 
I suggest that there are two such elements. The first involves the 
nature of the work or activity from which blacks have been excluded: 
the job of police officer in a predominantly but not entirely black com-
munity. The second relates to the reason given for their exclusion: 
that they failed to demonstrate sufficient proficiency in verbal and writ-
ten language skills. 
It is significant that the challenged action in Davis excluded blacks 
from working as police officers and not as mail carriers or bus drivers. 
The occupation of police officer has symbolic meaning within our cul-
ture. Police officers represent the law as well as enforce it. They are 
armed and have discretionary authority to use violence. They are 
charged with protecting the lives and property of some individuals 
within society and controlling the violent and unlawful behavior of 
others. If history-the accumulated meaningful behavior of our cul-
ture-has taught us to attach significance to race in considering these 
elements of the job of police officer-authority, control, protection, 
and sanctioned violence-then an action that determines the racial 
composition of a police force also has racial meaning. 
Furthermore, throughout American history police forces have had a 
different relationship to black communities than to white communities. 
252. See notes 225-228 supra and accompanying text. 
January 1987] UNCONSCIOUS RACISM 371 
In white communities, the police officer is viewed as a public servant. 
His job is to protect the lives and property of those in the community 
where he works. But the job of the law enforcement officer in black 
communities has been to control the communities' inhabitants and to 
protect the lives and property of whites who perceive blacks as the pri-
mary potential source of violence and crime. 
For blacks, those entrusted with law enforcement and the firepower 
that gives them authority have always been servants of the white men in 
power who exploit blacks economically and demean them socially.253 
Slaves were forbidden to bear arms254 and a white police force of over-
seers and sheriffs' posses enforced the master's law.255 With the aboli-
tion of slavery, the use of organized, socially sanctioned violence 
against blacks increased, and the authority of the sheriff's office was 
often indistinguishable from that of the Ku Klux Klan.256 As recently 
as 1967, there were nearly a dozen mcyor American cities where blacks 
accounted for over 25 percent of the population that were patrolled by 
police forces with only a token minority representation.257 It is not sur-
prising that many black communities continue to view the police as an 
occupying army.258 
The fact that police officers are authority figures to white as well as 
black citizens is also significant in determining the cultural meaning of 
253. 
[T]here is no "American dilemma" because black people in this country form a col-
ony, and it is not in the interest of the colonial power to liberate them. Black people 
are legal citizens of the United States with, for the most part, the same legal rights as 
other citizens. Yet they stand as colonial subjects in relation to the white society. 
Thus institutional racism has another name: colonialism •.•. 
The black community perceives the "white power structure" in very concrete 
terms. The man in the ghetto sees his white landlord come only to collect exorbitant 
rents and fail to make necessary repairs, while both know that the white-dominated 
city building inspection department will wink at violations or impose only slight 
fines. The man in the ghetto sees the white policeman on the comer brutally man-
handle a black drunkard in a doonvay, and at the same time accept a pay-off from one 
of the agents of the white-controlled rackets .... 
He is not about to listen to intellectual discourses on the pluralistic and frag-
mented nature of political power. He is faced with a "white power structure" as 
monolithic as Europe's colonial offices have been to African and Asian colonies. 
S. CARMICHAEL & C. HAMILTON, BLACK POWER: THE POLITICS OF LIBERATION IN AMERICA 5-10 
(1967); see also F. FANON, THE WRETCHED OF THE EARTH 38 (1963) ("The colonial world is a 
world cut in two. The dividing line, the frontiers are shown by barracks and police stations. 
In the colonies it is the policeman and the soldier who are the official, instituted go-betweens, 
the spokesmen of the settler and his rule of oppression."); Delgado, "Rotten Social Back-
ground'·: Should the Criminal Law Recognize a Defense of Severe Environmental Deprivation?, 3 L. & 
INEQ.UALITY 9, 29-30 (1985). 
254. See A. HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 21, at 39, 40, 76, 117, 131-32, 173, 184. 
255. See L. BENNETT, supra note 21, at 91, 94-95;J. FRANKLIN, supra note 21, at 135-36, 
138-39. 
256. Cj H. ZINN, A PEOPLE'S HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 198-99 (1980) (Southern 
whites used power to organize the Ku Klux Klan and other terrorist groups). 
257. Table A: Nonwhite Personnel in Selected Police Departments, in REPORT OF THE NATIONAL 
ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 169 (1968). 
258. See note 253 supra. 
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excluding large numbers of blacks from the D.C. police force. To the 
extent that our culture attaches specific meaning to the assignment of 
racial groups to certain occupational and hierarchical roles, behavior 
that maintains those role assignments will have racial meaning. For ex-
ample, whites are accustomed to seeing blacks as servants performing 
menial tasks. Thus, whites are generally neither surprised nor 
threatened when they see black porters, maids, andjanitors. This is not 
simply a reflection of the fact that many blacks have performed these 
jobs. It is also indicative of a historical and culturally ingrained system 
of beliefs that leads us to think of blacks as suited to these jobs, to 
associate the jobs with blacks. 
By contrast, whites are not accustomed to seeing blacks in positions 
of authority or power. Black managers, black professors, and black 
doctors are confronted with reactions ranging from disbelief to resist-
ance to concern about their competence. The historical exclusion of 
blacks from these jobs has been rationalized by a belief in their unsuita-
bility for these roles. What is at issue here is not just occupational ste-
reotypes born out of habit. These stereotypes manifest a larger and 
more complex ideology that has legitimized the white-over-black au-
thority relationship. Stereotypes are cultural symbols. They constitute 
our contemporary interpretation of past and present meaningful 
behavior. 
The argument in defense of all-male police forces provides a useful 
analogue for understanding our less readily apparent attitudes about 
authority and race. In suits alleging discrimination against women in 
the selection of patrol officers, police department defendants have ar-
gued that women would not make good officers because the job re-
quires an individual who can command respect from the man on the 
street. Men, they have argued, would not take orders from women, 
and, therefore, women would be less effective patrol persons.259 In 
other words, the departments' discriminatory hiring practices have 
been defended as a necessary adaptation to the sexist beliefs and prac-
tices of the culture.26o 
Whites would be less likely to verbalize the same argument regard-
ing blacks, but the fact remains that many individuals in our culture 
continue to resist and resent taking orders from blacks.261 If the court 
were convinced that the absence or presence of substantial numbers of 
black police officers on the D.C. force would be interpreted as the 
maintenance or disestablishment of culturally instilled beliefs about the 
259. See C. MILTON, WOMEN IN POLICING 24-26 (1972). 
260. Note that similar arguments are made by law firms respecting their clients. Some 
firms have sought to justify their failure to hire minorities and women by arguing that they 
must be sensitive to the preferences of their clients in selecting new associates and evaluating 
firm members for partnership. 
261. See J. FARBER, THE STUDENT AS NIGGER (1970); E. GOFFMAN, ASYLUMS (1961); W. 
GRIER & P. COBBS, BLACK RAGE (1968); R. SENNETT, AUTHORITY (1982). 
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need to control blacks and the appropriate roles for blacks and whites 
in authority relationships, then the Civil Service Commission's decision 
to rely on "Test 21" would have racial meaning. 
There is another reason why a significant segment of the culture is 
likely to view the exclusionary impact of "Test 21" in racially stigma-
tizing terms. "Test 21" was primarily a test of verbal and written skills. 
The Civil Service Commission justified its use of the test by noting its 
desire to upgrade the communication skills of the city's police of-
ficers.262 Our society has increasingly sought to measure intelligence 
through the use of written tests, and we have come to believe that per-
formance on such tests accurately reflects the whole of our intelli-
gence.263 Thus, most people are likely to think of those who 
performed poorly on "Test 21" not simply as lacking in communication 
skills but as unintelligent. The average person is likely to see the city's 
use of the test as an admirable and reasonable attempt to insure that 
the city has smart police officers. If larger numbers of blacks than 
whites fail the test, this will be seen as proof that blacks are not smart 
enough for the job. 
But evidence of cultural meaning must include more than dispro-
portionate impact. Some whites also performed poorly on the test. 
Observers of the test's results would not necessarily conclude that, be-
cause blacks performed less well on this test, they are intellectually in-
ferior as a group. They might think instead that the blacks who took 
this test just happened to be a less intelligent group, that less well-edu-
cated people performed less well on the test and the blacks who took 
this test had not on the whole received as good an education as the 
whites, or that poor people are less intelligent and blacks had done less 
well because a higher percentage of them were poor. 
The cultural meaning test would require the plaintiffs to produce 
evidence that a substantial part of the population will interpret the dis-
proportionate results of "Test 21" not as the product of random selec-
tion or the differential educational background or socioeconomic status 
of the test takers but as testimony to the inherent intellectual abilities of 
the racial groups to which the test takers belong. In other words, the 
government's use of the test has racial meaning if our culture has 
taught us to believe that blacks that fail the test have done so because 
they are black. 
This is precisely how most Americans will interpret the events in 
Davis. Throughout American history, a cultural myth that describes 
blacks as an inherently inferior race has justified their economic and 
social SUbjugation. At first, the myth found verification in religious 
262. Davis, 426 U.S. at 246. 
263. See Delgado, Bradley, Burkenroad, Chavez, Doering, Lardiere, Reeves, Smith & 
Windhauser, Can Scimce Be Inopportune? Constitutional Validity ofGovernmmtal Restrictiolls on Race· 
IQ Research, 31 UCLA L. REV. 128 (1983) [hereinafter Race-IQ Research]. 
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doctrine.264 By the mid-nineteenth century, the dogma of biblical 
scripture and verse was supplemented by the pseudoscience of biolo-
gists and social scientists who found fodder for the myth in craniome-
try,265 eugenics, and cultural anthropology.266 With the introduction 
of the I.Q test in the early twentieth century, the psychometricians as-
sumed primary authorship of this Homeric tale of God and nature's 
differential distribution of intellectual talent among the races.267 They 
provided the theory and numbers to prove the veracity of the myth, and 
the people's bards-the press, popular literature, and the theater-
transformed the racism of pseudoscience into a folklore that shaped the 
nation's consciousness.268 
During the last fifty years, the scientific community has done much 
to debunk both the data and theory of pseudoscientific racism.269 The 
use of intelligence tests to prove intergroup differences declined in the 
1930s when more thorough analyses of their findings indicated that dis-
crepancies in education and environment explained the racial differen-
tiations in test scores. But following the Supreme Court's decision 
ordering an end to school segregation, there was a resurgence in the 
use of I.Q tests by educators and politicians who sought to avoid im-
plementing Brown.270 In 1969, Arthur Jensen's landmark article on 
race and I.Q in the Harvard Educational Review gave racial eugenics a 
new legitimacy. 271 While his ideas came under immediate attack from 
both the scientific and political communities,272 the serious attention 
given them by academicians and politicians is evidence that the myth of 
racial inferiority is not dead.273 
Even where notions of genetic inferiority have been rejected, more 
sophisticated theories of "cultural inferiority" have emerged to take 
their place. Their proponents attribute racial disparities in academic 
achievement and intellectual skills to an intellectually debilitating cul-
ture of poverty in which large numbers of blacks have grown Up.274 
264. One popular nineteenth century belief traced blacks' inferior social position to 
their imaginary descent from certain biblical ancestors. See, e.g., j. BLUM, PSEUDOSCIENCE AND 
MENTAL ABILITY 99 (1978); T. GOSSETr, RACE: THE HISTORY OF AN IDEA IN AMERICA 5,62-63 
(1963). 
265. See S. GOULD, THE MISMEASURE OF MAN 30-72 (1981). 
266. See j. BLUM, supra note 264, at 25-69. 
267. See id. at 99-103; see also S. GOULD, supra note 265, at 174-234. 
268. See R. KLUGER, supra note 204, at 84-86. 
269. See Race-IQ Research, supra note 263, at 139, 209-11; note 272 infra. 
270. See, e.g., Lemon v. Bossier Parish School Bd., 444 F.2d 1400 (5th Cir. 1971); United 
States v. Sunflower County School Dist., 430 F.2d 839 (5th Cir. 1970); Singleton v.jackson 
Mun. Separate School Dist., 419 F.2d 1211 (5th Cir. 1970) (en bane); Smuck v. Hobson, 408 
F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (en bane), aff'g Hobson v. Hansen, 44 F.R.D. 18 (D.D.C. 1968). 
271. jensen, How Much Can We BoostI.Q; and Scholastic Achievement, 39 HARv. EDUC. REV. 1 
(1969); see also A. JENSEN, BIAS IN MENTAL TESTING (1980). 
272. See S. GOULD, supra note 265, at 127,317-20; L. KAMIN, THE SCIENCE AND POLITICS 
OF IQ(l974); E. SHARP, THE I.Q, CULT (1972). 
273. See j. DREYFUSS & C. LAWRENCE, THE BAKKE CASE: THE POLmcs OF INEQ.UALITY 
134-35 (1979); see also Race-IQ Research, supra note 263, at 138-39,209-11. 
274. For discussion and critique of this view, see K. CLARK, supra note 238; E. LEACOCK, 
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But it has become increasingly popular to argue that this pathological 
culture is not the result of societal discrimination. Instead, the exist-
ence of the culture of poverty is attributed to some unspecified inade-
quacy in blacks themselves.275 Recent polls of racial attitudes indicate 
that "most whites do not believe that racial discrimination is the princi-
pal cause of black inequality."276 But if not discrimination, then what? 
For many whites, the explanation lies in the inherent inferiority of 
blacks. Few will express this belief openly. It is no longer consistent 
with American ideology to speak in terms of inherent racial traits. But 
the myth of racial inferiority remains embedded in the fabric of our 
culture. 
Plaintiffs trying Davis under the test proposed in this article would 
present evidence detailing both the history and the contemporary man-
ifestations of this myth. They would seek to convince the court that 
most people in our culture believe that the average white person is in-
herently smarter than the average black person and that whites will in-
terpret the racially selective impact of "Test 21" as a confirmation of 
that belief. If the culture gives the governmental action this kind of 
racial meaning, the action constitutes a direct racial stigmatization. 
Like the segregated beach and the Memphis wall, it conveys a message 
that has its origins in a pervasive and mutually reinforcing pattern of 
racially stigmatizing actions, and it adds one more stigmatizing action 
to that pattern. Presumably, the decisionmakers who chose to use 
"Test 21" were aware of that message and were influenced by it, 
whether consciously or unconsciously. 
Ely's process defect analysis helps explain why proof that govern-
mental action will be interpreted in racial terms should lead a court to 
closely scrutinize that action. In selecting "Test 21" to screen police 
applicants, the Civil Service Commission weighed a number of benefits 
and costs. The fact that the test helps select candidates with good com-
munication skills is, presumably, a benefit. Yet the test may also ex-
clude many of those who are best able to establish rapport with the 
residents of the communities in which they work and best able to in-
spire their trust and confidence. The test may save time and money by 
making it unnecessary to offer additional training in communication 
skills in the police academy. But it may also create costs by selecting 
those candidates who will most need sensitivity training and community 
relations workshops. Likewise, the less tangible benefits of maintaining 
a work force with which the predominantly white residents of Capitol 
Hill, visiting tourists, and upper level bureaucrats will be comfortable 
must be weighed against the costs of failing to create more employment 
THE CULTURE OF POVER1Y: A CRmQ.uE (1971); C. VALENTINE, CULTURE AND POVER1Y: CRI-
TIQ.UE AND COUNTER-PROPOSALS (1968); see also Baratz & Baratz, Early Childhood IlItenlell/ioll: The 
Social Science Base of Institutiollal Racism, 40 HARV. EDUC. REV. 29 (1970). 
275. See W. RYAN, BLAMING THE VICTIM (rev. ed. 1971). 
276. J. DREYFUSS & C. lAWRENCE, supra note 273, at 142-44. 
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opportunities for the city's predominantly nonwhite, low income 
residents. 
This is but a small sampling of the kind of political prioritizing that 
must take place when any decision is made. Much of this weighing of 
costs and benefits is implicit. Some considerations receive the lowest 
priority because they are never considered. The Court in Davis tells us 
that the government's purpose in adopting "Test 21" was to "modestly 
upgrade the communicative abilities of its employees. "277 We do not 
know whether this benefit was considered so important that it out-
weighed all of the costs listed above, or whether those costs were never 
even considered. An unconscious belief in the intellectual inferiority of 
blacks may have led the decisionmakers to put more stock in the test's 
ability to measure relevant skills than was justified. An inarticulate dis-
comfort when confronted by blacks in positions of authority may not 
have led a commissioner to intentionally exclude blacks from the force, 
but it may have caused him to respond to the test's potential for dis-
criminatory impact with relief rather than concern. His insensitivity to 
the importance the city's blacks would attach to more black faces on the 
beat might mean that this consideration was never even weighed in the 
balance. 
These are the very "racially selective sympath[ies] and indiffer-
ence[s]"278 that create misapprehensions of process defects. These 
sympathies overestimate the validity of generalizations that are self-flat-
tering-for example, that written tests accurately measure an important 
kind of intelligence. And they undervalue the benefits of alternatives-
for example, a test that measures judgment in real life situations or em-
pathy with community residents-that would enhance the fortunes of 
others. 
3. Government subsidies to the poor. 
Proving racial meaning under the cultural meaning test 'will be most 
difficult in cases like Dandridge v. Williams ,279 Jefferson v. Hackney,280 and 
Harris v. McCrae.281 Each of these cases challenged a governmental de-
cision to limit subsidies to the poor for such basic human needs as food, 
clothing, shelter, and medical services. None of them claimed inten-
tional racial discrimination. And in all three cases the Court, having 
found that the challenged statute concerned economics and social wel-
fare, upheld it under the rational relationship test. The Court's posi-
tion in each case was that neither a classification based upon differential 
wealth nor the fact that the classification burdened a basic need was a 
basis for applying strict scrutiny. 
277. Davis, 426 U.S. at 246. 
278. Brest, supra note 7, at 14. 
279. 397 U.S. 471 (1970). 
280. 406 U.S. 535 (1972). 
281. 448 U.S. 297 (1980). 
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If one adopts the Court's reasoning, these cases are prototypical ex-
amples of the kind of neutral tax and welfare laws that Justice White 
sought to secure from invalidation in Davis.282 In all three cases, the 
legislative decision not to allocate resources produced a racially dispa-
rate impact. Dandridge andJefferson concerned laws that imposed an up-
per limit on the amount a family could receive from Aid to Families 
with Dependent Children ("AFDC"), thus funding those recipients at a 
lower percentage of acknowledged need than recipients in such other 
welfare categories as the aged and disabled.283 McCrae involved the ex-
clusion of certain abortions from coverage under a federal medicaid 
act.284 Blacks and Mexican-Americans were disproportionately repre-
sented in each of the disfavored groups, but without proof of racial ani-
mus, the Court considered their disparate burden irrelevant to the 
statutes' constitutionality.285 
If these cases were decided under the cultural meaning test, the 
Court would ask whether most people would interpret the decisions to 
disfavor AFDC recipients and to not fund abortions as having some-
thing to do with race. Would they view the decisions in racial terms, 
like the decision to barricade the streets of Memphis or to close the 
pools of Jackson, Mississippi?286 Or would they view the decisions in 
racially neutral terms, like a decision not to fund the MX missile or to 
increase farm subsidies? 
In Dandridge and Jefferson, plaintiffs would have to establish that a 
significant segment of the population perceives a decision to limit the 
funds available to AFDC recipients as a racial statement. They might 
present data on how survey respondents describe a typical AFDC recip-
ient. Do most people think of all AFDC recipients as black, Puerto Ri-
can, or Mexican-American? Do these perceptions reflect statistical 
reality, or are they based on generalizations? Do the survey respon-
dents hold pejorative beliefs about AFDC recipients that coincide with 
prevalent racial stereotypes?287 Do they perceive the government's ra-
tionales-which include providing incentives for family planning, en-
couraging gainful employment, and avoiding discrimination between 
welfare families and families of the working poor288-in racial terms? 
Is there historical or current evidence from the social sciences that we 
282. Davis, 426 U.S. at 248 & n.14. 
283. Jefferson, 406 U.S. at 537, 547; Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 484-85 & n.17. 
284. McCrae, 448 U.S. at 326. 
285. See notes 283-284 supra. 
286. See City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100 (1981); Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 
217 (1971). 
287. I am not aware of any existing research exploring the question of whether people 
tend to think of AFDC recipients in racial terms. My intuitive sense is that there is a widely 
shared inaccurate perception that most AFDC recipients are black. For a discussion ofpejora-
tive attitudes toward AFDC recipients, see Rainwater, Stigma in Income Tested Programs, in IN-
COME TESTED TRANSFER PROGRAMS 19 (I. Garfinkel ed. 1982); see also B. LEYSER, A. BLONG &J. 
RIGGS, BEYOND TIlE MYTHS: THE FAMILIES HELPED BY TIlE AFDC PROGRAM (2d ed. 1985). 
288. Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 483-84. 
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believe nonwhites are more likely to burden society with unsupported 
children or more likely to avoid available employment in order to stay 
on the dole?289 
It would also be useful for the Court to examine contemporaneous 
policy discussions within the academic and political communities about 
the efficacy of welfare programs as well as media coverage of the debate 
over welfare legislation. Evidence that the disutility of increased wel-
fare was presented in racial terms would be considered not to prove 
that the legislature sought to demean or punish blacks but to show that 
many people will interpret the decision to limit AFDC funding as a 
demeaning racial statement. 290 
Plaintiffs in McCrae would face an even more difficult task: They 
would have to establish a relationship between the strength of public 
sentiment against abortion-the perception that government-funded 
abortions condone and encourage promiscuity and irresponsible sex-
and the belief that such behavior is more prevalent among certain racial 
groups than others.291 This argument will be especially difficult be-
cause of the deep feelings surrounding this issue that are unrelated to 
race. In other words, the presence of strong cultural meaning unre-
lated to race-in this case, meaning related to religious beliefs about 
the existence and sanctity of prenatal human life-will tend to weaken 
the argument that the culture will think of the action in racial terms. 
It has not been my purpose here to prove the cases that plaintiffs 
might have made in Arlington Heights, Davis, Dandridge,Jefferson, and Mc-
Crae. Instead, I have tried to show how the proof which the cultural 
meaning test requires would differ from that required under the Davis 
doctrine and to demonstrate how the cultural meaning test more di-
recdy addresses the relevant constitutional issues of stigma and process 
defect. 
E. Applying the Cultural Meaning Test 
One can anticipate several additional difficulties regarding the test's 
application. I think that none of them are insurmountable. And while 
their resolution is not within the scope of this article, I will discuss each 
289. See notes 274-275 supra. 
290. For example, plaintiffs might point to the widespread impact of Daniel P. Moyni-
han's much-publicized report on "The Negro Family." See D. MOYNIHAN, THE NEGRO FAMILY: 
THE CASE FOR NATIONAL AcnON (1965). This report connects the increase in the AFDC rolls 
to what Moynihan terms "the steady disintegration of the Negro family structure." /d. at 14. 
Moynihan argues that increasing welfare subsidies only fosters this disintegration; he con-
cludes that "the present tangle of pathology [in the black family] is capable of perpetuating 
itself without assistance from the white world." [d. at 47. 
291. See notes 274-275 supra; see also Payne, Ethnic Pilfeling ill Ammcall Society, S.F. Chroni-
cle,June 11, 1986, at 48, col. 5 (citing a study which found that while white women are five 
times as likely as black women to abort their first pregnancy, black women "have been taking a 
disproportionately bad rap for their sexual behavior"). 
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of them briefly in order to indicate the direction such resolution might 
take. 
1. When "bad" means "good": conflicting cultural meanings. 
An initial difficulty with applying the cultural meaning test arises 
from the fact that we are not a monolithic culture. There may be in-
stances in which governmental action is given different meanings by 
two subcultures within the larger culture. For example, the court might 
find that blacks see the decision to fund AFDC recipients at lower levels 
than other need-categories in racial terms while whites do not, or the 
court may find that people in northern urban areas give racial meaning 
to restrictions on federally funded abortions while people in southern 
rural areas do not.292 
The easiest solution to this problem is to acknowledge racial mean-
ing for constitutional purposes only when the evidence indicates that 
the racial understanding will be widely shared within the predominant 
culture.293 This solution is better than the Davis/Arlington Heights intent 
test in that, at a minimum, it will correctly identify unconscious intent 
in cases like Memphis v. Greene or even Arlington Heights. 294 
292. This problem most commonly arises when a victimized group chooses to segregate 
itself. Does the presence of a black dormitory or a predominantly black university stigmatize 
blacks if the segregated institution reflects blacks' choice of cultural solidarity, political con-
trol, or educational quality over racial integration? See D. BELL, supra note 21, at 411-15. 
293. I am not certain that this "easy solution" is entirely satisfactory. My thesis sees 
cultural meaning as a proxy for the unconscious motivation of the decisionmaker and, there-
fore, seems to require that the dominant group's interpretation be critical to any application 
of the test. But there may be occasions when the meaning of a governmental action within the 
subculture most immediately affected is the most probative evidence of that action's meaning 
in the dominant culture. A victimized group may be more sensitive to attitudes and values in 
the dominant culture than are individuals who have been fully integrated into that culture. 
For example, the anthropologist who observes another culture is likely to be more objective 
than if she were observing her own culture. De Toqueville's and Myrdal's examinations of 
American culture exemplifY this phenomenon. Likewise, the minority subculture may well see 
the dominant culture more clearly than the dominant culture sees itself. 
Brown provides precedent for this attention to the interpretation of subcultures. The 
Brown Court focused on the meaning that black children attached to laws requiring segregated 
schools. Brown is an easy case, in that the racial meaning of segregated schools was also read-
ily apparent to members of the dominant culture. But in harder cases, it may be useful to give 
special consideration to the subculture's interpretation. 
294. Several colleagues have raised concerns about applying the cultural meaning test in 
affirmative action cases. They wonder whether the test would allow conservative judges to 
find that programs designed to remedy past or ongoing racial discrimination have racial 
meaning and are, therefore, unconstitutional. This is a question that deserves more extensive 
discussion than it can be given here. A preliminary response is that most affirmative action 
cases arise in the context of "race conscious" remedies where the racial classification is appar-
ent on the face of the statute. See, e.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980); Regents of 
the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). In such cases, the intent to classify on the 
basis of race is evident and is admitted by the defendants. The issue to be resolved by the 
cultural meaning test is, therefore, moot. The question before the Court in these cases is not 
whether the racial classification exists but whether it can be justified. Of course, the question 
of the cultural meaning or stigmatizing nature of the admitted racial classification remains an 
important question, particularly for Justice Brennan and those who joined his opinion in 
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2. The blind interpreting for the blind: the problem of judicial bias. 
A second difficulty with the cultural meaning test rests in the inevita-
ble cultural biases of judges. Judges are not immune from our culture's 
racism, nor can they escape the psychological mechanisms that render 
us all, to some extent, unaware of our racist beliefs. 
We must recognize, however, that this difficulty inheres in alljudi-
cial interpretation.295 The advantage of the cultural meaning test is 
that it makes the issue of culturally induced bias explicit. The judge 
who is hearing evidence regarding how our history and culture have 
influenced our racial beliefs is more likely to be made aware of his own 
heretofore unrecognized biases. Judges continue to come primarily 
from elite white backgrounds.296 They undoubtedly share the values 
and perceptions of that subculture, which may well be insensitive or 
even antagonistic toward the values, needs, and experiences of blacks 
and other minorities. The benefit of the cultural meaning test is that it 
confronts judges with this conflict and forces them to take responsibil-
ity for their own biases and preconceptions. 
3. "Media meaning": the problem oj the selJfulfilling prophecy. 
A third difficulty in applying the cultural meaning test arises where 
the parties, particularly the plaintiffs, create a racial issue where there 
seemingly was none. How, for example, should a court treat a chal-
lenge to a state bar exam where the racial issues were not apparent 
until mass demonstrations or a media campaign attracted public atten-
tion to them? Again, the answer must be found in the sophistication of 
the interpretive process. Is the newfound awareness of the racial issue 
merely a result of media hype, or has the media campaign succeeded 
because it has touched a cultural nerve lying just below the surface of 
our consciousness? 
Each of these potential problems indicates that the cultural meaning 
test will not create an easily recognizable bright line for judges to fol-
Bakke. See id. at 324 (Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, jJ., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
There are also some potential challenges to facially neutral affirtnative action programs 
such as the "Harvard Plan" cited by Justice Powell in Bakke, id. at 316-17, where race may be a 
more or less apparent factor in the decisionmaking process. The problems of conflicting cul-
tural meanings (do whites, but not blacks, perceive the program as stigmatizing?) and judicial 
bias, see notes 292 supra, 295-296 infra and accompanying texts, make these cases problematic, 
but the fact that the purposes are apparently remedial will not change the nature of the 
problems ofinterprelation. See notes 196-201 supra and accompanying text (discussing gen-
der discrimination cases). 
295. See notes 205, 208 supra. 
296. 
Of 253 of Mr. Reagan's nominees to the Federal bench in his first five years, only 
four were black, 11 Hispanic, one Asian, and 22 women. Almost all were affluent, 
with the majority each having a net worth of more than $400,000. More than a fifth 
of the first-tertn appointees are millionaires. 
Broff & Aron,judgeships Made Easy, N.Y. Times, Apr. 18, 1986, at A35, col. 1. 
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low. The test's advantage lies not so much in its ease of application as 
in its ability to spotlight the source of injury in cases of racial discrimi-
nation: the unconscious racism that continues to pervade our culture 
and influence our decisionmaking. 
IV. THE COURT'S COMPETENCE: A SEARCH FOR NEUTRAL PRINCIPLES 
The fourth skepticism concerning my thesis, to which this article al-
luded earlier, concerns the appropriate role for the courts in our consti-
tutional system. It asks whether the judiciary, by applying the cultural 
meaning test, will be overstepping its rightful place in the constitu-
tional framework and usurping the powers of those branches that rep-
resent the will of the people more directly. 
This argument proceeds roughly as follows: When a majority of the 
people expresses its will through the actions of the legislative and exec-
utive branches, the judiciary should not interfere with those actions by 
requiring a heightened level of justification from the governmental ac-
tor unless those actions violate the Constitution's substantive or proce-
dural principles.297 Only occasionally, however, will a constitutional 
principle be clearly stated and clearly violated.298 More often, the text 
of the Constitution articulates its values in broad terms such as "due 
process" and "equal protection" that are subject to a wide range of 
interpretations. Most Supreme Court jurisprudence consists of an ef-
fort to give some substantive content to these broad textual 
provisions.299 
These efforts, however, are sensitive to the charge that, unless an 
interpretation is grounded in some "neutral principle" that rests on 
analysis and reasoning transcending the immediate result, it will 
amount to no more than a court imposing its own idiosyncratic values 
on the political majority.soo The objection to the cultural meaning test 
297. See Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 fuRV. L. REV. 1, 25 
(1959). 
298. See, e.g., United States v.Johnson, 383 U.S. 169 (1966) (holding that Art. I, § 6 of 
the Constitution, which provides that "for any Speech or Debate in either House, [members 
of Congress] shall not be questioned in any other Place," barred the prosecution ofa former 
member of the House of Representatives where his conviction required proof that the legisla-
tive act of making a speech before Congress was the result of bribery). 
299. Unfortunately, this substantive content remains unarticulated. Karst and Horowitz 
have criticized the Court for focusing on the standard of review in due process and equal 
protection cases, thereby avoiding an explicit articulation of the substantive values that are 
implicit in their decisions to apply certain standards: "If its decisions are to be seen as princi-
pled, the Court must explain its principles as elaborations of substantive values in the Consti-
tution. What is needed, then, is not further refinement of judicial methodology, but clear 
statement of the substantive meaning of equal protection." Karst & Horowitz, supra note 14, 
at 24. 
300. See Wechsler, supra note 297, at 34. The Court has been particularly sensitive to the 
charge that, by giving substance to the due process and equal protection clauses, it has re-
vived the worst features of the Lochner era. For a catalogue of the numerous scholars who 
have voiced this criticism, see Wright, Professor Bicke~ the Scholarly Tradition, and the Supreme 
Court, 84 fuRV. L. REV. 769. 770 (1971). 
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is that to require heightened judicial scrutiny of actions found to have 
racially stigmatizing meaning entails a judicially imposed prioritization 
of the elimination of racial stigma over such other, popularly selected 
societal goods as quiet streets, neighborhood schools, and better edu-
cated police officers. In the absence of intentional racial discrimina-
tion-which clearly violates the antidiscrimination principle301-there 
is arguably no principled basis for requiring the majority to abandon its 
choice in favor of a choice that the court seeks to impose. 
But there is such a principle: the principle of due process. Part II of 
this article reviewed Dean Ely's treatment of racial antagonism and the 
resulting misapprehension of costs, benefits, and overlapping interests 
as a process defect that violates the constitutional requirement that 
government treat individuals fairly. I argued that such a race-based 
process defect is no less injurious or reprehensible when it originates in 
the unconscious.302 The fact that governmental action has racial mean-
ing within the culture is evidence that the decisionmaking process lead-
ing to that action was infected with the process defect Ely describes. 
A second, more direct response to the argument that nonpurposeful 
racial stigmatization violates no neutral constitutional principle chal-
lenges the critic to articulate the premise upon which the argument for 
judicial restraint is based. What is the neutral principle that the equal 
protection clause embodies? And why should that principle encompass 
intentional racial stigmatization but not those cases identified by the 
cultural meaning test? 
Some advocates of judicial restraint have ascribed to the equal pro-
tection clause the principle of rationality of means.303 They view this 
principle as neutral because, in its pure form, it only requires that the 
legislature achieve a certain level of efficiency in pursuing its goals; it 
does not question the goals themselves. The judicial role is to check 
whether legislative classifications have exceeded permissible levels of 
overinclusiveness or underinclusiveness.304 But it is also the court's 
role to articulate those permissible levels. Furthermore, the degree of 
overinclusiveness and underinclusiveness that the court will tolerate 
depends on the subject matter of the legislation.305 If the court finds 
that the legislation in question involves a racial classification, it will re-
301. See Brest, supra note 7, at 15; see also notes 307-309 infra and accompanying text. 
302. See notes 126·140 supra and accompanying text. 
303. See, e.g, Gunther, supra note 112, at 20-24 ("The [means-oriented] model of modest 
interventionism would have the courts do more than they have done for the last generation to 
assure rationality of means, without unduly impinging on legislative prerogatives regarding 
ends."); if. Freeman, supra note 3, at 1058 (criticizing the "means-oriented" approach which 
"regards the [equal protection] clause as nothing more than a judicial check on legislative 
mistakes. . .. In its pure form, the principle is perfectly abstract, concerned only with ques-
tions of neatness; inasmuch as it serves to check technique rather than goal, it is utterly value-
neutral."). 
304. See Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 112, at 344-53 (discussing the principle of 
"reasonable classification"). 
305. Freeman has noted that "[s]ince any legislative generalization is likely to fall if sub-
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quire a substantially closer fit between means and goals than it would 
require from legislation concerning other matters, and it will almost 
invariably invalidate the legislation.306 
This judicial choice to require a closer fit in cases involving racial 
classifications introduces yet another principle, one that disfavors race-
dependent conduct.307 But it is more difficult to describe this antidis-
crimination principle as neutral, because it involves a substantive value 
choice that favors nonrace-dependent political choices over those that 
are race-dependent. Some scholars have argued that even without a 
clear textual or historical justification, the antidiscrimination principle 
gains legitimacy as a neutral principle from the fact that it rests on 
shared values.30S Moreover, to the extent that existing constitutional 
doctrine-particularly the Davis intent requirement-embraces the an-
tidiscrimination principle as a neutral and, therefore, appropriate basis 
upon which to overrule a conflicting majoritarian value choice, it inter-
prets that principle as only forbidding governmental decisions that self-
consciously aim to disadvantage a minority group selectively.3og 
But why should purposeful racial discrimination violate the antidis-
crimination principle when unintentional racial stigmatization does 
not? Why is it appropriate for courts to impose upon the political 
branch a value choice that disfavors intentional racial stigmatization but 
not to impose a value choice that disfavors the stigmatization resulting 
from unconsciously held cultural beliefs and attitudes concerning race? 
One answer might be that the neutral principle of judicial economy 
distinguishes the value choice disfavoring intentional racial discrimina-
tion from that disfavoring all racially stigmatizing governmental con-
duct; requiring extraordinary justification for all racially stigmatizing 
practices would simply involve the courts in too many cases. But this 
response is little more than a recapitulation of the parade of horribles 
Justice White set forth in Davis.310 I noted earlier that a test that looks 
jected to strict scrutiny, the choice between [minimal and strict scrutiny] takes on a highly 
substantive content. " Freeman, supra note 3, at 1059; see also Karst & Horowitz, supra note 14. 
306. 
In sum, because of the significant risk that racial classifications established for osten-
sibly benign purposes can be misused, causing effects not unlike those created by 
invidious classifications, it is inappropriate to inquire only whether there is any con-
ceivable basis that might sustain such a classification. Instead, to justifY such a classi-
fication an important and articulated purpose for its use must be shown. In addition, 
any statute must be stricken that stigmatizes any group or singles out those least well 
represented in the political process to bear the brunt of a benign program. Thus, 
our review under the Fourteenth Amendment should be strict-not 'strict in theory 
and fatal in fact,' because it is stigma that causes fatality-but strict and searching 
nonetheless. 
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 361-62 (1978); see Gunther, supra note 
112, at 8. 
307. See Brest, supra note 7, at 1-2; Freeman, supra note 3, at 1061. 
308. Brest, supra note 7, at 5; see notes 312-316 infra and accompanying text. 
309. Brest, supra note 7, at 26-39. 
310. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 248 & n.14 (1976). 
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to racially stigmatizing meaning rather than to discriminatory effect 'will 
substantially shorten the length of that parade.311 Furthermore, to give 
judicial economy priority over the recognition of constitutional injury 
seems wrong. It is to make a value choice that is no different from the 
decision to deny that injury recognition altogether. 
Paul Brest provides a more plausible reason for holding judicial ac-
tivism appropriate in intentional discrimination cases but not in unin-
tentional ones. He argues that the antidiscrimination principle gains its 
legitimacy from the fact that it rests on "fundamental moral values that 
are widely shared in our society."312 If unintentional racial stigmatiza-
tion does not violate the antidiscrimination principle, it can only be be-
cause, in contrast to intentional racial discrimination, most of us believe 
that the continuing presence of historical racial stigma does not violate 
fundamental moral principles. 
Alan Freeman has described the approach that seeks to find neutral 
constitutional principles in shared values as a "new formalism" which 
disguises the fact that legal doctrine actually arises from "a continuing 
dialectic of struggle, characterized by value clashes that . . . share no 
agreed-upon reference point."313 The value clashes to which Freeman 
refers are those between, on the one hand, values that are defined from 
the vantage point of the perpetrators who are responsible for or benefit 
from discriminatory conditions and, on the other hand, values that are 
defined from the perspective of the victims who are burdened by the 
conditions we have come to associate with racial discrimination.314 
Freeman's criticism of the shared values approach is that it fosters a 
false view of the world by acting as if the values it identifies are ones in 
which we all have an equal stake when, in fact, they are defined from the 
perspective of the perpetrators.315 One might better call these values 
"dominant values." 
Of course, there is a sense in which the victims of discrimination 
share in the ideals of equality and racial justice, but the enterprise be-
ing considered here is that which gives meaning and substance to those 
ideals. And when one finds that intentional racial discrimination is 
morally reprehensible but that unconscious racial stigmatization is not, 
one has made a value choice that defines the "neutral" principle of an-
tidiscrimination in terms that adopt one world view and reject another. 
The shared values approach, however, describes this choice as if no 
choice had been made, as if the dominant values were universal 
values.316 
311. See notes 171,225-228 supra and accompanying texts. 
312. Brest, supra note 7, at 5. 
313. Freeman, School Desegregation Law: Promise, Contradiction, Rationalization, in SHADES OF 
BROWN: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 71, 72 (D. Bell ed. 1980). 
314. Id. at 74. 
315. [d. at 74-75. 
316. [d. at 74. 
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This criticism, that law and legal discourse serve a hegemonic func-
tion by legitimizing oppressive power relationships through false or 
misleading ideologies, is a central theme of legal academia's new 
left.317 In its most extreme form, the criticism characterizes any funda-
mental legal principle or shared value as an inevitably oppressive tool 
in the hands of those in power. A less extreme version only criticizes 
those approaches that claim the existence of some preexisting natural 
order or that seek to disguise the existence of conflicting world views 
by describing the dominant view as if it serves all persons equally well. 
This less extreme critique might advance an approach between one 
that defines neutral principles by discovering sufficiently widely shared 
values and calling them "neutral" or "fundamental" to promote their 
popUlarity, and one that says there are no such things as shared values. 
This intermediate approach would acknowledge the existence and le-
gitimacy of conflicting perspectives or world views while simultaneously 
promoting the full exposition and articulation of those perspectives. It 
would do so by denying anyone view of established status and by en-
couraging face to face confrontation among conflicting views. The 
courts would continue to interpret constitutional values and principles, 
but instead of purporting to discover one true meaning in the text, it 
would be understood that there are many possible interpretations, that 
judges participate in the creation of meaning as well as in its discovery, 
and that our understanding of meaning may change.3IS 
This is the approach described in Part IIJ.319 Like the social scien-
tist, the judge must recognize "that the values expressed in the laws are 
not culture-free and that our own best interpretation of them is rooted 
in culture."320 John Denvir, in advocating a similar hermeneutical ap-
proach to constitutional interpretation, notes that this approach avoids 
the critiques of formalism and objectivism advanced against the positiv-
ist approach as well as the critique of nihilism against those on the left 
who, in seeking to demystify constitutional law, often seem to reject the 
validity of all judicial review.321 Denvir sees the chief benefit of this 
317. Several critical commentators have described the process by which law has been 
made a vehicle for the transmission of ideological imagery that helps to preserve and legiti-
mize. See note 30 supra and accompanying text; see also Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Re-
trenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law (on file with 
author); Freeman, supra note 313; Kelman, Trashing, 36 STAN. L. REV. 293, 321-29 (1984); 
Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33 STAN. L. REV. 591 (1981). 
318. See Denvir,Justice Brennan, Justice Rehnquist, and Free Speech, 80 Nw. V.L. REV. 285 
(1986). 
319. See notes 188-190 supra and accompanying text. 
320. Chevigny, Why the Continental Disputes are Important: A Comment on Hoy and Garet, 58 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 199, 207-08 (1985). 
321. Denvir writes that the hermeneutical approach: 
avoids the critique of formalism by adopting a "looser and more contestable ration-
ality" as its method and accommodates the critique of objectivism by acknowledging 
that there is no "necessary" order to social life and by integrating into legal dis-
course "the explicit controversy over the right and feasible structure of society." 
The social order is no longer a pre-existing given but a social creation of which law is 
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approach to be its ability to make the normative element in law explicit: 
"Hermeneutics can help us develop a constitutional theory that is ra-
tionally persuasive without pretension to formalistic precision, and 
which openly admits that law is a part of politics."322 
In short, it would not be a bad thing for judges to base constitu-
tional decisions on their own sense of what values best reflect our cul-
tural tradition, so long as the conflicting perspectives competing to 
define those values are made explicit. The search to define those values 
could then serve a clarifying, rather than a mystifying, role. It should 
be equally clear that the role of judges as interpreters differs from that 
of ordinary folks only by virtue of their responsibility to articulate their 
latest understanding of what we share. Thus, the normative debate 
would always continue. 
The argument for this approach is particularly strong where issues 
of racial discrimination are concerned. While the positivist approach 
disguises value conflicts and legitimizes the status quo, to reject alljudi-
cial review would default to the product of the legislative process where 
the will of the majority legitimizes the results and where normative con-
cerns are more easily dismissed as beside the point. Blacks and other 
historically stigmatized and excluded groups have no small stake in the 
promotion of an explicitly normative debate. While their version of 
shared values or fundamental principles-the victim's perspective-
may not hold sway at the moment, the courts can become a legitimate 
forum for the persuasive articulation of that version. And once the de-
bate is made explicit, the hegemonic function of the law is diminished. 
This is not to say that the courts should become the exclusive or even 
the primary forum for normative debate, but rather that, by making the 
debate over fundamental principles explicitly political, one expands the 
arena for that debate. 
If the jurisprudential task is to give sense to broad propositions of 
law-deriving that sense from an ongoing judicial interpretation of cul-
turally created moral norms-then application of the proposed cultural 
meaning test is clearly within the courts' competence. The interpreta-
tion of the meaning of allegedly racially stigmatizing governmental ac-
tion is but one step in a larger interpretive process that asks whether a 
fundamental moral principle has been violated. I have argued that it is 
appropriate for the courts to decide that the best interpretation of the 
constitutional principle of equality disfavors not just purposely discrim-
inatory conduct but all conduct with racially stigmatizing meaning. 
an important constituent; the judge no longer studies the text to discover meaning 
but participates in the invention of meaning. Nor is there only one possible meaning 
as the result ofajudicial reading; hermeneutics admits to the existence ofa multiplic-
ity of possible interpretations. 
Denvir. supra note 318. at 290 (quoting Unger. The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARv. L. 
REV. 561, 578, 582 (1981». 
322. /d. at 292. 
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Thus, deciding whether particular governmental conduct does or does 
not bear that meaning is a necessary and appropriate part of the courts' 
task. 
CONCLUSION 
Ultimately, the greatest stumbling block to any proposal to modify 
the intent requirement will not be its lack of jurisprudential efficacy but 
the perception among those who give substance to our jurisprudence 
that it will operate against their self-interest. Derrick Bell has noted 
that the interests of blacks in achieving racial equality have been accom-
modated only when they have converged with the interests of powerful 
whites: The legal establishment has not responded to civil rights claims 
that threaten the superior societal status of upper and middle class 
whites.323 Alan Freeman has argued persuasively for the more radical 
proposition that antidiscrimination law has affirmatively advanced ra-
cism by promoting an ideology that justifies the continued economic 
subjugation of blacks. 324 The intent requirement is a centerpiece in an 
ideology of equal opportunity that legitimizes the continued existence 
of racially and economically discriminatory conditions and rationalizes 
the superordinate status of privileged whites.325 
The workings of the unconscious make this dissonance between ef-
forts to achieve full civil rights for blacks and the self-interest of those 
who are most able to effect change even more difficult to overcome. 
The ideology of which Freeman speaks is more than a consciously 
wielded hegemonic tool of domination.326 It is also an unconscious de-
fense mechanism against the guilt and anxiety of those who hold power 
and privilege through means and with motives that they cannot ac-
knowledge.327 Racism continues to be aided and abetted by self-con-
scious bigots and well-meaning liberals alike. 
I do not anticipate that either the Supreme Court or the academic 
establishment will rush to embrace and incorporate the approach this 
article proposes. It has not been my purpose to advance an analysis 
that is attractive for its ease of application or for its failure to challenge 
accepted and comfortable ways of thinking about equal protection and 
race. Rather, it is my hope that the preliminary thoughts expressed in 
the preceding pages will stimulate others to think about racism in a new 
way and will provoke a discussion of how equal protection doctrine can 
best incorporate this understanding of racism. 
This article has argued that judicial exploration of the cultural 
meaning of governmental actions with racially discriminatory impact is 
323. Bell, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. 
REV. 518, 523-24 (1980); see also D. BELL, supra note 21, at 435-44. 
324. See Freeman, supra note 3. 
325. See Lawrence, supra note 7, at 839-50; see also Freeman, supra note 3, at 1052-57. 
326. See notes 34-35 supra and accompanying text. 
327. See notes 36-38 supra and accompanying text. 
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the best way to discover the unconscious racism of governmental ac-
tors. This exploration will be beset by the complexities and inadequa-
cies of social interpretation and buffeted by the head winds of political 
resistance. Perhaps I am overly optimistic in believing that in the pro-
cess of this difficult exploration we may discover and understand a col-
lective self-interest that overshadows the multitude of parochial self-
interests the unconscious seeks to disguise and shield.328 But of one 
thing I am certain. A difficult and painful exploration beats death at the 
hands of the disease. 
328. Bill if. Bell. The SlIprellle COllrl, 198-1 Terlll-Foreword: The Cit/if Righls Chrollirles. 99 
HARV. L. REV. 4. 56-68 (1985) (raising serious doubts about whcther even a national crisis can 
ovcrcome American racism). 
